BRYAN COLLEGE LIBRARY
940.3 H551r MAINCIRC
Hill, David Jayne/The rebuilding of Euro
3 7211 00032 4954

WITHDRAWN

BRYAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

H. A. IRONSIDE
MEMORIAL LIBRARY

THE REBUILDING OF EUROPE

Other Books by David Jayne Hill

A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe.

Vol. I—The Struggle for Universal Empire. *With 5 Colored Maps, Chronological Tables, List of Treaties and Index. Pp. XXIII-481. $5.00.*

Vol. II—The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty. *With 4 Colored Maps, Tables, etc. Pp. XXIV-688. $5.00.*

Vol. III—The Diplomacy of the Age of Absolutism. *With 5 Colored Maps, Tables, etc. Pp. XXVI-706. $6.00.*

World Organization, as Affected by the Nature of the Modern State.

Pp. IX-214. $1.50.

Translated also into French and German.

The People's Government.

Pp. X-288. $1.25 net.

Americanism—What It Is.

Pp. XV-283. $1.25 net.

THE REBUILDING OF EUROPE

A SURVEY OF FORCES AND CONDITIONS

BY
DAVID JAYNE HILL

BRYAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1917

Copyright, 1917, by
THE CENTURY CO.

Published October, 1917

940.3
H

PREFACE

The world is passing through the birth pangs of a new historic period. Europe, because it controls the destiny of the greater part of the earth, was the first to feel these convulsions, but the transformation taking place is essentially a world movement.

The struggle now going on has been variously called "a trade war," a contest regarding "the destiny of the smaller states," "a war for democracy," and "a war for principles." No one of these expressions quite definitely conveys the real significance of the Great War, because no one of them adequately presents to the mind its relation to the changes in political thought that have occurred during the last few decades.

What has been most completely overlooked is the fact that the Great War was not in its beginning, and is not now, so much a struggle between different forms of government as it is a question regarding the purpose and spirit of all govern-

ments. The Austrian-Serbian-Russian conflict, promoted by Germany with ulterior designs, did not in any way involve forms of government. All the participants were monarchies, and no issue for or against democracy was presented. When France and England, acting as their interests and obligations required, were afterward forced into the fray, even then there was no question of the internal organization of governments, but it was seen to be a war for the salvation of Europe as a society of independent states. It has never become a war for democracy in the sense that there is an attempt by any nation to universalize a democratic form of government. That would be a doubtful venture, inconsistent with the true nature of democracy.

The truth is that the Great War is a revolution against the alleged rights of arbitrary force, rendered necessary by the failure to reach the goal of a secure international organization by an evolutionary process.

Modern nations have succeeded, with a few exceptions, in developing constitutional governments in which ideas of justice have been embodied in systems of law, but they have also in-

herited international traditions that were originated in an age when military force was the basis of state existence. These traditions are embodied in the following four propositions:

(1) The essence of a state is "sovereignty," defined as "supreme power."

(2) A sovereign state has the right to declare war upon any other sovereign state for any reason that seems to it sufficient.

(3) An act of conquest by the exercise of superior military force entitles the conqueror to the possession of the conquered territory.

(4) The population goes with the land and becomes subject to the will of the conqueror.

Such monstrous doctrines as these would never have been invented by any jurist or statesman under the constitutional régime, yet they are the postulates that underlie all the great European settlements, and have never been repudiated by any European international congress, not even by the conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. On the contrary, these propositions were tacitly assumed as composing the unwritten constitution of the European system of sovereign states, and virtually all the powers there repre-

sented had at some time, and in some cases habitually, put them into practice.

What gave to the Hague conferences their great interest for the public generally was the hope that there would come out of them some new enunciation of international law that would put an end to war and conquest. This was the strong human current that circled about the conferences, but among the delegates it was well understood that a direct blow aimed at any one of the four propositions just stated would mean the dissolution of the conference, and, if insisted upon, would involve a general war, for there were still national ambitions which war alone could satisfy.

Peace, it was hoped, might be prolonged by reliance upon the old see-saw, "The balance of power," fortified by increased armaments. Supplementary to this was the pious wish, which in the clearer heads never amounted to faith, that no nation would be guilty of dishonor by an abuse of power, although its freedom to do so was undisputed. Gently and timidly, restrictions upon the too barbarous exercise of the state's traditionally recognized prerogatives were proposed in the form of conventions about war on

land and war on the sea, with provisions for an honorable settlement of differences if any nation desired to be just; but even these measures were long contested, and the more important of them persistently opposed by certain powers.

The process of peaceful evolution toward international justice having failed to throw off the thraldom imposed upon Europe by the tradition of absolute sovereignty and its corollaries, it required no special clairvoyance to see that a revolution would some day come born of blood and fire. It has come. Great powers, appealing to the infamous dogma of unlimited right on the part of the state, have placed their wicked "necessities" above all law, above all morality, above all hunanity, and have plunged Europe and a great part of the world into a yawning gulf of death and devastation. To resist that arrogance and to end not only this war, but any war based on these assumptions, is the aim of the resisting powers. It is the making of a new world; but there can be no new world until there is a new Europe in which the dogma that the state is a licensed brigand is smitten dead.

It is the purpose of this volume to show that

this dogma, and not any particular form of mere state organization, is the real enemy that must be destroyed. The incidents of the Great War are well known and require no mention here. It is to the deeper problems that attention should be directed. Nor is it the intention of this little book to add to the array of purely subjective solutions of these problems,—for the true solution can be found only by the united efforts of a preponderance of the great powers,—but rather to point out what are the really fundamental issues involved in the Great War, and to take account of the forces and conditions which may aid or hinder the solution.

Six of the chapters contained in this volume were, in substance, first presented to the public last March in the form of lectures on the Schouler Foundation at the Johns Hopkins University; five of them were in part printed in the CENTURY MAGAZINE for May, June, July, September, and October of the present year.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	Europe's Heritage of Evil	3
II	International Ideals	38
III	Economic Imperialism	68
IV	The Vision of a Commonwealth	104
V	The Transfiguration of the German Empire	136
VI	International Organization	172
VII	The Constructive Power of Democracy	208
VIII	America's Interest in the New Europe	236
	Index	283

THE REBUILDING OF EUROPE

THE REBUILDING OF EUROPE

CHAPTER I

EUROPE'S HERITAGE OF EVIL

IN the retrospect of future historians the year 1914 may have a place not less important than the year 1453, which has been accepted as marking the dividing line between medieval and modern history. The fall of Constantinople and the establishment of the Ottoman Turks in Europe revealed the insufficiency of the bond that had held Christendom together. In like manner the present European War reveals the inadequacy of purely national conceptions for the complete organization of mankind; for as Christendom failed to unite the whole world by faith, so civilization has failed to maintain itself by a mere balance of forces.

The great tragedy of history has been the con-

flict between the universal humanism that Rome endeavored to establish, first by law and afterward by faith, and the tribalism of the primitive European races. In the fifteenth century tribalism triumphed. The moral unity of Europe, which Rome had vainly tried to secure, wholly disappeared. Both the empire and the papacy, in which great minds had placed implicit faith, proved unable, in the face of racial conflicts, either to rule the world or to preserve the coherence of Christendom. All that had given grandeur to Rome seemed to have ended in failure when the Greek Empire, the last bulwark of Roman imperialism, already long and bitterly alienated from the Roman Curia, paid the penalty of separatism, and fell before the Ottoman assault. With it the splendid postulates of the Roman imperial idea—the essential unity of mankind, the supremacy of law based upon reason and divine command, the moral solidarity of all who accepted the formulæ of faith, and the effective organization of peace as a condition of human happiness—suffered a fatal catastrophe. In place of the *Pax Romana, Faustrecht,* the right of the mailed fist, widely prevailed within the

confines of Christendom. Slowly dying during a thousand years, the traditions of the ancient world, which the Greek Empire had endeavored to preserve long after they had been undermined by tribalism in the West, were now definitively abandoned. The future was seen to belong to the separate nations, which alone possessed a strong sense of unity. The disparity of races, the spirit of local independence, the conflict between the spiritual and the temporal forms of obedience, combined to render possible the development of powerful national monarchies, and dynastic ambition was eager to make use of them for its own designs.

There was, indeed, an element of progress in this reassertion of the tribal spirit. The rule of Rome had destroyed the balance between law and liberty. The vital energies of the primitive races could not be thus suppressed. All the rich variety of human diversity pressed the issue of nationality. In order to give to law its complete authority, it was necessary that it should be developed out of experience rather than imposed as a dominant system. Each nation must arrive

at the common destination by pursuing its own path and under its own leadership. The formation of nation-states was, therefore, morally inevitable. It was essential to the full development of human capacities.

The defect in this process of evolution lay in the cruelty and ignorance of the barbarians out of whom these nation-states were formed. The procedure was of necessity a work of force rather than a work of intelligence. On the part of the masses of the population the instinct of avoiding danger gave to any efficient protector a vast authority. On the part of natural leaders the instinct of domination became the shaping power of the state. As a result, the nation-state, slowly evolving from the feudal state, became a dynastic creation, in which race, the natural basis of nationality, played a subordinate rôle. Conquest seldom proceeded along strictly ethnic lines. The task was primarily geographic expansion and strategic security. Once conquered, the different races gradually coalesced with their conquerors to form distinct national units in which blood yielded supremacy to national traditions, and the most opposite diversities of race, language, and

religious belief were thus finally compounded into the substance of the nation-states.

This, in brief outline, is the history of virtually all the nation-states of Europe. Not one of them can boast of absolute purity of race. Not one of them can establish a claim that its statehood is founded on ethnic homogeneity. Not one of them can profess that it is the product of conscious and voluntary adhesion to a predetermined theory of what the state should be and who should compose its substance.

And yet these nation-states are in no sense mere accidents. However self-conscious some of them may have become, they were originally the creations of dynastic purpose. The unity they now possess was derived from the sense of community that gradually grew up within them through close contact, common interests, common sufferings, and common triumphs; but they are all in reality creations of force, exercised chiefly by dominant dynasties, under which in the process of time they have arrived at a condition of national self-consciousness.

This in some cases has been so intense that the will of the nation has become more powerful

than the will of the dynasty; which, therefore, has either been cast off entirely, as in France, which exists by the will of the nation, or permitted to survive as a mere symbol of national unity, as in England. Only in a few instances does the dynasty continue to exercise uncontrolled authority.

In the process of forming the nation-state two instruments have been employed for the realization of dynastic purposes: war and marriage. The territorial expansion obtained by the warlike energies of a conquering tribe under the leadership of a hereditary chief has been vastly aided by the union of such tribes through the intermarriage of their chiefs and the process of inheritance, thus producing a tribe within a tribe. Great empires have been formed by wedlock, as mighty rivers are produced by the confluence of many tributaries into one stream. The house of Hapsburg, for example, owes more to Venus than to Mars. In the course of its history whole peoples, remote from one another in space and still more remote in character, have been transferred to these foreign rulers by marriage contracts. The nation-state has seldom been ruled

by the pure blood of even its own dominant tribe. From the very beginning royalty has been in some degree an international institution, a kind of super-tribe destined to rule by the mere fact of heredity, composed of kinsmen at the altar, but of foemen in the field. And, notwithstanding the devotion of monarchs to nationalism, there has always existed a secret solidarity of royal interests.

Success in war always creates its own moral standards, and dynasticism has not failed to do so. Republican Rome took pride in never waging an unjust war, and had its college of fetials to determine whether an action even against barbarians was just. This practice arose from a supreme devotion to the idea of law and a reverence for human reason as the source of law. The founders and expanders of the nation-states have entertained no such scruples. They have adopted the motto that the will of the prince is law, and that there is no binding law above it. The nation-states, and, in truth, most others, have assented to this dictum, the only question in debate being who really possesses the authority of the prince.

The "sovereign," whoever he is, being without a law to govern him, an abstract attribute of the ruler, called "sovereignty," has been generally accepted as the substance of the state, and its powers have been conceived to be, as those of the absolute prince confessedly were, altogether unlimited. Since Christendom was abolished, and tribalism has prevailed, unlimited power has been recognized, and is still recognized, in the public law of Europe as the foundation of the state.

The most fundamental of all the questions arising out of the Great War is, Can this open repudiation of humanism in the interest of tribalism be permitted to endure? Is it true that a sovereign—*any* sovereign, even the totality of the so-called "sovereign people," of any tribe or nation-state—has a right to claim unlimited authority or even authority limited only by the extent of its power? Is there not a law for the conduct of states, written or unwritten, which all sovereigns should be required to obey, wholly irrespective of the theoretical source or actual extent of their power? But if there is such a law, recognized or unrecognized, the conception of

sovereignty as in its nature absolute and unlimited is evidently false.

It was Machiavelli who expounded the tribal theory of the state and the methods of securing its advancement; and in this he was inventing no system of his own, but merely stating in definite terms the principles which successful monarchs were already putting into practice. "'The Prince,'" declares Villari, "had a more direct action on real life than any other book in the world, and a larger share in emancipating Europe from the Middle Ages"; but it would be more exact to say that Machiavelli's work, written in 1513 and published in 1532, was the perfect expression of an emancipation from moral restraits far advanced. The Christian idealism of the Middle Ages had already largely disappeared. The old grounds of obligation had been swept away. Men looked for their safety to the nation-state rather than to the solidarity of Christendom; and the state, as Machiavelli's gospel proclaimed it, consisted in absolute and irresponsible control exercised by one man who should embody its unity, strength, and authority.

Thus began the modern world. The conceptions of the Roman law, especially those of *imperium* and *majestas,* were partly revived in support of the royal dynasties in their struggle with the residues of feudalism, which resulted in the development of the national monarchies; but they had lost their note of universality. Even Christianity ceased to be ecumenical. There remained, indeed, a traditional fellowship and fraternity of kings, but it was virtually little more than a code of formal etiquette.

With the dissolution of the feudal organization through the predominance of the national monarchies disappeared that sense of mutual obligation which under the feudal régime had constituted an ethical bond between the different orders of society. What remained was the bare conception of irresponsible "sovereignty" considered as a divinely implanted, absolute, unlimited, and indivisible prerogative of personal rule, the charter right of each dynasty to seek its own aggrandizement, preponderance, and glory regardless of all considerations of race, reason, or religion.

With such a conception of the nature of the

state, the whole system of international relations was necessarily based upon military force. Casually formed customs, usually the expression of superior power or of temporary expediency, supplemented by transitory alliances and enforced conventions, supplied the only rules that obtained general recognition. Until Grotius appealed to the ethical motive, and the treaties of Westphalia recognized the *de jure* rights of territorial sovereignty, there was among the nations of Europe no semblance of public law which jurisprudence could recognize. But even after the Peace of Westphalia, the so-called "law of nations" was little more than a theoretical acceptance of the equal rights of autonomous sovereigns, each of whom could work his will without interference within his own domains, leaving to each ruler the unquestioned prerogative of dictating the religion of his own subjects, of taxing them, of arming them, and of making war with their united forces for his own advantage. In effect, the Peace of Westphalia, by rendering even petty princes absolute, permitted more than three hundred and sixty independent rulers to carry on the sanguinary game of war for plunder or conquest without re-

straint; and all, left free to destroy one another, were thus entitled by public law, through war and diplomacy, to seek their fortunes with complete autonomy. Sovereignty, defined as "supreme power," regardless of any principle of right, was conceived to be the very essence of the state. It remained simply to discover by a trial of strength which power was in reality supreme.

When in its moral awakening the Europe of the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century began to think for itself,—or at least to follow the thinking of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, and others who sought to find the true foundations of the state in the conception of law based upon the nature and necessities of men rather than upon dynastic power,—Europe found itself under the incubus of this sinister inheritance.

Without a convulsion that would shake the whole of Europe to its foundations it was powerless to throw it off. Rousseau had in "Le contrat social" merely transferred the idea of sovereignty from the monarch to the people, but he had not essentially altered its character. It was still "supreme power," still the "absolute, indivisible, and

perpetual" thing which Jean Bodin, seeking to give royalty a philosophical pedestal to stand upon, had said it was. Inherent in the people, it was still the personification of all the public powers; and the *volonté générale,* the general will, regardless of its moral qualities, was for each separate state, the unlimited, irresponsible source of law.

When the French Revolution judged and condemned the king, it was done as a sovereign act; and was, therefore, not permitted to be questioned by the rest of Europe. Was not sovereignty absolute? Then it belonged to France. Was it not indivisible? Then it belonged to the French people. Was it not perpetual? Who, then, could ever take it away or in any way dispute it? And thus the *volonté générale* of one nation, in the person of the residuary legatee of the Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte, made emperor by the assent of the *volonté générale* of France, assumed to act as sovereign over the whole of Europe.

There was no moment during the whole revolutionary period when sovereignty ceased to be conceived as unlimited supreme power. And thus the malign inheritance of Europe, in so far as it

was affected by the Revolution, was essentially unchanged. Monarchy and democracy alike, without distinction, have regarded sovereignty merely as "supreme power," "absolute, indivisible, and perpetual." Thus it stands in the text-books of the law of nations. So many sovereignties, so many absolute autocrats. Being the sole sources of law, how can they be subject to law? And there being no law which they may not set aside, since it is but their creature, sovereign nations are irresponsible, and have no more to do with moral right or wrong than so many untamed animals seeking to satisfy their appetites. The right to make war at will and to be answerable to no one, that was, and is, the accepted doctrine of the old Europe, which merely asserted itself anew in 1914.

This does not signify that it has never been contested. More than three hundred years ago, a now almost forgotten German jurist, though recognizing sovereignty as the foundation of the state, defined it as an attribute, not of the people as an unorganized mass, but of a "body politic" organized for the promotion of justice, deriving its authority as a moral entity from the rights of its

constituent members, whom it is organized to protect against wrong, and therefore from its very nature charged with mutual rights and obligations.

Here is pictured no irresponsible autocrat clothed with supreme power, but a responsible member of a family of nations, fitted to unite with other members of that family in extending over the whole earth the reign of law and justice, but above all required by the very nature and purpose of its authority to conduct itself in all its relations, outward and inward, in accordance with the principles from which its authority as an organ of justice is derived. Founded upon the inherent rights of persons, and existing for their protection, a state in this sense can arrogate to itself no sovereign right of conquest, whatever its power may be. The only authority it can claim is authority to defend the rights and interests thus committed to its guardianship. As a moral entity—for this is what Althusius taught that a state founded on rights necessarily is—it should be ready to apply the principles of justice and equity in its dealings with other states.

Thus understood, sovereignty is not merely a

name for supreme power. It is a right inherent in a free and independent group of human beings, possessing a definite territory, to form and maintain a government. Reduced to its simplest terms, it is the right of a free community to provide for self-regulation and to maintain its own existence. Whatever is necessary to that, and nothing more, is included in this conception of the state. Only in an incidental manner does it belong to the category of might. In its essential attributes it belongs to the category of right.

Were this conception of sovereignty generally accepted, justice and equity would not halt at the frontiers of a nation. The right of war would exist, but it would not be, as the old Europe has universally recognized it to be, a virtually unlimited right. There could be, under this conception, no permanently subject peoples. There could be no world dominion. There could be no legal schemes of conquest. War would mean the punishment of offenders against the law of nations, the suppression of anarchy and brigandage, resistance to the ambitions of the conqueror.

But the old Europe has never been disposed to give to sovereignty that meaning. It could not

do so while it was identified with royal legitimacy. That principle triumphed a hundred years ago in the Congress of Vienna, which strove to neutralize the effects of the French Revolution by ending forever the sovereignty of the people. Then followed the effort to establish Europe firmly upon the principles of absolutism by crushing out all constitutional aspirations. To accomplish this the unlimited right of war was necessary, for without armed intervention by the allied sovereigns the task was hopeless. Legitimacy was to be everywhere sustained by the Holy Alliance. Wherever a state adopted a constitution, the powers bound themselves at the Conference of Troppau, "if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Alliance."

The unlimited right of a sovereign state to make war for any reason it considered sufficient, or for no reason at all, thus seemed to be written into the public law of Europe. That was the unhallowed inheritance which even modern democracies have received from absolutism. Being entitled to all the prerogatives of sovereignty as historically understood, they have not repudiated the heritage. And thus they have tacitly ac-

cepted the evil principle of the despotisms against whose iniquities they have rebelled, and whose pernicious influence they were struggling to throw off.

In the call for the first Hague Conference "all questions concerning the political relation of states" were expressly excluded from the deliberations of the conference. In that, and in the second conference, rules were laid down regarding the manner of conducting war, both on land and sea, but nowhere were any regulations prescribed regarding the causes or conditions of declaring war that were to be considered legal or illegal, just or unjust. As one of the best accredited authorities on the subject says:

> Theoretically, international law ought to determine the causes for which war can be justly undertaken; in other words, it ought to mark out as plainly as municipal law what constitutes a wrong for which a remedy may be sought at law. It might also not unreasonably go on to discourage the commission of wrongs by investing a state seeking redress with special rights, and by subjecting a wrong-doer to special disabilities.

In fact, however, it does nothing of the kind. The reason is not merely that there would be no

means except war for enforcing such rules,—for that would apply equally to the regulations concerning the manner of conducting war that have been explicitly laid down,—but because no sovereign state has thus far been disposed to pledge itself not to engage in war except under conditions that in harmony with its own principles of legislation would be considered just. "Hence both parties in every war are regarded as being in an identical position, and consequently possessed of equal rights." Aggressor and victim alike, triumphant force and helpless innocence, these are held in equal honor by the public law of Europe as it now stands, and this law has been tacitly accepted by the whole "family of nations"!

It is upon this unlimited right to resort to war, and the consequent general irresponsibility in international relations, that the idea of neutrality reposes; and yet neutrality is historically an immense step forward in the path of progress when compared with the Machiavellian doctrine that no opportunity for gain from the quarrels of others should be allowed to pass unutilized. In every war, Machiavelli declares, one side or the other

will win, and the wise course for an intelligent prince to pursue is to join at the proper moment with the probable winner, whoever he may be, in order to be able to share with him the spoils of victory.

The modern doctrine of neutrality, which considers war an unavoidable evil, is no doubt an amelioration of Machiavelli's policy; for, instead of widening the range of hostilities, its aims to narrow the area of conflict. It is inspired, however, chiefly by the consideration that it is a national right to avoid the infection of a pestilence which the neutral power has not caused and for which it is not responsible. So long as the belligerents, who are conceded the privilege of mutual destruction,—but often with very unequal facilities for engaging in the conflict,—do not too deeply offend the neutral states by their activities, powerful nations feel justified in standing silent and inactive while weak states are crushed into subjection and the laws of war, which they themselves have helped to make, are violated.

From a moral point of view this appears to be a strange proceeding for a member of the "family of nations"; but it must be considered that this

is a family of a very peculiar kind. In it each member, by tacit consent, is believed to fulfil his whole duty by looking solely after his own interests. Governments, it is held, are in each case responsible to their own constituents for the preservation of the safety and well-being of the nations intrusted to their care, and consequently they cannot act with the freedom of a private person. They may not, therefore, incontinently plunge their people into war without reasons that involve the national interests. Until there is a better organization of international relations, this condition must continue; but it is rapidly coming to be perceived that, if civilization is not to suffer shipwreck, a better organization must be sought.

Before attempting to find a basis for a revision of international relations it is necessary to consider how intimately national interests have become associated with war. For a long time, all the interests of the state were regarded as personal to the sovereign. All its territory was his territory. All the property of the nation was his property, of which the people enjoyed only the usufruct. Even their persons and their lives were at his dis-

posal, for they were in all respects his subjects.

To-day the identity of the sovereign is changed, but not the conception of sovereignty. The people, standing in the place of the sovereign, claim the right of succession to all the royal prerogatives. The national interests have become their interests. The appeal to their patriotism rests upon this ground. The power, gain, and glory of the state are represented to be theirs. Even where it has not entirely superseded the monarch, the nation believes itself to have entered into partnership with him, and the people consider themselves shareholders in the vast enterprise of expanding dominion. Even the beggar in the street is assured that it is *his* country; and, though ragged and hungry, he takes a pride in his proprietorship.

It is the nation's territory, industry, commerce, and prestige that are now in question. And government, even the government of the people, is no longer merely protective. It enters into every kind of business, owns railways, steamship lines, manufactories, everything involving the life and prosperity of the people. The state has become an economic as well as a political organ of society.

The modern national state is, in fact, a stupendous and autonomous business corporation, the most portentous and the most lawless business trust, and views other nations as its business rivals, aiming at the control of foreign markets, and of the sources of raw materials wherever they may exist. And these vast economic entities, with their vision fixed on gain, combine not only the command of armies and navies, but absolute freedom from effective legal restriction with immensely concentrated wealth such as the kings and emperors of the past never had at their disposal.

Whatever, from an internal and social point of view, the merits or defects of the extension of state functions may be, they are bristling with possibilities of war, and when modern nations engage in it, it is no longer a dynastic adventure, but a people's war. Commanding the strength and resources of a whole people, and acting for its alleged interests, these great economic corporations are fitted for aggression as well as for defense. If they were subject to the usual laws of business that prevail in the regulation of private enterprises within their own borders, in accordance

with the principles they apply at home, these mailed and armed knights of trade might not be dangerous to the world's peace; but they are not subject to these, or to any such regulations. They recognize no law which they feel themselves obliged to obey. Inheriting by tradition from the past alleged rights of absolute sovereignty, and equipped with military forces on land and sea, they are engaged in a struggle for supremacy which they would not for a moment permit within their own legal jurisdiction. Were a similar organization formed within their own borders, adopting as its principles of action the privileges usually claimed by sovereign states, it would be promptly and ruthlessly suppressed as a dangerous outlaw.

This statement implies no reflection upon any particular nation, for all to some extent share in the responsibility. What is here condemned as essentially unsocial and anarchic is the indifference of these great national economic corporations to one another's rights, and above all the absence in the law of nations, as it is now understood, of accepted regulations such as the lesser constituent elements of the business world are required by

these very states to obey under their authority. If civilization is to endure, and nations are not to become privileged highway robbers on the land and pirates on the sea, this part of the law of nations must be revised not only as respects the rules of war, but the rules of peace. In so far as a nation is a business entity it should be governed by the same principles in its dealings with other nations as civilized states apply to business within their own limits. But international law has not yet reached the stage of formal development where this is recognized. It is still under the influence of the inherited customs of the past, the baneful fiction of an absolute sovereign prerogative. Just as Christendom found that it was not in fact so organized as to restrain the Hun and the Tartar, so we are discovering that civilization is not yet so organized as to restrain their modern counterparts. So long as international business is controlled by an absolute conception of sovereignty, and sustained by military force, there will be no prospect of either peace or equity in the world.

Let us not here undertake to speak of remedies. We must first comprehend the nature of the situ-

ation. Nor should we here attempt to apportion blame, which would only end in bitter controversy. If the evil is in the system, then it is the system that must be changed; and it will be time enough to inquire how to change it and to pronounce specific condemnations when we know what change is required and who may refuse to participate in making it.

Undoubtedly, we have all of us been cherishing illusions. Let us, then, endeavor to dissipate them.

We have assumed that in some mystical manner progress is inherent in society; that it is necessarily produced by natural laws; that the mere duration of time carries us forward to perfection; and that the older civilization becomes, the wiser it tends to be. Trusting to these baseless generalities, we have in a spirit of optimism forgotten that we have duties to perform, renunciations to make, and sacrifices to offer if the state, or the so-called society of states, is to prosper. We have formed the habit of looking to the state as a source of personal benefit to ourselves, which calls for only the smallest contributions from us in return. We have made exorbitant demands upon it, as undis-

ciplined children extort privileges from over-indulgent parents. We have wanted better wages, better prices for our commodities, better opportunities of trade, better conditions of life, free schools, free books, playgrounds, public provisions of every kind at the expense of the state. In order to obtain these benefits, some have desired that the state should become omnipotent, seeking to augment its resources by despoiling the rich within its limits, and exploiting or even conquering foreign territory wrested from other peoples, in the belief that this would render it easier to satisfy their desires, and through its increased power become the dispenser of happiness. When for this purpose armies and navies have been required, it has usually been easy to obtain them; for may not the state, being a sovereign power, do all things necessary for its own interest? Thus men's consciences have been put to rest.

This tendency of modern states and the sudden revelation of its meaning have been forcibly expressed by a recent writer. He says:

> A few more teasings, a few more pistols held at the head of the state, and a scheme, we were expecting, would be forthcoming that would render us all happy in spite

of ourselves. Then, one fine morning in August, there came a rude awakening. We got a message from the state couched in language we had never heard before. "I require you," said the state, "to place your property and your lives at my service. Now, and for some time to come, I give nothing, but ask for everything. Arm yourselves for my defense. Give me your sons, and be willing that they should die for me. Repay what you owe me. *My* turn has come."

And thus Europe is now called upon to pay the debt its theory of the state and of the state's omnipotence has incurred.

We have also trusted blindly to the process of social evolution. Industrialism and commerce, we have assumed, will automatically bring in a new era. Before it militarism, the grim relic of the old régime, will disappear. There will soon be no need for fighting. When all the world turns to industry, as it will, wars will cease. Commerce will cement the nations together and create a perfect solidarity of interests.

But the present war has thrown a new light on the relations of militarism and industry. Forty years ago, Herbert Spencer, with his strong proclivity for brilliant generalization, fancied that the age of militarism was soon to be super-

seded by an age of universal industrialism. He described their opposite polities, the conditions of the gradual transition, and the final triumph of industry over militancy. But what do we now behold? Has militarism diminished with the growth of industry? Has not militarism simply become more titanic and even more demoniacal by the aid of industry, until war has become the most stupendous problem of modern mechanics? And now we see militarism wholly absorbing industry, claiming all its resources, and even organizing and commanding it.

And why is this? It is because the state as a business corporation is employing military force as its advance agent, struggling for the control of markets and resources, and the command of new peoples who are to feed and move the awful enginery of war.

And this condition of the world is the logical outcome of the inherited theory of the state. This fact is now beginning to be recognized, and recently there has been much said regarding imperialism and democracy, often assuming that the mere internal *form* of government alone is responsible for the international situation in Eu-

rope. But it is not the form, it is the spirit, and above all the postulates, of government that are at fault. If democracies may act according to their "good pleasure," if the mere power of majorities is to rule without restraint, if there are no sacred and controlling principles of action, in what respect is a multiple sovereign superior to a single autocrat? If the private greed of a people is sustained by the pretensions of absolutism in international affairs, democracy itself becomes imperial, without accepting the principles of equity which have sometimes given dignity to the imperial idea. In truth, the most dangerous conceivable enemy to peace and justice would be a group of competitive democracies delirious with unsatisfied desires.

If there is to be a new Europe, it must not look for new forms of organization so much as for a new spirit of action. It must renounce altogether its evil heritage. It must reconstruct its theory of the state as an absolute autonomous entity. If the state continues to be a business corporation, as it probably in some sense will, then it must abandon the conception of sovereignty as an un-

limited right to act in any way it pleases under the cover of national interests and necessity. It must consent to be governed by ethical principles. It must not demand something for nothing, it must not make its power the measure of its action, it must not put its interests above its obligations. It may plead them, it may argue them, and it may use its business advantages justly to enforce them; but it may not threaten the life or appropriate the property of its neighbors or insist upon controlling them on its own terms. It may display its wares, proclaim their excellence, fix its own prices, buy and sell where it finds its advantage; but it must not bring to bear a machine-gun as a means of persuasion upon its rival across the street.

No one can make a thorough and impartial inquiry into the causes of the present European conflict without perceiving that their roots run deep into the soil of trade rivalry. Beneath the apparent political antagonisms are the economic aspirations that have produced them. In the light of history we can no longer accept the doctrine that industrialism and commercialism by a process of natural evolution automatically supersede militarism. On the contrary, we perceive

that militarism on the one hand, and industry and commerce on the other, are at present partners rather than antagonists. They are different, but closely associated, activities of modern business policy as conducted by the state. If there were no economic questions involved, the conflict of nationalities could soon be ended. Modern wars are primarily trade wars. Modern armies and navies are not maintained for the purpose of ruthlessly taking human life or of covering rulers with glory. They are, on the one hand, armed guardians of economic advantages already possessed; and, on the other, agents of intended future depredation, gradually organized for purposes alleged to be innocent, and at what is esteemed the auspicious moment despatched upon their mission of aggression. International misunderstandings are readily adjusted where there is the will to adjust them; but against the deliberately formed policies of national business expansion—the reaching out for new territory, increased population, war indemnities, coaling stations, trade monopolies, control of markets, supplies of raw materials, and advantageous treaty privileges, to be procured under the

shadow of the sword—there is no defense except the power to thwart or obstruct them by armed resistance.

We must, then, definitely abandon the thesis that industrialism is essentially pacific, and will eventually automatically disband armies and navies, and thus put an end to war. On the contrary, modern armies and navies are the result of trade rivalry, and are justified to those who support them on the ground that there are national interests to be defended or advantages to be attained by their existence. So long as even one powerful nation retains its heritage of evil and insists that it may employ its armies or navies aggressively as an agency in its national business; so long, to put the matter directly, as the nations must buy and sell, travel and exchange, negotiate and deliver, with bayonets at their breasts, so long defensive armies and navies will be necessary, and the battle for civilization must go on.

Strange as it may seem, it is not the poorest nations, but the richest, where discontent is deepest and most widespread. It is the great powers that are most inclined to war, and are most fully prepared to make it; and the reason is not diffi-

cult to discern. The greater the state the greater its ambitions. It is easily within the grasp of five or six great powers to secure the permanent peace of the world, and, far more important than that, to secure the observance of just laws by all nations. But, unfortunately, governments, feeling themselves charged with the duty of augmenting the resources of the state, find no limit to their ambitions except in their powers of action, which are great. The whole future of the world has in the past virtually lain in the hands of a small number of men, not all of them monarchs, but the recognized leaders of public thought and action in their respective nations.

This order of things is less likely to continue in the future than at any time in the past. Far less frequently than in former times will individual men shape the destinies of nations. And this is an important augury for the new Europe. Only a few men, and they but temporarily, framed and executed the policies that have, for example, created the British Empire. As the historian Seeley said, "We have conquered half the world in a fit of absence of mind." And in all this process the British people have never been con-

sulted, just as the German people were not consulted in the two critical moments of their existence; for in the past peoples were seldom consulted regarding their national destiny. But that time has passed forever. Henceforth no intelligent people will ever be led into the shambles of aggressive warfare without being consulted. That is the first mark of difference that will distinguish the new Europe from the old. And, being consulted, will they not ask with increasing earnestness why nations cannot conduct their business as the state generally requires private business to be conducted, in accordance with reasonable rules of procedure? Many negative answers will, no doubt, be given, for governments are tenacious of their traditions; but, nevertheless, there will be a general revision of the inherited conception of the nature of the state, and a perception that world dominion is not the prerogative of any single nation. States, like individual men, must admit their responsibilities to one another, accept the obligation to obey just and equal laws and take their respective places in the society of states in a spirit of loyalty to civilization as a human and not an exclusively national ideal.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL IDEALS

DESPITE the heritage of evil in the absolute conception of the state and the relations between states; and, in truth, on account of it, men of reflective habits of mind have devoted much attention to the ideas that ought to prevail when, either in the course of progressive evolution or at some critical period of readjustment, the opportunity for amelioration may exist.

At the very outset, however, we are confronted with the question how far the thought and purpose of man can affect such vast issues as social, political, and international organization. Judging by the past, we should, perhaps, be led to conclude, that mere theories have, on the whole, very little to do with the mass action of mankind, and that such action is almost universally determined by the blind instincts and irresistible appetites of men rather than by reason; with the result that it is useless to expect that anything of national

magnitude will happen simply because it is reasonable or that international affairs will ever cease to be more unreasonable than they have been in the past.

If there were no important change in the human units that make up the populations of what we call the civilized nations of the world, this hopeless prospect might be justified; but, in fact, a very radical change has occurred in these later decades. It consists in an ever-widening common consciousness regarding national and international affairs. Great world events, portrayed in terms generally intelligible, and brought home to the masses of mankind everywhere, have awakened the intelligence of the common man as it has never been aroused before. In the humblest walks of life men are now discussing difficult questions of jurisprudence and diplomacy in the light of stirring events of world-wide significance, and they are asking one another, What is to become of civilization? Will it perish in the conflict of national interests, or will it enter upon a new era of development?

Justice, peace, coöperation, culture—all these seem to be imperiled by national antagonisms;

and yet they are aspirations that all nations profess to entertain. How may they be realized? By intelligent organization, no doubt; but it must be of a more thorough kind and on a larger scale than has ever before been attempted. It cannot stop at the national boundaries; it must include the whole family of man.

The tragic character of the present world-conflict has greatly stimulated thought in this direction, but no plan of international organization has thus far been proposed which has met with universal approbation as likely to prove practicable. It is an easy task to outline an international constitution based upon the principle of federation; but all schemes of this kind when applied to practice are confronted with the pretensions of absolute sovereignty, and the indisposition on the part of governments to surrender any of their prerogatives.

Before great progress can be made in harmonizing national interests it will be necessary to reconsider, in the light of modern knowledge and experience, the true nature of the state and by a readjustment of opinions upon that subject pre-

pare the way for a change in the attitude of nations toward one another.

The present is an unusually auspicious moment for reflection upon this subject, for in the sanguinary drama now enacting we are witnessing the demonstration of the utter impracticability of realizing any of the international ideals if nations, having become economic corporations, are to contend with one another for the possession of the earth upon the assumption that superior military power is the source of rightful authority.

In so far as that idea is merely a historical inheritance coming down to us through the tacit acceptance of unfounded pretentions, we may very readily abandon it, as marking a stage of social evolution which we have left behind us. But the case is not so simple. We find that all international ideals are openly challenged and repudiated. We are told that, rightly conceived, the state is incapable of compromise; that it is a vehicle of authority and of culture that cannot, even if it would, refuse to execute its lofty mission of expansion and transformation.

The truth is that the battle between opposing theories of the state has not yet been fought out.

What is the purpose of the state? Does it exist for the individual person, as democracy contends, or does the individual person exist for the state, as absolutism asserts?

Deep down beneath all the superficial drift of international questions is a problem in philosophy, upon the solution of which there is so far no agreement.

As a question of philosophy the opposing types of conception regarding the nature of the state may, perhaps, be best illustrated by comparing the theories of Kant and Hegel, the one emphasizing the freedom, development, and responsibility of the individual man, the other the power, the glory, and the divinity of the state.

At the end of the eighteenth century the idea of dynastic proprietorship was already vanishing, and the revolutionary movement, begun in America and continued in France and throughout Europe, demanded a reconstruction of the idea of government. At that time the pretensions of royal absolutism were challenged as they had never been before. Then followed an effort at reconstruction, and, more than any other of that generation, Immanuel Kant attempted to show that

there is a truly philosophic foundation for the existence and authority of the state as a human institution.

It is Kant who best marks the transition to distinctively modern thought not only on account of his having lived in the period of revolt against absolutism, but on account of the place he assigns to man as a factor in history. To his mind the great necessity for man is freedom. All the forces of humanity are locked up in the possibilities of the individual being. The great problem of society is to release the free activity of human faculties. No one had ever so fully realized the inherent dignity of personality, or urged so strongly its extrication from the mechanism of dynamic process. The authority that should govern persons, he thinks, should not come from without, either from nature on the one hand or the state on the other. The reason for the state is to be found in the nature of man as a self-determining, rational, and responsible being. Personality is not a means to an end; it is an end in itself, and therefore should not be treated as a mere thing, or made the creature, the instrument, or the victim of arbitrary force.

Government, then, should be organized for human service and not merely for the service of a class to the detriment of another class, but for society as a whole. It must, no doubt, be territorial, and therefore circumscribed in its jurisdiction; that is, there may be, and in fact must be, many governments but they should all have the same purpose. The state in its proper sense is a structure of moral order, the creation of self-conscious reason, aiming at the establishment of an external support of human rights by an outward defense of an inner principle. It is to be sharply distinguished from society, which is a natural product. In its perfection it would be the external harmony of the activities resulting from personal freedom. The business of government, therefore, is to remove the hindrances to freedom, which are found in the love of power, of glory, and of gain, motives engendered by the natural instincts which man shares with the lower animals.

Such a conception appears at first sight to be not only cosmopolitan, but anti-national. Cosmopolitan it undoubtedly is, and therein lies the possibility of ultimately realizing the idea of a

true society of states; but it is not anti-national in the sense of denying the value and necessity of the nation. What it aims at is the extension of local order until it becomes general order, by so conceiving the state as to allow of its coöperation with other states, either by federation, or some other correlation, with the purpose of insuring universal harmony and, therefore, permanent peace.

But in order to reach this result Kant holds that the "holy and inviolable law of reason" must triumph over the impulses of the natural man not by military force, for freedom and violence are incompatible, but by the gradual evolution of mankind through the action of rational intelligence.

Here is presented, no doubt, a conception of the state which renders internationalism possible without the destruction of nationalism. But we find in Kant only the beginning of a complete political philosophy, for the reason that he had not seen his own idea of personality as the basis of political organization anywhere effectively worked out. He had not witnessed the development of constitutionalism, which was only just asserting

itself, and his conservative spirit in matters practical was rudely shocked by the enormities of the French Revolution. Yet he perceived that it was upon the inherent rights of the individual man that the state must be founded if despotism was to be abolished. But he also apprehended the deeper truth that rights without duties cannot be sustained, and he therefore laid the principal stress upon duty—duty to the state and duty to all mankind.

While Kant's conception of the state was making practical progress in other parts of the world, his Fatherland was harried by invasion, subjugated by conquest, and in the Napoleonic domination a new imperialism was holding all continental Europe in its grasp. Fichte applied the Kantian conception of duty to the fallen fortunes of the Prussian state, for a strong doctrine of nationalism became the necessity of the hour. But it was Hegel, after liberation had been achieved, who, determined to philosophize everything, made the state the shrine of the indwelling absolute, and for the cosmopolitanism of Kant was substituted a theory of the state which proclaimed it an organ of divine action, identified

patriotism with religion, and rendered the separate nationalities as unapproachable for purposes of rational understanding as the planets in the solar system.

For Hegel the individual man is nothing in himself. Whatever he has of moral personality is the creation of the state. It is true that in his writings Hegel begins with personal consciousness as a fundamental fact in the manner of Kant; but in his fully developed philosophy, after he has assumed the task of glorifying the state, he makes of it the only vehicle through which the absolute reaches humanity, and he always means by it the Prussian state,—the Prussian state, as Haym has said, as it existed in 1821, when Hegel wrote.

But this was a necessary corollary of Hegel's conception of history as immanent reason. It was idle, he thought, to speak of what a state "ought to be." Being an incarnation of the absolute, it is what it is, and cannot be other than it is. It is right in all it does. All changes are divine acts. The individual man must take his orders from the state, because it alone has the right to command. The state being an embodiment of

the absolute, it is foolish to try to make constitutions, as if we had any right of choice. Parliaments are only mediating bodies, which should take their directions from the permanent ruler in order to enlighten the masses as to how they are to execute these orders. The state is an organism in which every constituent part is subject to the will of the whole. But as this unity is not found in society as a whole, it must be sought in the will of a dominant person, the monarch, through whom the absolute speaks. And thus the philosopher sinks at last into the sycophant, crowning his system with the dogma of divine right, and ending with the adulation of a notoriously weak and reactionary king.

Evidently, if all states are like this,—and this is intended as a theory of the state in the abstract,—there can be no restraint upon the purpose of the monarch. He is absolute, and all states are absolute. There being no law but their own will, there can be no such thing as international law; and, as the state's omnipotence includes the unlimited right of making war at the will of the sovereign, there cannot be a permanent peace. Such a condition is an "empty dream." It is

through war that the absolute carries forward the work of history.

Almost with unanimity, after being for a time under the spell of Hegel's speculations, some decades ago philosophers abandoned absolutism, and raised the cry, "Back to Kant!" In the philosophy of the state, however, Hegel still exerts an influence. The picture of it as a self-subsisting and dominant power serves well the designs of imperial ambition. Religion, war, and further domination all seem to be reconciled by the assertion that the individual man exists for the state, and that the state is not founded on the rights of the individual man.

Hence there is to-day a contest between these opposing conceptions—a contest upon the decision of which the future of international relations throughout the world will depend. If, as Kant's theory assumes, law is the formulation of justice and equity, resulting from a consensus of social needs interpreted in the light of reason, of which the state is an expression, then there is law for states as well as for individual men. If, on the contrary, law is a sovereign decree emanating from a dominant will regardless of limitations,

there can be no law for states until such a superior will is established over them.

Both ideas have been worked out in the development of modern states. Some have followed the absolutist theory even in their internal organization; and in these authority without restriction emanates from a superior, an individual ruler or a governing class. In others authority proceeds from the constituents of the state under definite forms of limitation, in which checks upon the pretensions of absolute sovereignty are embodied in the very structure of government. None but states of the latter kind are truly constitutional. They are by their very nature creations of law. They recognize the fact that whatever rightful authority there is in the world is derived from claims to justice antecedent to all legislation and inherent in personality. When all the resources of sophistry have been exhausted in trying to derive rights from power,—that is, to prove that might is right,—we shall be obliged to go back to Kant and admit that human personality as such is a source of claims to justice and equity, or we must confess that right and wrong are

merely imaginary distinctions, and jurisprudence a system of purely mechanical ideas.

It has been said that all men may have "interests," but no one has any "rights" until government has accorded them by an act of legislation. In some technical sense this may be true, but in a broad human sense it is not true. If it were true, it would be absurd to fight for another man's rights. But all the progress the world has ever made, all that distinguishes civilization from barbarism, springs from someone's sense of duty, which means simply the recognition of another man's right, and this is as real when it is denied as when it is conceded.

Certainly these inherent rights do not belong to human beings in an isolated and non-social state, for men never existed in a non-social state. All men are members of a series and members of a group, and it is in these relations that they recognize their claims to justice and to equity, which remain the same whether they are granted or not.

Thus the idea of law is a part of the mental furniture of every being capable of an act of reflection. To say with Hegel—or with Austin, or with any legal positivist—that there is and can

BRYAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

be no international law, because there is no international sovereign to decree it, is to define law by a mere accident and not by its essential nature, that is, by the fact that laws have sometimes, but certainly not generally, been issued as sovereign decrees.

It is singular how this notion lingers. A modern disciple of Hegel, for example, argues thus:

> The whole of international law rests on the principle that treaties are to be observed. But behind all this there is the sheer fact of the separate individual Powers, each absolute in its limited area; so that, at bottom, the whole fabric of international rules and customs is just an agreement of separate wills, and not an expression of a single general will.

And he sees in this a reason why leagues and federations cannot have the quality of law, forgetful of the fact that in all modern constitutional states every law of every legislative body is a result arrived at by an agreement of separate wills expressed in the votes of the legislators. But if the separate wills of a congress or a parliament may formulate a law, why may not separate and independent states formulate a law for the gov-

ernment of their own conduct? And having pledged themselves to it, being law in the most perfect sense, are they not bound by it?

There is, it must be admitted, an ineffaceable distinction between the nature of a state, even a constitutional state, and a human being. The state is the guardian of private rights and interests. It acts for its constituents in a fiduciary capacity. It is, indeed, an "ark of safety" to which communities of men have committed the keeping of their lives and treasures on the troubled waters of an uncharted world. "It is the vehicle which carries the whole value of life." Furthermore, it exists in a world of hostile forces. "In the world, right can only prevail through might." Therefore the state must be strong, and to be strong it must be armed, as the individual man under the protection of the state need not be. How otherwise can it fulfil its sacred trust?

All this is true and of the first importance; but, while it justifies the possession of force by the state, it makes it very plain that the strength of the state is not an end in itself, but merely a means—an instrument for the protection of rights

and interests intrusted to its care. The end of the state is, therefore, not aggression, or profit, or power, but justice. The primary reason for the existence of a government is that each citizen shall be protected in his rights.

It is this that distinguishes the state from other forms of human association. Its function is primarily protective. Upon this foundation rest all its special and peculiar prerogatives. Here is the reason for its authority, but this is limited by the reason for its existence. Society has manifold functions, but they may be normally left to individual and corporate enterprise within the state, which may be a complete and perfect "body politic" without them. On the other hand, these functions may be in part, and even to a great extent, taken over and performed by the state, but they are not necessary to its existence. They do, however, modify its character. When the state, in addition to its protective function, assumes those of industry, transportation, and commerce, as the modern state sometimes does, it undergoes a radical transformation. It itself then becomes a business corporation, a rival, and a competitor in the world of trade.

Now what is most important to consider is that, while this expansion of its functions profoundly changes the character of the state, it does not confer upon it any new authority. It does multiply and extend its interests, but it does not in any respect render the state absolute or endow it with unlimited right of command. Mere business cannot be regarded as a source of absolute sovereignty.

For constitutional states, therefore,—that is, for governments based upon the protection of human rights, and not upon some superhuman claim to authority, like that of the divine right of the monarch,—there is no logical ground for claiming sovereign rights in the absolutist sense. Such states are free and independent, but they do not represent the will to power. They represent and embody the will to justice; and the principles of justice are, *ipso facto,* their law of action. Everything violative of justice is for them usurpation. They may commit acts of injustice, they may explain them, they may excuse them; but they cannot logically justify them. As an organ of justice the state exceeds its prerogatives when it is unjust.

Undoubtedly this implies that international law is self-subsistent. For constitutional states it exists regardless of customs and conventions, and would be their law if no customs or conventions had ever existed, for its principles enter into their very purpose and structure. For them to deny these principles in their conduct would be to denature themselves.

Written or unwritten, international law is accepted by all constitutional states as binding upon them. By some, as in the United States, it is expressly declared to be a part of the law of the land. Acceptance of it should be the condition of the recognition of a government; for in so far as a community of men does not admit its existence, it is not a state in any defensible sense. An aggregation of *de facto* forces it may be, but in so far as it is merely an embodiment of the will to power and not the will to justice, it falls below statehood and is merely a predatory band, an outlaw that deserves to be proscribed and refused a place in the society of states.

In practice the specific rules of international law are established by a general consensus. They are sometimes inferred from custom and some-

times defined in conventions; but these rules are admitted to be merely partial and tentative efforts to express in definite formulæ what justice and equity demand. In this respect international law is comparable with science. As the man of science is engaged in a continuous effort to discover and state truth, so the jurist and the statesman, in so far as they are really such, persistently seek to formulate the requirements of justice. In both cases the formulæ arrived at may be plainly incomplete; but justice, like truth, is not a mere creation of the mind. It is an object of research and discovery; and as far as it is discovered and agreed upon it is obligatory, although our knowledge of it may still be incomplete.

It is, therefore, a solecism to speak of international law as "destroyed" or "non-existent," because it is sometimes violated. It can never be destroyed. It will continue to reassert itself; and, as public order and state authority appear more necessary after a period of domestic anarchy than they ever did before, international law, after an orgy of violence and atrocity, appeals with new strength to the reason of mankind as something

that possesses an inherent claim upon our respect and obedience.

Although criminally violated, it is an error to suppose that international law has been wholly disregarded in the great European conflict. On the contrary, it has been recognized and appealed to as never before in human history. Never in any previous war have such efforts been put forth by belligerents to justify their own conduct, and to prove that their enemies have openly disregarded the principles of justice as well as the merely technical rules of warfare. The voluminous white, red, yellow, and other books published by the governments are eloquent tributes to the authority of international law, which they constantly accuse their enemies of violating, and profess to appeal to as a body of rules that ought to be obeyed. In truth, the approval and disapproval of their acts by the neutral nations are based almost entirely upon the conclusiveness or inconclusiveness of the evidence that these accusations are true, and the weight of public condemnation corresponds with the preponderance of guilt resulting from intentional disregard of the principles of justice.

How trivial it is, then, to speak of international law as being of slight importance, and especially to treat it as if it had no claims to the title of binding law because it does not have an immediate external sanction! An ultimate sanction it unquestionably has. If it were generally disregarded, it would involve the complete ruin of civilization. If, on the other hand, it were generally obeyed, if all the great powers, not to speak of the smaller ones, earnestly sought to carry out in all their relations with one another the principles for which they profess to stand, and which they endeavor to enforce within their own jurisdictions and demand that other governments should observe in respect to themselves, it would seem like a different world.

Is it then not idle to pretend that international law has no sanction when obedience or disobedience of its precepts carries such far-reaching consequences to mankind? In the present condition of the world, as the rain falls alike on the just and on the unjust, even under municipal law the victims of unprovoked aggression often suffer while the guilty escape the penalty the state would impose upon them; but we do not on this

account deny the existence of the law. Nor can it be said that no penalty is attached to the violation of the law of nations. In general, besides its direct consequence of resentment and hostility on the part of the nation wronged, it should involve the general reprobation of mankind. And, in fact, the penalties for violations of international law are far more specifically apportioned and executed than we sometimes imagine. The perpetration of injustice by one state upon another invariably deteriorates its own citizenship and destroys within the body politic itself values far more precious than those obtained by an unjust war. "A state," it has been well said, "can do no wrong to another which is not equally, and even more, a wrong to itself." Regarded from a historical point of view, there are few projects of international depredation that have not brought terrific retributions; and, although law-abiding states have sometimes been subjected to infamous encroachments, it is a fact supported by statistics that many small and inoffensive states, like Switzerland and Holland, demand lower taxes and borrow money at lower rates of interest than the imperial powers that have from time to time

attempted to subjugate their neighbors, thereby sowing dragon's teeth of reprisal and revenge that exhaust populations and burden them with public debt. The cost of overgrown armies and navies and the far heavier cost of young life offered as a sacrifice to national pride and national greed—are not these a penalty for disregarding a law of life written in the reason and the conscience of man?

What, then, is law, if not that principle of self-regulation by which a being realizes the true end of its existence? Our statements of it may vary from time to time, for the perception of it depends upon the development of our intelligence. But it does not depend upon our will. It is inherent in our being. It is manifested through our reason. It is confirmed through our experience. There is a law of nations as well as a law of individual life, which we have only partly discovered, because we have not sought the highest good of all, but only the highest good of a limited number. But nature deals in universals. So long, therefore, as all nations, or even some nations, insist upon a right of territorial expansion at the expense of others; so long as they fail to

recognize that, irrespective of size and strength, they are members of a community of jural equals; so long as they claim that their will is law, so long war will be the *ratio ultima,* and preparation for it the highest wisdom of statesmanship. If it is impossible to place confidence in leagues of peace, it is still less possible to confide our destinies to a league to enforce peace, if it is to be composed of powers that need themselves to be placed under guardians. The only league that could be trusted effectually to enforce peace would be one composed exclusively of states that are disposed to recognize the obligations of international law, and voluntarily to pledge themselves to protect and obey it.

But, to speak plainly, peace is not in itself a human ideal. As long as it leaves unsolved the problems of justice, it is not even a desirable aspiration. It may even be repugnant to the moral sentiments of an enlightened conscience. It is to be desired only when it is the concomitant of realized social good, for it is in no sense an end in itself. Yet the word is not to be set aside as representing a mere negation, as if it were simply the

absence of strife. Peace on earth would mean the liberation of human faculties for the highest and noblest achievements of which human nature is capable. It would mean a splendid efflorescence of art, literature, science, philosophy, and religion, in short, culture in its best sense, as the spontaneous unfolding of the powers of personality.

And when we consider what an absolutist state might do to repress human spontaneity, destroy the sense of personality, and render its own dogmas definitive, we see what an incubus upon civilization it is capable of becoming. If the tendency to monopolize and direct for its own purposes all human energies in channels of its own devising were unrestrained, we should eventually have an official art, an official science, and an official literature that would be like iron shackles to the human mind.

These things, being human, are essentially cosmopolitan, and thrive best where international intercourse is least restrained. If, as the absolutist theory of the state assumes, a particular government did, in reality, embody the indwelling absolute, the source and shaper of all intelligent existence, as Hegel would have it, would it even

then have the right to dictate what language should be employed, what arts should be encouraged, what forms they should take, and what purposes they should serve? What a narrow view it is to assume that any merely national culture is a world culture or that it has a right to impose itself upon recalcitrant peoples who have a culture of their own! Such an assumption is not only unphilosophical; it is unhistorical. "Culture is not, and never can be, an inherent quality peculiar to a particular nation or language. It is the heritage of the whole human race, cherished, enriched, and transmitted by one generation to another, from one corner of the earth to another. Human languages are the vessels in which culture resides. No language has been a culture-language from the beginning, and none is incapable of becoming such in the end." Culture, in any true sense, cannot be made a national monopoly. It is an affair of the human soul, and any vehicle of repression against which the soul is in revolt is doomed to defeat, or culture will perish in the struggle.

Here speak with voices that cannot be silenced and with pleadings that must be heard the sup-

pressed nationalities, whole peoples smitten with the sword, torn up from their historic roots, and made to serve the narrow selfish purposes of dominant dynasties. It is useless to speak of peace while these enormities exist. How can peoples who, through mere numerical superiority and military power, have overwhelmed subject races, and by the menace of the sword forbid the use of native languages and the retention of historic memories, speak seriously of superior culture? It is only by the power of persistence under conditions of perfect liberty that the superiority of a form of culture can vindicate itself, for that is for each nation the highest which is best suited to its powers of achievements; and when a dynastic ruler by violence strips a subject race of its spiritual inheritance, it reverses and destroys the process by which true culture is developed. There is no people in the world who would not resist it if this procedure were practised upon itself.

A people, therefore, cannot fit itself for international society or realize its own normal development as a state until it is ready to recognize the claims of personality. Where mixed races

compose the population, and nationality is identified with a dominant race, there can be no true national unity, because there is no spirit of co-operation. On the other hand, it has been shown by the experience of Switzerland and the United States that different races may coëxist in the same nation without in the slightest degree destroying their personal freedom, and that they may co-operate together successfully in the organization of liberty. Many nations may still be unripe for this higher development of nationality, and the contests for race segregation and race domination may still continue; but the obstacle to harmony does not proceed from the essential nature of the state. It consists rather in the arrest of political evolution at a stage where true statehood has not yet been achieved; for a nation organized merely for power, for conquest, for world dominion, and not for justice, is not yet a state in the proper meaning of the word, but an unsocial and anarchical survival of primitive despotism.

The complete realization of international ideals must, therefore, wait on further political evolution. But they are not wholly dependent

on purely speculative thought. They are closely intertwined with practical experience. They gain new strength from every new disillusionment regarding the value and expediency of schemes of conquest and the effort to secure social prosperity by military force. We have, therefore, to take into account existing realities. No more than the old will the new Europe be a mere structure of thought. It is materially shaping itself now before our eyes. It is being forged and fashioned amid the smoke and flame and torture of battle. It is to be determined not only by what men love and desire, but also by what they hate and by what they recoil from in horror. Its battle-cry is: "Never again! Never again!" Thrones may be shaken or they may endure; but out of the anguish, the disillusionment, and the fading of iridescent dreams the new Europe will come forth chastened, reconstituted, and redeemed.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

IN the discussion of international questions it is a common oversight to lay the principal stress on political organization, to the neglect of economic facts and aspirations. It is evident that if all nations were living under a truly constitutional régime and were disposed to apply the principles of constitutional states in their dealings with one another, it would not be difficult to establish a world organization with a settled code of law, a court of arbitral justice, and perhaps a council of conciliation to propose methods of adjusting controversies arising from a conflict of national policies. But such an organization would provide only a set of institutions. It would not reach the national motives that move the world to action.

Among the causes of conflict the most difficult to control are the economic motives; for it is

these that are at present the most influential in determining the ambitions of nations, which are not merely "bodies politic," but economic corporations, seeking to acquire and possess the resources of the world. Regarded from this point of view, the external aim of national existence is efficiency rather than justice. Its purpose is not alone the protection of rights, but the augmentation of power. As long as the employment of military force as an auxiliary of industry and trade seems to the great powers more advantageous than peaceable coöperation in the utilization of the earth's resources, war will appear to be a natural, and to some a justifiable, method of national development.

Modern imperialism is, in fact, far more actuated by economic than by political motives. Politically, imperialism is merely a dynastic interest; but economically, it is made to appear that territorial expansion and extended domination are in the people's interest. In this representation there are, however, two abuses of the people's confidence: for, while a few special interests may profit by an imperial policy, the average person is not rendered richer or happier by

imperial triumphs; and, if he were, it would still be a criminal act to seduce a people into partnership in a policy of plunder on the ground that advantages may be obtained for them through the power of the state which could not be procured by private means. When a government embarks upon a policy of imperial aggression, it virtually says to the nation, "Provide us with the necessary power, and we shall win for you increased advantages in which you will all share." A people thus deluded are the victims not only of deception, but of corruption. By becoming shareholders in a joint-stock operation, the object of which is illicit gain, they furnish the capital for a predatory enterprise, only to discover in the end that they do not share in its fruits even when these are obtained by conquests and annexations. On the contrary, they find themselves burdened with public debt, impoverished by the neglect of their business, and saddened by the loss of their sons killed or maimed in battle. It may well be doubted if, when the balance is struck, the average person in any nation, though victorious in war, has on the whole been to any important extent enriched by imperial aggres-

sion. New territory may have been obtained, new accessions may have been made to the mass of the population, wider political control may have been acquired, but rarely, if ever, has the sum of happiness been thus increased.

To most civilized peoples the thought of aggressive war for purposes of gain, involving as it necessarily does every variety of crime,—robbery, murder, outrage, and sacrilege,—is revolting to the conscience and repellent to intelligence; but, in reality, imperial aspirations are never so repulsively presented to the mind. They are invariably disguised for the great mass of the people under a mask of virtuous pretenses. Alleged defense against intended invasion, the undoing of historic wrongs, the attainment of "natural boundaries," the unification of divided peoples, the restoration of suppressed nationalities, the extension of the benefits of a higher culture to lower races—all these are the reasons set forth in public proclamations and diplomatic apologies for schemes of aggression, while the advantages to be gained are represented as incidental concomitants of these lofty purposes.

It would, of course, be unreasonable to deny

that long-obstructed national aspirations and a desire for equality of privilege with other nations may be perfectly legitimate, as for example, the unification of Germany and of Italy, or a determination to put an end to exclusion from markets and waterways over which unfair monopolies have been established. In cases where whole peoples have by force been rendered economically dependent there may be, no doubt, just grounds for demanding changes; but in the main these are fit subjects for negotiation and transaction, in accordance with legitimate business methods, rather than for the exercise of military force. In the past, resort to violence for the attainment of national ends has not only been customary, but it has seemed to follow as a logical corollary from the absolutist theory of the state. If that theory is still to be maintained, then there is no escape from the perfect legitimacy of wholesale conquest, limited only by the power of a state to attain its ends by force. Every existing empire in the world has, in fact, been created by military power. To those who accept the absolutist theory of the state there is nothing reprehensible in the spirit of conquest and imperial domination.

Why should any nation holding this theory refrain from extending its power as far as possible? It is, in truth, certain that it will not refrain; and it follows with logical necessity that as long as this theory is held the conflict of nations will continue.

The whole future of civilization turns upon the decision whether the state is to be henceforth a creation of force or a creation of law. If it is to be considered merely a creation of force, then preparation for war is the only wisdom; for only the strong state can survive, and it must be at all times ready to fight for its existence. But if, on the other hand, the state is rightly to be conceived as a creation of law, then all states accepting this theory are menaced by the existence of strong embodiments of power which refuse to be governed by the rules of law. As long as they exist, as long as they arm themselves for aggression, as long as they devise and entertain schemes of conquest, so long the truly constitutional states must be prepared to defend themselves and even to defend one another.

Considered by itself, merely dynastic imperialism is not at present a menace to the world's

peace. There is probably no nation so devoted to a dynasty and to the dynastic conception of government as to endanger the peace of its neighbors for purely dynastic reasons. Mankind has passed that point. But territorial expansion, the extension of political control for economic reasons, the lust for markets, the quest for resources, the command of great waterways, supremacy on the sea—these are the driving and compelling forces that make imperialism a terror in the world. In the hands of an efficient, irresponsible, and remorseless great power, these ambitions would render this planet a place of unending torture to every law-respecting people.

It is an interesting fact that in the case of the states of Europe which were at one time engaged in a struggle for empire, but have since abandoned it, there has been an impressive diminution in the proportion of time during which they have been occupied with war. Denmark, for example, during the period of its struggle for supremacy in the Baltic, in the sixteenth century devoted 32.5 years, and in the seventeenth century 30.5 years, to war; but in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-

turies, when the kingdom had ceased to entertain imperial ambitions, the average time devoted to war, in which it was involved chiefly through its alliances, was only about 13 per cent. of the whole period. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Sweden, while aiming to be the seat of empire in the North by dominating Poland, North Germany, and Denmark, was engaged in war more than 50 per cent. of the time; but in the nineteenth century after the Swedish imperial ambitions had become extinct, although forced into war in self-defense during the Napoleonic period, warlike activities occupied only 6.5 per cent. of the time, and since 1815 the kingdom has been at peace. Holland, also, during the period of colonial expansion was involved in war during 62 per cent. of the time, but in the last half century has been exempt from warfare. Spain, in the full tide of colonial expansion, was engaged in war during 82 per cent. of the time; but in the nineteenth century, with the exception of the Napoleonic period, the wars of Spain, until the short conflict with the United States over Cuba, were mere domestic insurrections against absolutism.

If now we turn to the great powers, we find that they have been almost constantly engaged in war or preparation for it and that it has grown almost entirely out of their imperial aspirations. Austria, in the period of imperial consolidation from 1500 to 1650, was engaged in war 75.5 per cent. of the entire time. After the Peace of Westphalia there was a marked diminution of warlike activities. During the eighteenth century the proportion fell to 48 per cent., and in the nineteenth to 13.5 per cent. During the whole period from 1100 down to the beginning of the nineteenth century France has been engaged in war about one half the time, and during the last century 35 per cent. of the time. During four centuries Russia has been 60 per cent. of the time occupied with war. Since 1500, England has been involved nearly 52 per cent. of the time in foreign wars.

Many of the wars included in these estimates were, it is true, of an unimportant character, and certainly no one of them, not even the Napoleonic wars, could compare in magnitude with the great European conflict now raging; but the greater part of them were, on one side or the other, im-

perial wars, and proceeded upon the principle that the right of possession belongs to the power that can take and hold. There may have been differences in the treatment of the vanquished after the struggle was ended, and in the character of the civilization imposed by the conqueror; but in the past no great power has doubted that it had a perfect right to subjugate a weaker race or dismember a defenseless state whenever it was to its material advantage to do so, and there is no great power that has not acted in this way.

Down to the invasion of Belgium in 1914, the most odious crime ever committed against a civilized people was, no doubt, the first partition of Poland; yet at the time not a voice was raised against it. Louis XV was "infinitely displeased," but did not even reply to the King of Poland's appeal for help. George III coolly answered that "justice ought to be the invariable rule of sovereigns"; but concluded, "I fear, however, misfortunes have reached the point where redress can be had from the hand of the Almighty alone." Catherine II thought justice satisfied when "every one takes something." Frederick II wrote to his brother, "The partition will unite the three re-

ligions, Greek, Catholic, and Calvinist; for we would take our communion from the same consecrated body, which is Poland." Only Maria Theresa felt a twinge of conscience. She took, but she felt the shame of it. She wrote:

> We have by our moderation and fidelity to our engagements acquired the confidence, I may venture to say the admiration, of Europe. . . . One year has lost it all. I confess, it is difficult to endure it, and that nothing in the world has cost me more than the loss of our good name.

It is a strange phenomenon that in matters where the unsophisticated human conscience so promptly pronounces judgment and spontaneously condemns, the solid mass of moral conviction should count for nothing in affairs of state. Against it a purely national prejudice has almost never failed to prevail. At the present moment there is a strong sympathy expressed for the misfortunes of small states; and yet how little the great powers have done to secure the safety and the rights of the lesser nations. It may seem ungracious, in the midst of a bitter struggle, to open the books of the past and recall to the contestants the record they have helped to make. But how shall we ever put an end to economic

imperialism if we do not lay bare its vices and if we do not condemn it in all who have practised it? So long as it remains unchallenged, it will go on. But the crime of letting it go on is not confined to the injury inflicted upon the quarry in the game of empire, the small state or the weak people. The most fatal injury is to the imperial peoples, who suffer themselves to be drawn into predatory aggression and made *particeps criminis* by the appeal to their racial instincts, their loyalty to their governments, their passion for supremacy, or the baser incentive of mere vulgar greed. If there is to be a better spirit in the new Europe, there will be required much penitence for the past and many high resolves for the future. But there are grounds for believing that a turning-point in history has now been reached. It has required the awful cataclysm that is now agitating Europe to open the eyes of civilized peoples to the truth that the state, with all its machinery of destruction, cannot longer be set above the moral law. It has at the same time raised the question in every thoughtful mind, What is the state, and whence comes its authority that for its own increase of power it may so ruthlessly crush the lives of men

beneath its chariot wheel, hurling whole peoples against each other, armed with every ingenious device for wholesale murder, and strewing the earth with death and mutilation? There is hope in the fact that nations which in the past have themselves joined in the quest for empire and have taken part in the subjugation of helpless peoples now assert that they are fighting the battle of democracy and sacrificing their own lives for the safety of small and defenseless states. After that how can they ever again place empire above moral obligation, and material gain above the principles they proclaim?

It was, beyond dispute, economic imperialism that caused the present war and plunged all Europe into it. No one can fail to see the opposition of interests that led up to it. They were real, they were obvious; but it was an anachronism to fight about them. They were primarily business interests—markets, resources, trade routes. These were the issues. To settle them advantagously the sword was thrown into the scale, great armies were mustered and despatched upon their errand of hewing their way to the heart of opposing nations. Has it been a good way

to transact business? It was easy to begin it, but it is difficult to end it. It can never be ended by mere fighting. The lesson of it must be learned and accepted by all; and, whoever wins on the battle-field, no real victory can be attained that does not result in the triumph of principles of universal justice, and the renunciation of material advantages as mere spoils of war. Unless the victory resulting from this war is a triumph for humanity, whoever the victor may be at the making of a treaty, it will not be a peace, but the seed of future conflicts. The real battle-field is in the souls of the nations; and nations as well as individual men must learn that "he who conquereth his own spirit is greater than he who taketh a city."

Herein, then, lies the foreshadowing of a new Europe, that, hereafter, the stronger may not profit by his superior strength. It sounds, indeed, like a new doctrine, and it will be hard to live by, but it has its apostolate. It is explicitly announced as a creed. Whatever sympathy the Entente Allies have received in America has been given to them because they were the first to an-

nounce it, and because it is believed that they are sincere in proclaiming that law is to be respected and the right of the stronger is to be denied. They have opened a great issue, and they will be held to it. The small states, the weak peoples, the submerged races, they affirm, must henceforth receive from the powerful just consideration. The state is no longer to be regarded as an entity existing only for its own augmentation of power, above the law, defiant of humanity, and responsible to no one for its action. There is to be a society of states in a true sense, in which international law is to be respected. In brief, there is to be an end of economic imperialism. It is to be a different world.

For the historian, at least, it is difficult to accept these high resolutions as certain to endure. History has never been an advance in a direct line toward the fulfilment of great ideals. There are frequently reactionary movements, but they are seldom complete. Human nature does not change radically, but in great crises men see a new light; and, having seen it, it is never quite so dark as it was before.

At all events, a new standard has been raised.

Let us, therefore, rally to it. Let us make it easy to perform acts of penitence and contrition. Let all who believe in the constitutional state, who base it upon the rights of the person, who would subject it as far as possible to moral law, and who wish to banish from the earth the shadow of the sword, unite in accepting this standard. At least one step of progress has been made since the conferences at The Hague. Then no one dared to raise the deeper issues. No one in those conclaves ventured to question the prerogatives of government. No one felt that the moment had arrived to discuss the real causes of war or to rebuke the greed of the great powers. There was of necessity an atmosphere of courtesy, but it was breathed through a veil of mutual suspicion. The very fact that there were subjects that could not be frankly considered rendered impossible perfect confidence. Again and again it was whispered, "We must not isolate this or that power"; and, therefore, no action could be taken to which *all* the powers,—which knew that they were pitted against one another,—could not agree. The small states were all in leading-strings, each one thinking of its own exposure and, in some in-

stances, of its own designs. It is well that we have reached a point where the truth may be told and where the real causes of conflict may be openly discussed.

There can be among really constitutional states no discrimination based on mere forms of government. These grow out of the exigencies of each nation; and by its own principles each constitutional state is prohibited from dictating its form of government to any other. Monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, all and equally may enter into the family of nations as long as they accept and respect the principles of law. But economic imperialism is a spirit and not a form. Until that is renounced there can be no society of states, because it is anti-social, predatory, and based on arbitrary force. So long as nations, whatever their form of government, resort to military power in order to subordinate other nations, and forcibly extort from them economic advantages, so long civilization will find itself face to face with a dangerous enemy.

If the Entente Allies are sincere in this war, they are prepared to make an end of forceful exploitation and to enter into solemn engagements

to keep the faith. They have appealed to the conscience of mankind. They have defined their own conceptions of right and wrong. They have professed to be ready to die for them. They have insisted upon the sanctity of treaty obligations. They have proclaimed the rights of defenseless peoples. They have asserted that humanity and national morality are to be preferred to empire. In this they have risen to a great height, from which it would be humiliating ever to descend. To all who believe in their sincerity they have spoken with a divinely prophetic voice; and if they are true to their professions, they will create a new era in the history of the world.

What then is the attitude of the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, toward this standard? Are they also ready to accept it?

If the German Empire has an authorized champion and apologist, entitled by position and attainments to be heard and credited, it is the former imperial chancellor, Prince von Bülow. In the first sentence of his book on "Imperial Germany," published just before the war began, he says: "Germany is the youngest of the Great

Powers of Europe; an uninvited and unwelcome intruder when it demanded its share in the treasures of the world." The reason is frankly stated. "This union of the states of the Mid-European continent," he says, "so long prevented, so often feared, and at last accomplished by the force of German arms and incomparable statesmanship, seemed to imply something of a threat, or at any rate a disturbing factor."

It may well be doubted if, at the time of the establishment of the German Empire, it was regarded by the world at large as a "disturbing factor," much less as a "threat." German unity having been attained, Bismarck's avowed policy was to guard it from danger from any possible coalition of adverse powers. As long as that régime lasted, no disturbance of the peace was looked for from Germany. Prince von Bülow himself quotes Bismarck as saying: "In Serbia I am an Austrian, in Bulgaria I am a Russian, in Egypt I am English." At the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, all Europe except Russia was willing to accept the great chancellor at his own valuation as an "honest broker" interested chiefly in the peace of Europe; and as regards Russia,

that was in Bismarck's mind "the wild elephant" that "was to walk between the two tame elephants, Germany and Austria"!

But Prince von Bülow's own interpretation of the meaning of German unity is, it must be confessed, somewhat disquieting. The voluntary and spontaneous movement of the German people, he affirms, could never have created the empire. It was only through a struggle with the rest of Europe, he explains, that the Germanic spirit could be evoked. "The opposition in Germany itself could hardly be overcome," he continues, "except by such a struggle. By this means national policy was interwoven with international policy; with incomparable audacity and constructive statesmanship, in consummating the work of uniting Germany, Bismarck left out of play the political capabilities of the Germans, in which they have never excelled, while he called into action their fighting powers, which have always been their strongest point."

These are illuminating words by the former chancellor of the empire, uttered in a spirit of historic truth; and it is in the same spirit that they are here cited. The world would have no fear

of the German people, although unified and strong, if their old-time qualities were in control; but, almost against its will, it seems, Germany became an imperial power and entered international politics, for which Prussian domination opened the way, and centralized military ascendancy furnished the means of action. Prince von Bülow does not permit the German people themselves or their neighbors to forget that it was not the political capabilities of the constituent states, but Prussian military prowess alone that created and can further extend the empire.

"The German Empire of medieval times," the former chancellor writes, "was not founded by the voluntary union of the tribes, but by the victory of one single tribe over the others, who for a long time unwillingly bore the rule of the stronger." And, in order to leave no doubt of the indebtedness of the German people to Prussia, but rather to show them their complete dependence upon its force of arms, he continues: "As the old Empire was founded by a superior tribe, so the new was founded by the strongest of the individual states. . . . In a modern form, but in the old way, the German nation has, after a thousand

years, once again, and more perfectly, completed the work which it accomplished in early times, and for whose destruction it alone was to blame."

It is precisely this return to the past, this frank revival of the methods in use a thousand years ago, this acceptance of a theory of the state which civilization has everywhere rejected, and this frank emphasis upon the intrinsic superiority of "fighting powers," that have made Europe afraid of Germany, and created a distrust of the use intended to be made of its tremendous energies.

And this distrust is not removed by the picture which Prince von Bülow paints of the intellectual state of Germany. "German intellect," he says, "had already reached its zenith without the help of Prussia. The princes of the West were the patrons of German culture; the Hohenzollerns were the political teachers and taskmasters." There is as yet, he affirms, no fusion between the Prussian and the German spirit. Representatives of German intellectual life, he assures us, sometimes regard the Prussian state as a "hostile power," and the Prussian at times considers the

free development of the German intellect as a "destructive force." "Again and again," he declares, "in Parliament and in the press accusations are levelled against Prussia in the name of freedom, and against the undaunted German intellect in the name of order." Between them, he assures us, there is as yet no real reconciliation.

It does not admit of doubt that, if Germany were to-day in the mood it was when the German universities and cultivated classes voiced their sentiments in 1848, there would be a vigorous movement for internationalism. Instead of this, on its cloistered side, the German nation conceives of itself as a universal spirit of righteousness—humanity inspired by divinity—working for incarnation in mankind through its superior forms of culture. In other countries, it is assumed, individual men are seeking only their own private happiness. They have no sense of universality or principle of organization. The German state cares for all its own. It alone, therefore, has the secret of ultimate victory. It alone can save the world from degeneration and decay. For this overwhelming reason it ought to conquer, dominate, and reconstruct the world!

Dies ist unser! so lass uns sagen und so es behaupten.

Considered by itself, this *Weltanschauung* would be entirely harmless, a form of innocuous spiritual pride; but, taken in connection with the Prussian military organization, to which it looks as a means of action, it has become portentous. Like the faith of Islam, with which Pan-Germanism unconsciously compares itself, it has kindled a fire of fanaticism that does not shrink from extremes; and thus, to the pride of culture, is added the zeal of religion:

> *Wir sind des Hammergottes Geschlecht*
> *Und wollen sein Weltreich erobern.*

This spirit of Pan-Germanism reaches its full flower in the "*Alldeutscher Verband,*" whose publications, widely scattered in cheap popular editions, have done infinite damage to the reputation of the empire. Among the publications of this kind the most elaborate is the book entitled "Gross-Deutschland," published at Leipsic, in 1911, by Otto Richard Tannenberg.

Here is recited and interpreted ethnologically,

statistically, chartographically, and prophetically the German dream of *Weltpolitik*. With erudition that has involved years of research, and with a definiteness and perspicuity that leave nothing unexplained, even down to the definitive treaties of peace after the Great War shall have accomplished its purposes, we have in this elaborate work a complete exposition of economic imperialism as contemplated by the Pan-Germanists—an exposition sown broadcast among the people.

There is here no question of diffusing German culture for the benefit of other nations, and no attempt to prove the moral value of superior organization; there is nothing, in fact, but "the promise of booty, the prospect of profit, the vision of panting prey waiting to be transfixed," a world empire, produced by the vivisection of civilized nations under the edge of the sword.

This urgent exhortation to prompt military aggression, with incredible frankness, makes no pretense of anything forced upon Germany, but declares it to be both expedient and practicable to acquire new territory, expel its occupants, and enjoy its resources, without the slightest recognition of any rights or any law, Being strong,

numerous, and well prepared, it insists that the time has come for Germans to strike for world dominion. "The period of preparation," Tannenberg declares, "has lasted a long time (from 1871 to 1911)—forty years of toil on land and sea, the end constantly in view. The need now is to begin the battle, to vanquish, and to conquer; to gain new territories—lands for colonization for the German peasants, fathers of future warriors, and for the future conquests. . . . 'Peace' is a detestable word; peace between Germans and Slavs is like a treaty made on paper, between water and fire. . . . Since we have the force, we have not to seek reasons,—not more than the English in taking South Africa."

Once brought within the fold of the Greater Germany, there would be in Europe, aside from the Balkans, eighty-seven millions, contributed by Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and the Baltic provinces of Russia, originally of German stock. That some of these populations have ceased to speak German does not signify; it is a matter of ethnic unity, the restoration of long-lost brothers. That other races occupy these territories also, sometimes exceeding in numbers the

German occupants, does not render this less necessary. "If all the German tribes existed to-day," writes Tannenberg, "and had the force of the Low Saxons, there would be neither Latins nor Slavs. The frontiers of Europe would be the frontiers of Germany in Europe."

But this scheme of Germanic expansion does not end with the unification of the Teutonic race in Europe. There would be other Germanies, all definitely outlined and marked in colors: an African Germany, stretching across the dark continent from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean; a near Asiatic Germany, covering the whole of the Ottoman Empire; a far Asiatic Germany, embracing the greater part of China; an oceanic Germany, including all the Dutch islands in the Pacific; and even an American Germany, covering the whole of the southern half of South America. Such are the Teutonic ambitions and the Teutonic plans of conquest as delineated upon Tannenberg's future map of the world.

Wherever there are Germans, wherever Germans go, there the standard of the imperial eagle should be set up. "We are eighty-seven millions of representatives of German nationality on our

continent," runs this exhortation to universal dominion. "Our country is the most populous, the best organized. The new era is at hand. We shall fight and we shall conquer. . . . If in the time of the great migrations a man of mental and military strength had arisen to group the formidable, unnumbered, and innumerable mass of the German people, to give it one will, one thought, in politics or in religion, that admirable force, perhaps the greatest that has ever existed, would not have been dissipated by an insensate individualism. The movement would have united to the force of Islam the German tenacity. . . . The culture of Europe would, to-day, be purely German, and with it the entire world."

How terrific this incorrigible spirit of tribalism is can be realized only when we stop to reflect what the culture of the time of the great migrations was, and what this unchained brute force and tenacity would have inflicted upon Europe, if it had never been tempered and ameliorated by the Latin influences that gave it the first semblance to civilization.

"In the good old time," writes Tannenberg, "it sometimes happened that a strong people attacked

a feeble one, exterminated it, and expelled it from its patrimony. To-day these acts of violence are no longer committed. To-day, everything goes gently in this poor world, and the privileged are for peace. The little peoples and the debris of peoples have invented a new word, 'International Right.' At bottom it is nothing but a calculation based upon our stupid generosity. . . . Some one should make room; either the Slavs of the West or the South, or ourselves! As we are the strongest, the choice will not be difficult. . . . A people can maintain itself only by growing. . . . Greater Germany is possible only through a struggle with Europe. Russia, France, and England will oppose the foundation of Greater Germany. Austria, powerless as she is, will not weigh much in the balance. At all events, Germans will not march against Germany."

The aim is not wanting in clear-sightedness. Not everything can be accomplished at once. "A customs union of Greater Germany," runs the project, "with the countries of the Balkans and the Danube would be in their interest as well as ours. On the one side, Greater Germany, a world power, a country industrial and commercial; on

the other, the Magyars, the Rumanians, the Serbs, the Bulgars, the Albanians, the Greeks,—peoples exclusively agricultural. . . . By that accord, the commerce of the East, of Syria, and of Mesopotamia would fall into our hands, . . . not only a market for the products of industry of the mother-country, but also a *point d'appui* and an advance toward our expansion in the Far East and in Africa."

Of course none of these aspirations is put forth with official authority, but not being contradicted, they appear to have a certain sanction. Certainly they have never been disavowed by the Imperial German Government. In part, at least, they have very high confirmation. Prince von Bülow, for example, writes: "We have carefully cultivated good relations with Turkey and Islam, especially since the journey to the East undertaken by our Emperor and Empress. These relations are not of a sentimental nature, for the continued existence of Turkey serves our interest from the industrial, military, and political points of view. Industrially and financially, Turkey offered us a rich and fertile field of activity . . . which we have cultivated with profit"; and he concludes by

expressing the reliance of Germany upon Turkey "in the event of a general European war," while for Austria Turkey is described as "the most convenient neighbor possible." For Prince von Bülow, as he admits, Bismarck's opinion that Turkey and the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier was no longer to be entertained. It was, in fact, to the East that his vision turned.

"No sensible man," he declares, "will ever entertain the idea of recovering either national or political influence over the lands in the South and West which were lost so many centuries ago." For these losses, he admits, "compensation has been granted by Providence in the East." "Those possessions," he concludes, "we must and will retain." But Prince von Bülow has never been an advocate of a Little Germany. "Bismarck's successors," he declared in the Reichstag, on November 14, 1906, "must not imitate, but develop his policy. If the course of events demands that we transcend the limits of Bismarck's aims, then we must do so."

If there has, in fact, as German statesmen profess, been an "encirclement" of Germany, is it to

be wondered at, in view of the frank proclamation of German plans of territorial expansion? No part of the world has been considered immune from attack. "For us," says Tannenberg, "it is a vital question to acquire colonial empires which will enable us to remain independent of the goodwill of our competitors, offer us a market for our products and our industry, and give us the possibility of procuring the raw materials so necessary and so precious which now are wanting. I mention, for example, only the need of cotton. It may be to us of no importance at whose expense it shall be taken. It is essential that we have these colonies, and that is why we shall have them. Whether it be at the cost of England or of France, it is only a question of power, and perhaps also of a little risk."

How much risk it would be advisable to run may be inferred from Tannenberg's complaint that Bismarck's policy was "senile," because as early as 1885 it did not reach out for Cuba and the Philippines, especially Cuba, "the pearl of the Antilles," as large as Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and Alsace united; which, Tannenberg asserts, "was well worth a little war"!

And he could not drop this subject without adding an insult to the citizens of German origin in the United States by saying: "The position of Cuba relative to North America would have created a new relation between the German people and the ten millions of German emigrants domiciled in the United States; and, beside its situation, would have given us the preponderance in the Gulf of Mexico."

"After all," runs this outspoken exhortation to aggression, "politics is a business," a statement that recalls Prince von Bülow's observation that "politics is a rough trade, in which sentimental souls rarely bring even a simple piece of work to a successful issue." "Justice and injustice," continues Tannenberg, "are notions which are necessary only in civil life." And yet he pleads it is "unjust" that small states, like Belgium and Holland, should possess rich colonies and enjoy nearly double the per capita wealth enjoyed by subjects of the German Empire, "only because these two countries do not bear arms, as we do." "For that reason," he says, "they capitalize what they save, and laugh in our faces." But why should not Germans do the same? Is economic

imperialism after all an unprofitable business?

It would be easy, Tannenberg declares, to make it profitable. Think of Luxemburg, with a total military strength of only 323 soldiers and officers, only one man to a thousand of the population! And Belgium, rich in colonies, a great center of industry and commerce, with its coal and iron, and only a paper protection! "Yet Belgium," he reminds us, "was once a part of the German Empire."

A subject that awakens very serious reflection is presented in the appendix to this remarkable work, which contains the text of the treaties to be concluded when the war for European conquest is ended. By the imaginary treaty of Brussels, drawn up in 1911, France cedes to Germany the Vosges, with Epinal; Moselle and Meuse, with Nancy and Lunéville; the town of Verdun; and the Ardennes, with Sedan. France further gives asylum to the inhabitants of this territory, and establishes them elsewhere within her own borders, in order to make room for German settlers; declares its assent to the incorporation of Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, and Switzerland into the

German Empire; cedes to Germany the twelve milliards of francs lent to Russia; renounces all colonies; and pays to Germany a cash indemnity of thirty-five milliards of marks. By the supposititious treaty of Riga, also drawn up in 1911, Russia cedes vast territories to Germany; creates a kingdom of Poland on its own soil, where the Prussian Poles, to be expelled from Prussian Poland, may reside; and accepts the incorporation of Austria, ceded by the Hapsburgs to the Hohenzollerns, into the German Empire. As an inducement to Great Britain to sanction these proceedings, the French and Portuguese colonies are by these treaties to be divided between the two empires on the assumption that British neutrality would be thus insured.

In citing these documents, so frankly disclosing the Pan-German dream of expansion, there is no intention to insist, as André Chéradame has asserted, that these specific plans were all contemplated by the highest official authorities of the German Empire; but it is a disturbing reflection that, as he points out, ninety per cent. of the whole program of the Pan-German propaganda, so far as the continent of Europe is concerned, has, not-

withstanding unexpected opposition, actually been carried into temporary effect.

What is most discouraging from the point of view of international society is the fact that the official philosophy of Prussia, which, as Prince von Bülow reminds us, "attained her greatness as a country of soldiers and officials . . . and to this day is still in all essentials a state of soldiers and officials," has taken command of German intelligence and industry. That philosophy is explicitly stated by the former imperial chancellor in the following words:

"It is a law of life and development in history that, where two national civilizations meet, they fight for ascendancy. In the struggle between nationalities, one nation is the hammer and the other the anvil; one is the victor and the other the vanquished."

CHAPTER IV

THE VISION OF A COMMONWEALTH

SO long as governments insist upon the right of a strong state to subjugate or to exploit against its interest a weaker state, there will be no international harmony, and the world will be subjected to the ravages of recurrent wars. The attitude of the great powers upon this subject is, therefore, of the greatest moment, for it will determine the fate of civilization; and, in the end, in all but the most absolute governments, this attitude will be affected by the predominant opinions of thoughtful men.

It is, then, of interest to inquire, What is the present position of the great powers, upon whose decisions the future peace of the world will chiefly depend, regarding the rights of the small states, and of those colonial possessions which in the past have often been so cruelly exploited for the benefit of their overlords? In brief, are there any powers

that are willing to submit to a peaceful decision of their own rights in relation to the weaker states, and voluntarily to subject themselves to principles of law and equity in their conduct generally? Upon the answer to these questions turns the whole problem of even partial international organization and the prospect of eliminating the military control of international affairs. Even though it should be found that a certain number of powers were disposed to apply strictly ethical principles to their business transactions, without throwing their military force into the scale, it would not follow that military force could be entirely dispensed with; for, as long as there remained in the world even one formidable military power that persisted in using force for its material advantage and refused to resort to pacific means for adjusting conflicts of interest, it would still be necessary for the powers that were ready to dispense with military decisions to arm themselves for defense against aggression, and perhaps to combine their forces in the interest of safety and justice.

It would, however, mark the beginning of a new era if a number of great powers were sufficiently

enlightened to perceive that economic imperialism is, in effect, an anachronism, and that their real interests would be better served by a combination not for the balance of power, but for a decided preponderance of power, that would be able by their union, on the one hand, to establish a system of legal relations and conciliatory policies; and, on the other, to render military exploitation an unprofitable and even a dangerous adventure.

It would, undoubtedly, be both unwise and unjust to limit in any way the extent of international union were it not for the fact that, until profound changes occur, a universal union would seem to be impossible. There is at present no unanimity among the nations regarding any authoritative basis for a society of states. No proposal has ever been made for the recognition of any such basis in any international conference. Because some powers have held that the state is a law to itself, and that there is no law which it is bound to obey, it has been impossible even to suggest that there is for sovereign states such a thing as outlawry. If there is in the nature of things no super-state law, and if states cannot make it

without general consent, then of course no state can be treated as an outlaw; for there is no standard by which the legality of its conduct may be determined.

But it is still possible for a union of states to be formed which can determine by what law its members will be governed, and it is possible for them to exclude from it any state that does not accept this law. It is likely that if the formation of civil society had been suspended until every brigand and every housebreaker in the community was ready to favor a law against robbery, civil society would never have come into existence. The only way, it would appear, in which there is ever to be a real society of states is for those great powers which can find a sufficient community of interest to unite in the determination that they will themselves observe principles of justice and equity, and that they will unite their forces in defense of them.

It would be well if, at the conclusion of the Great War, or, if possible, even before it is ended, certain basic principles could be laid down that would be accepted by the belligerents as inherently just and equitable, and solemnly subscribed

to as binding upon them. Upon no other basis would a permanent peace appear to be possible. Any other result would be a mere armistice; for, whatever it may have been in the beginning, the present war is now declared to be "a conflict of principles," a battle for law and right on the one side, and for arbitrary power on the other.

If the conflict is really a struggle for a just organization of international relations, it is of the highest importance to the cause of civilization that the principles necessary to a true society of states should be clearly formulated and, as far as possible, accepted now, while the conflict is still going on; and those who profess to champion them should not hesitate solemnly to pledge themselves to respect and obey them. We should then know with greater certainty what the purposes of all the belligerents really are.

In a book on "The War of Democracy," Viscount Bryce, whose writings and personality are held in very high esteem in this country, employs in the subtitle the expression, "the struggle for a new Europe." What, then, is this new Europe to be for which, as Lord Bryce would have us believe, the Entente Allies are struggling? Does

it merely involve some changes in political geography? Thoughtful men will not be satisfied with that, for the mere shifting of frontiers, however reasonable it may seem at the time, has no guarantee of permanence except by means of armed force until a better system of international relations is adopted. Or is it for a mere form of government that the Allies are contending? Who then has the authority to impose upon Europe a particular kind of polity, and who can assure us that democracy, if made universal, would always be wise and just and peaceable? No, it is something deeper than these outward changes that this experienced historian and statesman has in mind when he speaks of "the fundamental significance of the struggle for a new Europe." "The present war," he insists, "differs from all that have gone before it not only in its vast scale and in the volume of misery it has brought upon the world, but also in the fact that it is a war of principles, and a war in which the permanent interests not merely of the belligerent powers, but of all nations, are involved as such interests were never involved before."

That the present war is on either side a purely

altruistic championship of merely abstract principles cannot, of course, be pretended. On the side of the Entente Allies, as well as on that of the Central Powers, immediate national interests of great consequence are involved. But this does not signify that in its underlying principles and in its ultimate consequences the struggle may not in some sense be an affair of all mankind. Our own country has been already so vitally affected by it, and is now so deeply involved in all of its results, that we cannot regard the fate of these principles with indifference. What is truly surprising to us in this country is that two great empires, England and Russia, and the French Republic, which has twice quelled the spirit of imperialism within itself and reasserted its love of freedom, are now solidly united in fighting the battle of democracy. Suddenly, through the mysterious working of some intangible but all-pervading and overmastering influence, we have witnessed this unexpected alinement of nations, in which there is an almost general repudiation of the past, a reassertion of the larger claims of humanity, and a spirit of sacrifice that is an astonishment to all who behold it. There is yet

to be fought a battle more sublime than any ever yet waged in the name of democracy, because it will be a battle for that which gives to democracy its indestructible vitality—the essential dignity of the human person, and its inherent right to freedom, to justice, and to the quality of mercy at the hands of one's fellow-men. This is no tribal adventure, no thrust for territorial expansion, no quest for new markets and undeveloped resources, no aspiration for world supremacy; but a consolidated human demand that in the future the world be so regulated that innocent and non-combatant peoples may live under the protection of law, may depend upon the sanctity of treaties, may be secure in their independence and rights of self-government, and that the people of all nations may enjoy in safety the use of the great seas and oceans which nature has provided as the highways of peaceful commerce and fruitful human intercourse.

In its beginning the European War was undoubtedly a conflict of national and racial interests, a struggle for the future control of the Balkan Peninsula and the debris of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. Was the prize to be possessed

by the Teuton or the Slav? The assassination at Sarajevo and the part in it attributed to Serbia were only signals and excuses for the beginning of a drama already carefully staged and in which the parts were supposed to be carefully assigned. Germany intended that it should be a swift, short war, in which the principal prize would be won by a comparatively small effort, and others incidentally acquired. But interests were affected and forces were evoked that had not entered into the calculations of the aggressors. It was the unexpected emergence of these new forces, and the nature of the resistance met with in the course of the war, that entirely changed its character, and converted it into a war of principles; for the progress of the conflict disclosed an antithesis of conceptions regarding matters of general human interest that had hitherto been unsuspected. The whole system of law, treaties, and human obligations which had been counted upon as furnishing a sure foundation for civilized society was suddenly discovered to be without solidity. In the general débacle the hopes, the beliefs, even the friendships, with which the present century had opened so auspiciously in matters international

were suddenly swept away. It is needless to dwell upon barbarities on land and sea that a few years ago would have been utterly incredible. Our thoughts must take a deeper direction. We must face the fact that we have not to deal with mere incidents, but with the underlying causes of which they are the outward expression. If the postulates of economic imperialism are correct, there is nothing abnormal in all this destruction, desecration, and slaughter at which the minds and consciences of many have revolted; for upon this assumption, sovereign power is acting wholly within its rights, and is even engaged in the solemn execution of its sacred duty. There is, therefore, upon this assumption, nothing left to us but to arm, mine, fortify, and entrench, repudiating internationalism and trusting solely to our physical instruments of defense. In truth, there are before the nations only two alternatives: on the one hand, the reëstablishment of international existence upon a more solid foundation than that afforded by military rivalry and the supremacy of national power, and, on the other, a return to the life of troglodytes. If the world is to escape permanent international anarchy, it

will be through the decision of governments to accept and loyally respect certain principles of justice and mutual obligation in the form of a constitution of civilization in which are recognized the reciprocal rights and duties of separate nations. It is within the capacity of a few great powers to adopt and maintain such principles; and they will do so whenever the masses of the people, speaking in their sovereign right, declare that their governments must accept and conform to them. If this is what Lord Bryce means, when he speaks of the "War of Democracy," then he is voicing an appeal to all thoughtful persons in every civilized nation; for the democratic conception, based as it is on the rights of man, is the only true source of law for the rights of states also, and is alone adapted to that general extension which opens a vision of a commonwealth of mankind in which all nations, regardless of territorial boundaries, may rightfully claim a place.

Are there, then, any nations that are prepared to be guided by this vision, to forego the aspiration for world supremacy, and to unite with one

another in the creation of such a general commonwealth?

It is an interesting fact not only that the people of Russia have overthrown autocracy, but that, in the midst of a great crisis, another power which the world has regarded as imperial should openly recognize the truth that it has, by the forces of its own national development, ceased to be an "empire" in the old sense of the word, and has become a confraternity of free and virtually self-governing communities.

The present war has revealed to Great Britain, and made it evident to all the world, that British strength does not at present consist in the exercise of an *imperium,* but in the recognition of the essential freedom and the equal rights of what the most authoritative British statesmen now call the "autonomous colonies"; and it is especially interesting to find a conservative, like Bonar Law, saying that what was impossible before the war will be easy after it, and that the relation of the dominions to the mother-country would never again be what it was before. It is, in fact, a confederation of autonomous self-governing repub-

lics, rather than an empire in the proper sense, that is coming into existence through this internal transformation of the British Empire. Common aims, common safety, common interests, and common ideas—these are the foundations of this confraternity. It is not the bugle-call of imperial command that has brought troops from every quarter of the globe to participate with Great Britain in the present struggle, but the common conviction that democracy is in danger and that free nations must stand together. An English historian, in the midst of the war, writes:

> This is a testing time for Democracy. The people of Great Britain and the Dominions, to whom all the world looks as trustees, together with France and America, of the great democratic tradition, are brought face to face, for the first time, with their full responsibility as British citizens. Upon the way in which that responsibility is realized and discharged depends the future of the democratic principle, not only in these islands, but throughout the world.

And this is the conviction of the dominions themselves. To the astonishment of the world, not one has failed to respond. Sir Clifford Sifton said in an address at Montreal:

> Bound by no constitution, bound by no law, equity, or obligation, Canada has decided as a nation to make war. We have levied an army; we have sent the greatest army to England that has ever crossed the Atlantic, to take part in the battles of England. We have placed ourselves in opposition to great world powers. We are now training and equipping an army greater than the combined forces of Wellington and Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo.

Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and even India, have responded voluntarily in a similar manner; but they did so not as imperial possessions, but as virtually independent nations, sure of themselves, confident of their future, and inspired by the vision of a union in which for all coming time they are to be free and independent participants. From the uttermost parts of the earth they have gathered "to honor their uncovenanted bond, obedient to one uncalculating purpose; and the fields of their final achievement, where they lie in a fellowship too close and a peace too deep to be broken, are the image and the epitome of the cause for which they fell."

But in all this fine consciousness of British unity there is not the slightest touch of really imperial influence. The Canadian and the Austra-

lian do not wish to be rated as Englishmen, and would sometimes even resent it. Common traditions there are; but they are not merely traditions of race, of language, or of religion. They are primarily traditions of liberty. It is not the state that holds them together; it is the conviction that all that makes the state worth saving is the protection it affords to freedom, the value it gives to the individual life.

But such an inspiration can never end in a stolid and pertinacious tribalism. It feels a larger kinship and seeks a wider partnership. It gives unity to the nation, but it reaches out for international friendships and affinities. It seeks to establish the greater commonwealth of nations. It aspires to a place in a system. And the same Canadian who said that Canada was ready to take part in the battles of England said at the same time: "I say to you that Canada must stand now as a nation. . . . The nations will say, if you can levy armies to make war, you can attend to your own business, and we will not be referred to the head of the Empire; we want you to answer our questions directly."

By the force of its own free development de-

mocracy must become international. In no other way can it realize its own security. In no other way can it attain to its own ideals. "It is necessary," says a Canadian writer, "to declare with utmost haste . . . that motives of national aggrandisement and national enmity must be subordinated to the desire for the larger benefits growing out of peace and international good-will." And never will the autonomous colonies enter a war in the name of the empire in which they do not have a voice. Said the high commissioner of the Australian Commonwealth, Mr. Andrew Fisher, on his arrival in London:

> If I had stayed in Scotland, I should have been able to heckle my member on questions of imperial policy, and to vote for or against him on that ground. I went to Australia, and I have been prime minister. But all the time I have had no say whatever about imperial policy—no say whatever. Now that can't go on. There must be some change.

In April, 1916, at the conference of the Entente Allies held at Paris, the sense of a commonwealth took a wider range, and this meeting, it has been held, assumed the form of "a legislative parliament of France, Russia, England, Italy, Belgium,

Serbia, Japan, and the self-governing British Dominions." The subject of interest was financial solidarity during the present war, and even after it. Some of the exclusiveness that marked that conference may vanish, and will certainly be diminished after the war is over; but it may well be that, "if the agreements growing out of this event stand the test of time, they will dispose effectively of the contention that dissimilar nations cannot act in harmony for their mutual advantage in matters international."

Three of these nations, Britain, France, and Russia, are henceforth to be bound together as at the beginning of the war it was never imagined they could ever be by a new sense of the value and the meaning of democracy. They will be in relations that will enable them after the war to dispense with military action except for their common defense. With the sincere support of other nations for common purposes, there should be no room in the world for economic imperialism in its existing form. Deplorable, indeed, would be a further and more powerfully organized example of it by prohibition of commercial intercourse, which would be, in effect, an indefinite prolonga-

tion of international strife on economic lines. But such a purpose is not in the highest interest of these powers; and, when this comes to be duly considered in the treaties of peace it may happily be averted.

Taking all its past into account, it would be impossible to exempt the British Empire from the charge of economic imperialism. No nation has ever been more constantly actuated by the spirit of commercialism sustained by military force than the British. The fault is frankly admitted by its own historians. Professor Ramsay Muir says:

> This motive has been present in many of our own wars; it has been the predominant motive with us perhaps more often than with any other people, from the time when we fought to overthrow the Spanish monopoly of the tropical West, to the time when we waged two wars with China in order to force open the gates of that vast market.

But Great Britain has learned the lesson of experience. It is not just to blame a progressive and liberal people for the actions of the past, when other standards of conduct were generally accepted, and when national rivalry was necessitated by the conditions of the time. The pressing

question is, Shall these conditions be perpetuated? Great Britain now answers, "No."

The Imperial German Government alleges that prior to 1914 there was a conspiracy headed by Great Britain, to suppress "the liberty of national evolution" of the German Empire and to deny "the freedom of the seas."

What then is meant by "the liberty of national evolution" and "the freedom of the seas"?

Aiming to become a world power, Germany has desired to possess a free hand in acquiring territory in all parts of the world, without being subject to the restraint of other powers. Portions of every continent are marked on the map as future German possessions. "The German Empire," says Franz von Liszt, "has not yet acquired the title of a World Power for it is far from being comparable with Great Britain and Russia, either by the number of its inhabitants or the independence of its economic life. Still less can Austria-Hungary pretend to this title." To obtain it is, however, he thinks, a legitimate aspiration of the Central empires. There will, of course, he admits, be opposition by other nations; but the goal

is worthy of the effort. "The supremacy of the world," he says, "belongs to the Power which by its geographic configuration, the extent of its territory, and the number of its population, possesses a complete economic independence." The Germans claim this as their rightful inheritance. Their strength, they consider, gives them a title to it. They are self-avowed contestants for world supremacy.

And "the freedom of the seas," what does that imply? It signifies, as the Imperial German Government understand it, the unrestrained privilege of obtaining a colonial empire by means of maritime strength.

To realize such an ambition there must be left no rival on the sea who would be able to prevent it. Speaking of the sea power of England, a German writer says:

> The war between her and us . . . turns upon the mastery of the seas, and the priceless values bound up with that; and a coexistence of the two States, of which many Utopians dream, is ruled out as definitely as was the coexistence of Rome and Carthage. The antagonism between England and Germany will, therefore, remain until one of them is finally brought to the ground.

It is this incessant invocation of war and the indisposition to accept the possibility of peace that have made it so difficult for foreign peoples to understand the mind of Germany, or for those who wish to be friends to explain and defend the German attitude toward other nations. Even the German emperor himself has not hesitated to throw out a challenge to all the maritime powers. "I will never rest," he has said, "until I have raised my navy to a position similar to that occupied by my army." And the reason for this determination he frankly declares in the words: "Germany's colonial aims can only be gained when Germany has become lord of the ocean."

What, prior to August, 1914, had Great Britain done to call forth an accusation of irreconcilable hostility? No foreboding of such antagonism existed in 1890, when, for the protectorate of Zanzibar, Great Britain surrendered the island of Helgoland to Germany; or in 1895, when that stronghold became the fortified gate of the Kiel Canal at its North Sea terminus. Even when the first extensive naval legislation was enacted in Germany, in 1900, it created no great disturbance in England. The first indication that British ap-

prehension was aroused was the building of the earliest "dreadnaughts" by England in 1905. But even in 1907 Germany was making cordial public professions of faith in her English rival's fairness and generosity. "Everywhere in the world," said a representative of the imperial German foreign office, in May of that year, to a delegation of British journalists, "where Great Britain has brought any country under her influence, she has never suppressed the trade developments in other lands, as many nations have to their own detriment. You have always devoted your energies and labors to the opening up of the country's sources of production, bringing it nearer to civilization and progress. You have never excluded other states from territories under British influence, but allowed them to go along with you. This policy of yours is now celebrating one of its greatest triumphs in Egypt."

In the following summer occurred the second conference at The Hague. Great Britain proposed the limitation of armaments on the sea, but in deference to the wishes of the German delegates the proposal was given formal sepulture, with solemn funeral rites conducted in a spirit of

friendly consideration by the Russian president of the conference.

The eager interest of German military circles in the construction of the Zeppelin airships in 1908 no doubt really disturbed the British mind; for here was a device which, it was believed in Germany, would be able to float in triumph over the British fleet and bring to terms the coast towns of the island and even London itself. But England, under a Liberal ministry, was not inclined to war, and renewed the proposal of a holiday in fleet-building, reinforced by the importunities of the United States. In 1914 a treaty had amicably regulated the affair of the Bagdad railway. Even as late as July 29, 1914, three days before the German declaration of war, Great Britain was so far from being considered in Germany as the arch-conspirator in bringing about war that the Imperial German Government sought and expected Great Britain's complete neutrality in the war it then intended to declare on Russia and France, on condition that Germany would take from France only her colonies and leave undisturbed her territorial integrity on the continent. So great at that time was the confidence in Eng-

land's disinclination for war that it was believed she would passively consent to Germany's forcible appropriation of the French colonies without even a *pourboire* in compensation for this indulgence.

It may be useful to recall what the conditions actually were when the German emperor on August 1, 1914, declared war on Russia. Dismissing from our minds for the moment all questions regarding the underlying causes of the war, and without at this time attempting to pass judgment upon any of the issues involved in it, let us fix our attention upon the military situation as it existed on that fateful day when the whole mechanism of European security suddenly broke down.

We may pass over the ultimatum to Serbia, Austria's invasion of Serbian territory, and Russia's resolve to protect the small Slav state or procure a hearing for its case as a question of European interest by which armed conflict might, perhaps, have been avoided. On August 1, the German emperor had in his hands the following documents:

1. A telegram from the czar, dated July 30,

reading: "The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defense and on account of Austria's preparations. I hope from all my heart that these won't in any way interfere with your part as mediator, which I greatly value."

2. A telegraphic instruction by Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30, directing Sir Edward Goschen, the British ambassador at Berlin, to say to the imperial German chancellor "most earnestly," that "the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. . . . And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves."

3. A telegram dated July 31, from Mr. Sazo-

noff, Russian minister for foreign affairs, reading as follows: "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory; if, recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

4. A telegram of July 31 from Sir Edward Grey, reading: "If Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences."

5. A telegram from Count Berchtold, minister for foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary to all Austro-Hungarian embassies and legations, dated

July 31, to be communicated to all governments, reading: "Negotiations dealing with the situation are proceeding between the cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and we still hope that they may lead to a general understanding."

In these circumstances, on August 1, the German emperor, having received no reply to his demand that Russian mobilization should cease within twelve hours, declared war on Russia, thus automatically involving France, Russia's ally, although knowing that France did not desire war. The sole reason given for this action was that Russia had not at that time ceased the mobilization of her army in defense of Serbia against Austria's attack, there being no direct quarrel between Russia and Germany. How unjust was the ultimatum sent on the previous day to Russia, is shown by the telegram of the German emperor to King George, on August 1, the day he declared war on Russia. The telegram was sent under the impression, which proved erroneous, that Great Britain was ready to guarantee the neutrality of France; yet the German emperor declared that it was "too late" to stop the mobilization begun on that day! The telegram reads:

I have just received the communication of your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilization which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts—east and west—must proceed according to the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your telegram unfortunately came too late; but if France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier. WILLIAM.

No one of these nations, it is alleged, desired a general war, and yet it came as a matter of military necessity! "I hope France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are *at this moment* being held back by telegraph and telephone from crossing the French frontier." And, according to Berlin, mobilization had not even been ordered until five o'clock of that same day!

What a white light is poured by this last telegram upon the mechanism of destruction that had been so laboriously prepared! Only one man in

Europe who could stop the war, and he caught in the fatal toils of his own machinery! For technical reasons, telegram too late, German troops held back on the French frontier by telegraph and telephone—I hope France will not be nervous. But why this solicitude for the nerves of France? Was Germany also nervous?

I am making here no accusation. What I wish to emphasize is that the machinery for preserving peace had not been sufficiently organized, while the machinery of war had become so efficient as to be virtually uncontrollable. No one, we are assured, wanted war. All wanted peace. Serbia wanted justice. So also, it is said, did Austria. But Europe had not provided for justice to a small state.

The time has come when Europe should reassert its moral unity and make an end of tribalism. All the machinery for international coöperation already exists, and needs only the adjustment of it to the purposes of peace. The railways and the steamships that have facilitated the mobilization of troops and munitions of war, the telegraphic lines which have transmitted the orders

setting great armies in motion, the vast factories that have been forging instruments of destruction, are already there, waiting to convey the merchandise, communicate the messages, and produce the commodities of peace. The one thing lacking is the effective organization of international justice. Let it once be agreed that each people shall be secure in its freedom and independence, and that nations may be as sure of justice as are individual men in a well-organized state, and the transformation would be already accomplished.

Depending, as it does, upon good faith, this regeneration is essentially an inner process in the minds and souls of men. It cannot be imposed from without. It cannot be forced upon one nation by another. It cannot be effected by fighting. It will never come as the spontaneous act of governments. It must come from the overwhelming determination of the people of many nations to have it so.

The real testing time of democracy will be the moment of victory; for victory there must be, and yet a victory that is not a conquest. If the claims of democracy in this war are to be accepted, it is intended to be a defense of the conquered against

the conqueror, a protest against the ordeal of battle as the decisive factor in determining the fate of nations. To invert the rôles would be to abandon the cause. If there is to be a commonwealth of nations, the Central Powers should not be excluded from it except by their own will. The first article in a treaty of peace should be a statement of the principles for which we are now fighting in this war and the establishment of a commonwealth based upon them. Respect for treaties, the rights of the small states, the rule of law, the abandonment of conquests, the right of a people to choose its affiliations, the ultimate extinction of militarism as a system, the submission of justiciable differences to a competent tribunal, the responsibility of states to the society of states —these are the essential terms of a durable treaty of peace. If this can be attained, there will indeed be a new Europe.

Should a nation wait to be vanquished before accepting such a peace? Is it not the only peace in which any nation can place its trust? Against any other the vanquished would be in perpetual revolt. But in such a peace all men would at the same time have the support of their own sense of

justice and secure the realization of their own highest ideals. It would be to all the peoples of Europe like a proclamation of emancipation. With it would come the joy of liberty, the sense of security, the flood-tide of human fellowship. For such a peace the mighty host of the dead on land and sea might well rejoice if they could know that they had bought it with their lives.

CHAPTER V

THE TRANSFIGURATION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

WHAT is the present attitude of Germany toward a commonwealth of nations? According to the philosophy of the state underlying the practice of economic imperialism, there is to be no end to national antagonisms in the pursuit of power, and this conviction seems to have been intensified rather than attenuated in the minds of many Germans during the progress of the war. One of the most eminent of German historians, Professor Eduard Meyer of Berlin, wrote in 1915:

> Dispelled for all time are the dreams of those well-intentioned visionaries who hoped for a day when the nations would be at peace forever, and all their disputes would be settled at the bar of an international tribunal of arbitration by which war would be made impossible—dreams that have been so widely entertained in America, where the people have become effeminate in their sentiments in recent years. The Hague Peace Conferences, in-

stituted at the suggestion of the Czar,—how great a travesty in the world's history!—and the palace in which they were held, are a satire on the times, and subsequent events have fully justified Germany in her disinclination at first to participate in this empty farce.[1]

It was at the high tide of German victories that these words were written, and they serve well to indicate what the permanent attitude of the German Empire would be in case of a final German triumph. There would be no appeal to the jurists to define the equities of international life. "A series of long and sanguinary wars," this writer gravely assures us, "will mark the century upon which we have entered." And the reason for this is frankly stated. "The dominating circumstance by which coming events will be most strongly influenced will be the impassable gulf that has opened between England and Germany, and their feeling of bitter enmity for each other. So far as we are able to scan the future," he continues, "a reconciliation is not possible; we Germans can never forget how England has served us." And for this reason the conclusion is

[1] Neither conference was, in fact, held in the so-called Palace of Peace. The first assembled in the House in the Wood, the second in the Hall of the Knights.

reached that "the era of internationalism is past and will never return. It will be replaced by a period of vigorous and ruthless assertion of national ambition,—the struggle of the nations with one another. . . . To return to the paths of Internationalism, and again sacrifice interests of great importance to ourselves for the sake of it, would be a crime against our own people."

This deliberate repudiation of the idea of an international community of interests and obligations expresses an entirely new attitude, which no nation in modern times has ever yet taken. It sweeps away with disdain the whole foundation upon which a society of states must be based. For such a society it would substitute the absolute, all-dominating power of an organization which contains in itself no standard or consciousness of rectitude. "To us Germans," Professor Meyer says, "the state is the most indispensable as well as the highest requisite of our earthly existence. . . . The state is of much higher importance than any individual groups, and eventually is of infinitely more value than the sum of all the individuals within its jurisdiction." The reason

given for this assertion is that the state "has a life apart; its mission is unending; and, in theory at least, unless it is wrecked by a force from without, its existence is endless, encompassing as it does all the generations yet to come, and welding them into a great unit,—the mighty life of a nation acting its part in the history of the world."

This is, in substance, the state as Hegel conceived it, with the divinity left out. As now represented, the empire is a "splendidly creative monarchy" possessed of absolute power, no longer pretending to be divine, and confessedly very narrowly human; for, as this theory of empire expresses it, "the final decision in every measure undertaken rests with the sovereign, who therefore assumes full responsibility for it, and no one can relieve him of it." But as the sovereign in this conception is the sole personal representative of the state, and the state is of "infinitely more value than the sum of all the individuals within its jurisdiction," there is no one entitled to hold him responsible, no standard by which to measure his responsibility. If at his command millions of men, no matter how many millions, are slain in battle, since all human beings taken together

are of less importance than the power and prosperity of the empire, no wrong is committed; and if there were a wrong, there would be no means of preventing or even of condemning it. "In this personal element," we are gravely assured, "lies the tremendous advantage that a monarchial government has over any other, in that it unites in one person the power to act for the State, together with the undivided responsibility to conscience for the consequences of the act." And thus the conscience of one man who holds himself accountable to no one, but whose interest it is by any and all means to extend his power, is made the measure of the state's responsibility.

One has only to open the pages of the jurists and philosophers of an earlier time, when the German peoples and princes were struggling for their local rights and liberties against the authority of the old empire, and to reread the history of the contests for the "Germanic liberties," then held to be so dear, to realize how completely, even since the time of Bismarck, the conception of the German state has been transformed. What Germans for centuries have bitterly fought against is now set forth as the highest and noblest achieve-

ment of that race. In 1913, Prince von Bülow was saying, "The strong control exercised by the authorities of Prussia has always evoked a particularly vigorous counter-movement among the German people themselves." But if Professor Eduard Meyer is right, that control is henceforth to be regarded as the crowning glory of German achievement. The triumph of German imperialism, which at the time he wrote seemed to Professor Meyer so certain, would in his opinion create a condition in which the ultimate law for the German people would be the conscience of the German emperor. "The world in which we shall find ourselves after peace has been concluded," he says, "will be totally different from the one with which we have been familiar, even should there be no outward change, no shifting of the old-time boundary lines. This war is not only the greatest war in the history of mankind, it is the most epoch-making event of modern history. The world as we knew it before August 1, 1914, has ceased to be. What precedes that date seems to belong to a remote past, so far removed from us that we can hardly realize that we had a share in it."

There can be no doubt that the world will never be the same that it was on August 1, 1914, when one man, responsible only to his own conscience, plunged Europe into war; but what is new and startling in Professor Meyer's conception of the future is the intended transformation in the idea of the German Empire which it reveals. From its inception the empire was without doubt an autocratic structure with enormously centralized powers; but neither its author, Prince von Bismarck, nor its apologist, Prince von Bülow, in their most rapturous moments of devotion to their sovereigns would have called it "a splendid creative monarchy" in which the conscience of the sovereign is the highest law of the nation. Bismarck would have recalled that his own acts in creating it were performed in a manner that the conscience of William I certainly did not inspire, and Bülow could not have forgotten that in 1908 it was his function as imperial chancellor to quiet the disturbance of the public mind caused by the indiscreet utterances of William II in the *Daily Telegraph* interview, and to pledge his own honor that he would not again

permit the emperor to act without the responsible advice of his councilors.

Before 1914 the constitution of the German Empire was not interpreted as a monarchy, but as a confederation of monarchies, which, in its own terms, is "an eternal alliance for the protection of the territory of the Confederation, and of the rights of the same as well as the promotion of the welfare of the German people." It is a confederation of coördinate monarchs and three free city-republics. "To the King of Prussia," reads the eleventh article, "shall belong the presidency of the Confederation, and he shall have the title of German Emperor"; but he is nowhere referred to as a monarch except in Prussia. His imperial powers of control and appointment are very great, especially in time of war, since "all German troops are bound to render unconditional obedience to the commands of the Emperor"; but his duties and powers, though broad, are nevertheless to some extent enumerated and defined. They are quite definitely limited by the Bundesrat, and apparently, but not really, by the popularly elected Reichstag, which is in effect a mere

debating society, which the Germans themselves have named "The hall of echoes." It is of interest to note, however, that the powers of the Bundesrat and the Reichstag are specified in the constitution before the presidency is even mentioned.

The truth is that the constitution of the German Empire is, and probably was designed to be, an extremely ambiguous document capable of being construed as creating a truly constitutional government, but well adapted to such perversions and usurpations of power as an autocratic ruler, especially in time of war and in absolute command of an immense and well-disciplined army, might choose to make.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the war has developed new interpretations of the imperial constitution, and that in the hours of apparent victory the Byzantinism that even in time of peace had become so conspicuous among the German functionaries and aspirants to imperial favor should be exaggerated, with the result of attributing to the emperor powers which the people never supposed that he legally possessed; for, although

it was the sovereigns and not the people of Germany who made the constitution of the empire, the people have assumed that it was made in their interest and not for their enslavement.

The recent revelation that the war may not bring forth a German victory has created a widespread interest in the real meaning of the constitution and a new desire for popular control of the government. The German Empire is undoubtedly on the brink of changes which are at present incalculable, for the character of these changes will depend upon the eventualities of the war. A German defeat would unquestionably result in radical revision of the constitutional organization of the empire and important restrictions upon the powers of the emperor, not excluding a possibility of even more fundamental changes. If, on the other hand, the Central Powers suffer no serious defeat, and especially if the plans of the Pan-Germanists are in any important degree successful, it is with this new conception of imperial autocracy that the rest of the world will hereafter have to contend. The complete triumph of the Central Powers would mean the triumph of the

Prussian monarchy, and would confirm its supremacy over the entire German Empire and its present allies.

It is of the highest importance to the peace of the world to take into account the critical situation which is created for Europe by this new conception which the war has generated of the German Empire as "a splendid creative monarchy." There is in this conception no repudiation of the Pan-German plans of expansion. On the contrary, there is an explicit assertion that if they are now destined to be defeated, the world's peace will suffer for it, since nothing short of an imperial victory will prevent the prospect of future wars. The "hammer and anvil" philosophy of history is vigorously reasserted, and Germany intends to be always the hammer and never the anvil. "It is impossible," writes Professor Meyer, "to pierce the veil that hides the future, and to foretell that which will come to pass. Yet even now every German must clearly discern that, if the German nation would maintain its position in the world, there are three things that we must cleave to as the inviolable basis of our independent and vigorous existence." These, he says, are

"our military organization, our economic organization, together with protection for our agricultural industries, for by these the necessities of life are assured to us and we are made independent of supplies from abroad; and, lastly, a virile monarchial government, wholly independent to act, that it may be free to combine and utilize in creative activity all the forces of which the nation is capable. For the beneficent results of this activity we had every reason to be grateful," he concludes, "when the outbreak of the war found us fully supplied with material and thoroughly prepared, while every day that the war continues gives us renewed evidence of its efficiency."

It is, in fact, the efficiency of the German Empire in war, its perfection as a form of power, that constitutes its great merit in this writer's eyes, for the end of the state is power, not only creative and constructive power, but destructive power as well. "The truth of the whole matter undoubtedly is," he says, "that the time has arrived when two distinct forms of state organization"—the German and the English—"must face each other in a struggle for life or death." They cannot, it

seems, longer live together in the same world.

It is then with this new Germany, if she is victorious—always prepared for war, trusting only to the sword, believing in the necessity of future wars, bent on "creative activity" in the development of her "vigorous existence," under the command of "one man wholly independent to act," and opposed to internationalism,—that, if this interpretation of imperial purpose is correct, the other nations of the earth will have to live. If there is to be peace, Germany contends, it must be a peace imposed by the conqueror in which other forms of state organization will have to yield to imperial supremacy. Such is the claim, and such is the boast.

Certainly, this is not the old Germany that we knew and loved, the teacher of music and poetry, science and philosophy, art and literature. A thousand memories of kindly faces and sweet voices and delicate attentions flood in upon our minds as we compare the present with the past. The land of song, the home of the humanities, the embodiment of *Gemütlichkeit,* are they really gone forever? And what has any one done to Germany that she should now wish to estrange

herself from all the world? Does she really repudiate internationalism? Hereafter will there be in the world no welcome ports for her great fleets of merchantmen as of old? Shall we not again sail the wide ocean with her great captains? Shall we not learn again of the great masters who have been our teachers? Tear out that page, Professor Meyer, and write it in another mood. What can the German Empire expect of a world in which there is no internationalism? What is to be its place among the nations? And whose fault is it that there is to be no internationalism? Who has been the first to violate treaties? Who has been the first to decline to let Europe decide what was from its very nature a European question? Who first declared war in the midst of negotiations? Who first proceeded not against an enemy in arms, but against an unarmed and neutralized people? Who first challenged all neutrals by a campaign of frightfulness in which innocent non-combatants, men, women, and even little children, were shattered into fragments by explosions, or mercilessly drowned in the sea? Is the right to live in the world a question for the conscience of one man? Shall the burden of guilt

in the struggle for empire be made to rest upon one human being and not fall also upon those who have intended to profit by it? And, finally, can it be expected that the world will remain friendly with a nation that organizes assassination as a means to power?

We may as well frankly recognize the fact first as last, that German imperial aggression does not grow entirely out of the adoration of a dynasty nor out of its compulsion, nor is it purely the result of a philosophic theory of the state. It is because dynasties serve national purposes that they are invested with peculiar sanctity, and it is because an imperial government can increase the power of a people over other peoples that the aid of philosophy is invoked to sustain its prestige. When we appeal to history the evidence of this is overwhelming. What has reconciled Germany to the overlordship of Prussia is the material advantages that have been derived from German unity. For the wave of conquest, which originally proceeded from the Mark Brandenburg and derived the name of Prussia (Bo-Russia) from the annexation of a Slavic province of Po-

land obtained by a union of war and diplomacy, there is no sentiment of reverence in the German heart. The Germans know too well their own history. An empire ruled by Prussia would have been repudiated in the first decades of its existence had it not brought extensive economical advantages to all the German states. This it undoubtedly has done, and the appreciation of it is heightened by the expectation that the centralized power of a unified Germany will procure further gains to the German people, new employment for their labor, new markets for their goods, new resources for their exploitation. The Pan-Germanist program is not really founded on race affinity or sentiment of any kind. It aims at the extension of the empire because it is regarded as a fruitful tree, the growth of which will not only cast a protecting shade, but bear rich fruits for the German people.

This aspect of German imperialism is well illustrated in such works as Dr. Friedrich Naumann's "Central Europe" ("Mittel-Europa") and Professor Harms on "Germany's Share in the World's Trade"; the latter manifesting a very lively sense of the economic importance to Ger-

many of international trade, and of the disadvantage that would be incurred if foreign markets were lost to her.

It is Dr. Naumann, however, whose circle of readers is very wide and whose authority as a popular writer and as a member of the Reichstag is very great, who best interprets the dominating thought in current German political plans for the future. Writing in the midst of war and under the inspiration of war, he presents to us his vision of a new Central Europe great enough and strong enough to hold an undisputed place in the midst of permanently hostile nations, giving to *Deutschtum* a rock-ribbed security in which to abide its time for that military development and that economic expansion to which he believes that the German peoples are entitled. Only in the midst of war, it is contended, could the mind be prepared to comprehend the need and the import of such a vast conception; for *Mittel-Europa* —the further extended, further energized, and further fortified Teutonic empire of the future— could never even be conceived by the ordinary every-day spirit. "As Bismarck, in the midst of the war of 1870 and not after it had ended, be-

held a vision of the German Empire," he writes, "so in the midst of war, in the flowing of blood and the commotion of peoples, will be laid by our statesmen the foundations of the new construction."

What then is this new imperial edifice to include? It is, in the words of its projector, to consist in nothing less than "the coalescence of those states which belong neither to the Anglo-French Alliance nor to the Russian Empire; but, above all, the combination of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, since all further plans for the uniting of the Central European peoples depend upon the success attending the union of the two Central States."

The necessity for this union, Naumann thinks, is absolute, for the reason that the day for the rôle of small states in history is forever past. In the old Europe the small states had a natural place. Germany was entirely composed of them, but, always discordant, they presented a shifting picture of struggling princes, each actuated by his own interest and rarely forming combinations of historical significance. Like clouds they suddenly gathered and as suddenly were dissipated.

The so-called Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, in which the German states nominally existed, was under the house of Hapsburg utterly devoid of unity, the greater half nearly always subject to foreign influence insinuated under the pretense of protecting them against the authority of the empire of which they formed a part.

To-day, under the pressure of a common hostility, the German Empire, unified by Prussia, and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, feeling their common necessity of coöperation, are aware of being united in a struggle for their existence. No longer is separatism to be defended. War has created a Central European soul, which must now, he thinks, take on a body fitted to its needs.

But it is not a mere temporary exigency that has brought about this result. Great business has necessitated great politics, and the organization of the state must correspond to them. We must, says Naumann, as Cecil Rhodes expressed it, "think in continents." Sovereignty in any real sense can hardly any longer be ascribed to the little peoples. Without allies they are noth-

ing. Isolation is weakness and danger. Even Prussia, alone, is too small for a modern state. "The State," Treitschke taught, "is power"; and he added, "There is something laughable in the idea of a small State." No doubt amidst the battle of giants it may seem laughable for the physically feeble to demand freedom or even justice, and yet, as has been well said, "there is something unpardonably brutal in such laughter." There being no historical rôle for the small states according to this philosophy, they do not enter at all into the groundwork of Central Europe. They would prove too independent, too refractory, and certainly too feebly inspired by the imperial spirit, to be combined in the active and potent nucleus of power required for the realization of this great political conception. Italy, if it were more amenable to Teutonic influence, might be an acceptable acquisition; but, at present, it is too Latin in its affinities to be incorporated in the body of Central Europe. Like Holland, Switzerland, the Balkan States, Turkey and the Scandinavian countries, Italy is on the whole too peripheral to form a vital organ in this new organism. All these countries, despite

the greatly enhanced quantitative conception of the modern state as a great power, "since they still have before them historical waiting-time for their decision," are to be held for the time being in solution. The first and pressing necessity is to create that nucleus of Central Europe—the combination of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary—around which the little states may ultimately crystallize; for these, Naumann thinks, when they once "see with open eyes" what their future position will be, will one by one seek safety and advantage by adhering to the Central Powers.

Such, in outline, is Naumann's program for the future. It is a program only, but it is one upon which he expends a lavish art in order to give it all possible attractiveness.

In his estimation, the critical moment, will be in the negotiations for peace. What the terms of peace will be he prudently does not attempt to say; but whatever they are, "whether the outer limits of the central empires of Middle Europe are to be bent somewhat more toward the West or toward the East, upon the ground of military triumph, the question in all circumstances re-

mains: whether the plenipotentiaries from Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest leave the hall of the Peace Congress as clear, true friends or as secret enemies." "We wish," he continues, "that they return to their peoples with the solution: 'Eternally undivided.' "

In that case no doubt Europe will enter upon a period of development differing widely from the past. But will that union be achieved? No one better than the projector of Central Europe understands that the answer to the question can not be certain. "All wars of coalition since remote antiquity," he says, "have been attended with difficult conclusions of peace, for they have always ended with gains and losses that must be reconciled with one another." Such a peace as that of 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, Naumann insists, must not be repeated. The one really great trophy of the war will be wrapped up in the question of permanent union. If the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the German Empire can be kept asunder, that will be for the Entente Powers a great and permanent victory. If, on the other hand, they unite to form a new Central Europe, the sons of Germany and

Austria-Hungary, he thinks, will not have died in vain.

It is not, however, a general reorganization of national life and a better assurance of general peace that are expected from the coalescence of the Central empires. It is rather their mutual defense and a quicker and firmer preparation for new military emergencies. In the negotiations for peace, it is admitted, each of the belligerents will seek its freedom as well as its advantage; but, insists Naumann, "it is an unhistorical form of apprehension if one believes that five or eight Great Powers will leave the hall of the Peace Congress without already having new treaties in their pockets." In any case, it will not, he thinks, be the beginning of everlasting peace. There will be pacific endeavors and perhaps new assurances; but there will remain unsettled an incredible number of new as well as old questions that will awaken solicitude for the future. "All the ministries of war, all the general staffs, all the admiralties," Naumann contends, "will reflect upon the lessons of the war when it is over; a still more scientific technique will invent new weapons; the frontier strongholds will be made

broader and more extended." And the inference from all this is that no single state can remain alone. The German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, if they are to survive, he urges, must combine for their mutual safety and support.

This necessity arises in part from their territorial unity, viewed from an orographical point of view. Nature, from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Alps, the Adriatic, and the southern plain of the Danube, has so ordained it. "Open the map," says Naumann, "and see what lies between the Vistula and the Vosges, what between Galicia and the Bodensee! This area can be conceived only as a unit, as a well-articulated brother-land, as a confederation of defense, as a self-sufficing economic district. Here must all historic particularism in the stress of the world-war so far vanish that it confirms the idea of unity."

And as unity is favored, so must it be permanently secured by physical conditions. What these conditions are the war has revealed. The best-established result of a technical military character is that in the future fighting will be

only in long-drawn-out lines, and trenches will furnish the basis of the defense of the Fatherland. The policy of the trench consists in this, that every state must calculate within what limits it can or cannot establish its trench-defense position. Had the French entrenched themselves from Belfort to Dunkirk, it is asserted, the invasion of France through Belgium would probably have proved impossible. The same, it is insisted, holds good for the East Prussian and Austro-Galician frontiers. After the war frontier entrenchments will everywhere be erected where the possibilities of war are present. New Chinese walls must arise if the nations are to live in friendship. Two long walls from north to south will divide the European continent into three strips. The Middle European question is whether between the walls running north and south still another between Germany and Austria-Hungary will be needed. Naumann urges that if the unity of future policies is not secured, the necessity will be imperative; but, if thus rendered necessary, it will be in the highest degree injurious and full of evil portent for both sides.

Inclusion or exclusion—these are the alterna-

tives offered to Austria by this new system of fortified insularity, here presented as the only possible method of securing friendly relations. What is it that demands these insurmountable barriers between nation and nation? Is it utter despair of all moral and legal means of reconciliation between them? Whence, then, this ineradicable incompatibility between the nations east and west of these mural barricades? What is it that makes it necessary for all the future to part them by impassable and eternally guarded moats? It is, apparently, that Central Europe may be thus established as a consolidated Teutonic power rendered forever independent of those voluntary concessions, adjustments, and agreements by which contiguous peoples have hitherto regulated their conduct. But why should a nation seek this exemption from the ordinary conditions of human existence in a social state? Is it merely as a means of defense? Is it to preserve from violation the sacred principle of nationality? Is it to maintain intact a pure and disinterested neutrality in the midst of a warring world?

Not one of these last mentioned considerations

is advanced as a reason for this consolidation and immurement. There is no discussion even of the possible basis of pacific readjustments, no proposal to restore autonomy to the suppressed nationalities in the German and Austro-Hungarian realms, no thought whatever for the Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, and others already immured within these empires, no reference to neutrality except to point out that the trench policy will render it more difficult for the small states to remain neutral, and thus will tend to draw them into the circle of the Central Powers. It is assumed throughout that the only possible bonds of union and the only possible conditions of friendly relationship are of a purely mechanical nature. The little states, it is emphasized, being incapable of the system of entrenchment on account of its cost and their natural environment, will be left without defense, and therefore will constitute available raw material for further economic exploitation. When Central Europe is organized and fortified those states that, to use Naumann's words, "belong neither to the Anglo-French Confederation nor to the Russian Empire" are to fall like ripe fruit, without effort

or sacrifice on the part of the new imperial union, into its outstretched hands.

With almost anxious particularity it is insisted that no such thought as this antedated the war either at Berlin or Vienna, much less entered into the causation of it. In the German Empire, it is frankly stated, existed the thought that sometime there must come an accounting with Russia, and also that sometime there must be a fight with England concerning sea power. These eventualities, he admits, were already prepared for in the mind of the German Government and of the German people. The new development was that there suddenly and unexpectedly rushed together as in a mighty flood the war with Russia, the war with France, and the war on the sea. In the war with France and the war on the sea Austria-Hungary had no part, but with very pressing Balkan, Slav, and Italian perils. Thus two great interests unexpectedly blended, and the three wars became virtually one. Nevertheless, owing to this duality of origin, the conflict has had a different aspect as seen from Vienna, Budapest, and Berlin. At first the idea of common statehood and common responsibility in all

directions was wanting; but the war has generated it and has proved that it is not merely a German war or a Danube war, but the historical test of Central Europe.

"The war unites!" exclaims Naumann; but he comprehends fully what contrarieties are to be blended, what antagonisms are to be overcome if Central Europe is to emerge from the struggle as a political unit. He acknowledges that Austria-Hungary is filled with particularism and the strife of partly submerged nationalities, while Germany is a new unity tending toward further centralization. Germany, from a loose confederation, has become a federal state; Austria-Hungary is a confederacy formed of independent, but conventionally united, monarchies. Germany, it is noted, is more northern, colder, more uniform, more technical; Austria-Hungary more southern, gayer, more temperamental, more romantic. Germany is for the most part Protestant, Austria-Hungary for the most part Catholic. Austria-Hungary possesses more of the past, and perhaps more of the future, but Germany more of the present. The rhythm of life is different. It is as if east and west, north and south, the eighteenth

century and the twentieth century were all to be melted together.

Whatever the contradictions of nature or inclination, concludes Naumann, the future existence of the two empires depends upon their union. Neither has any other possible ally upon whom it can with confidence depend. Their combination is therefore a reciprocal necessity.

Of the two, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy contains the greater quantity of racial diversities and nationalist aspirations; yet this may not prove a cause of disruption, for union with a strong power is essential to the existence of these submerged nationalities. The Czechs, Moravians, Poles, Serbs, Croats and Slovaks, and even the Magyars alone, would be too feeble to maintain their national independence in isolation. From the nature of things, it is asserted, their future contentions are bound to be in the sphere of domestic rather than in that of foreign politics. Only under the protection and by the indulgence of their alleged oppressors could they indulge in patriotic declamation. Tolerance would be less dangerous and perhaps less necessary in the projected new Central Europe, for

Prussian advice and, if needed, Prussian assistance, would be at hand to complete the process of absorption and assimilation. Having Prussianized Germany, what would forbid the ultimate Prussianization of all Central Europe? Are not the Prussians themselves of Slavic origin?

There is, in fact, in this great scheme of empire, an almost ostentatious suppression of *Deutschland über Alles*. The project does not disclose, except by inference, the holy mission of German *Kultur* in the redemption of the world. On the contrary, there is, in appearance at least, no emphasis of nationality. For this there are obvious reasons. "It is, of course, understood," says Naumann, "that in belligerent Germany all our old heroic memories rise up from the grave, and we behold brought before us the Prussian King Frederick II, Moltke, and Bismarck. We struggle as Germans, but we struggle together with millions of non-Germans, who are prepared to go with us in battle and in death, if they are respected by us, and if they are permitted to believe that our victory is at the same time their victory."

It is chiefly upon this belief and the sense of

freely acting together that reliance is placed for the constitution of Central Europe. That is why a political union is deemed possible in time of war that would be utterly impossible in a time of peace. It is not considered as at all an affair of chancelleries or parliaments. It could not be secured by merely formal treaties. In such engagements there is always too little or too much, and there is and can be, Naumann thinks, no assurance that mere treaties will always be respected. It is in the actual identity of aim and aspiration of peoples, not in the artificial agreements of cabinets, that a true bond of union must be sought. "Security," he says, "lies in the many-sidedness of political, economic, and personal living together; in the spontaneous and organized overflow of one body politic into the other; in the community of ideas, of history, of culture, of labor, of conceptions of right,—of a thousand great and small things. Only when we reach this condition, shall we be firmly bound together."

There is deep insight in this conception of the prerequisites of union. Nothing fruitful can be hoped for from any form of human government or from any political and especially any interna-

tional combination that is not founded upon the character, the interests, and the aims of those affected by it. It is, therefore, timely for Austro-Hungarians to consider whether a union that confessedly could be conceived only in a time of war is the most advantageous for the dual monarchy in a time of peace.

It is evident that Austria-Hungary is the weak point in the Pan-German scheme of southeastern expansion. Without the practical subordination of the dual monarchy to the control of the Imperial German Government the dream of a Hamburg-to-Bagdad railroad, with German ports on all the southern seas, vanishes into thin air. It is for this reason that Naumann has written his book, for he comprehends perfectly that, left to themselves, neither Austria nor Hungary, much less the latter, can be easily persuaded to regard the scheme of union which he urges as conformable either to their character, their interest, or their national aims, for it would clearly involve their ultimate extinction as separate nations. It is doubtful if they could be voluntarily induced to enter into so close a partnership with so predominant a partner as the Imperial German Govern-

ment. Already there are signs of restlessness under existing Prussian control. The Austro-Hungarian response to the project of a Central Europe under Prussian headship has thus far not been encouraging to Berlin. For this reason, in order to realize the Hamburg-to-Bagdad hegemony, with the control which this involves, the Imperial German Government would, no doubt, gladly free its hands for the purpose of enforcing this result by surrendering for the present every advantage thus far obtained in the west, with the intention of later recovering all that would be temporarily abandoned in France and Belgium.

The fate not only of Austria-Hungary and their submerged nationalities, but that of Greece, the Balkan States, the Ottoman Empire, and even that of Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian kingdoms, will be determined by the settlement of this Mid-European question. Once organized, as German science and skill could organize the Central Europe that Naumann has delineated, it would not only become the overlord of the entire European continent, but the most formidable maritime power that has ever existed.

It is this dream of dominating Europe that has

inspired the Imperial German Government, on the one hand, to propose negotiations for peace, and, on the other, vigorously to continue the war in the hope that one or another of its opponents may be eliminated from the conflict. It is this also that furnishes the ground for the hostility to internationalism. German economic imperialism is as little inclined as the Prussian dynasty to take a place in the world regulated by general agreements. "We never concealed our doubts that peace could be guaranteed permanently by international organizations such as arbitration courts," said the imperial chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, in speaking to a committee of the Reichstag; and his attitude on this subject has commanded virtually universal assent in Germany.

There is something disconcerting to the rest of the world in this fierce spirit of Teutonic tribalism that seems not even to desire a wider friendship. The disposition to reject all international relations, the dependence on mechanical, economic, and military force, and the total absence of the humanism which characterized the old Germany that we knew and loved—it is these things that render this transfigured German Em-

pire weird and strange and at the same time formidable—like a giant caveman, dwelling apart, toiling in his waking hours in preparation for battle, and in his sleep dreaming of enemies and hostilities, as the chief preoccupations of existence.

CHAPTER VI

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

NOTWITHSTANDING the German distrust of arbitration courts, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg has pointed out the conclusion at which all human intelligence must arrive when it devotes itself to a serious examination of international relations. He says:

> If at and after the end of the war the world will only become fully conscious of the horrifying destruction of life and property, then through the whole of humanity there will ring a cry for peaceful arrangements and understandings which, as far as they are within human power, will prevent the return of such a monstrous catastrophe. This cry will be so powerful and so justified that it must lead to some result.

What then is that result to be? It cannot be the domination of any single nation. That is a form of peace to which the world will not submit.

If men were ruled by pure intelligence, it would not be difficult to make a permanent end of war and its devastations; but experience has shown that neither those who govern nor those who are governed are purely intellectual beings. There is in the nature of every man, and hence in the composition of every nation, an element of reason; but there are also instincts, emotions, and passions. Some of these arise from the limitations and necessities of nature as a complex of active forces governed by the great laws of struggle, selection, and survival. In addition to these there are also fortuitous associations of ideas, tribal traditions, and inherent prejudices that have their origin outside the sphere of conscious mental processes. Nations as well as men have their inheritance of natural traits which assimilate them to different species of animals, such as the wolf, the fox, and the lamb. In consequence, the probable conduct of certain races of men may be made the subject of calculation almost as certain as that resulting from the study of the instinctive life of birds and beasts upon which superior intelligence bases its powers of capture and control.

In the seclusion of their studies, philosophers, beginning with a few *a priori* principles of reason, find it an easy task to construct in their minds a universal state, or so to conceive the relations of separate states to one another as to conclude that nothing is simpler than to realize an ultimate federation of the world. On the contrary, those who have been close observers of human nature and especially those who have come in contact with many varied populations in many different countries find it difficult to believe that either a universal state or a perfect harmony of all separate states will ever be possible unless human nature is radically changed. They perceive the fatalities in national existence which prevent the triumph of international ideals, and they wonder how other men of great intelligence can fancy that a plan of coöperation is, in effect, almost accomplished simply because it has been consistently and logically thought out.

As a result of the present European conflict and its revelation of national aims and purposes, there will, no doubt, be urged upon all nations a deeper consideration of the causes of international strife, and elaborate plans will be proposed for

securing more perfect international harmony. Unquestionably the moral sense of all intelligent men will be profoundly stirred, and the iniquity as well as the irrationality of war between civilized nations will be deeply impressed upon them. But this will not be a new experience. In modern times the atrocities accompanying great wars have never failed to call forth projects for a thoroughgoing reorganization of the world. Thus it was that in the midst of the Thirty Years' War, Emeric Crucé proposed that Venice be chosen as the permanent seat of a corps of ambassadors whose votes should settle all international differences. It was during the "Robber Wars" of Louis XIV that William Penn, whom Montesquieu called "the modern Lycurgus," propounded his plans for universal peace. It was at the conclusion of the struggle for the Spanish succession that Fénelon presented to the Congress of Utrecht his famous dissertation, in which he said:

> Neighboring states are not only under obligation to treat one another according to the rules of justice and good faith; they ought in addition, for their own safety, as well as for the common interest, to form a kind of general society and republic.

It was upon the same occasion that the Abbé de Saint-Pierre elaborated his extension of Sully's alleged "Grand Design," in which—anticipating the purpose of the present program of the League to Enforce Peace—he proposed not only the submission of differences to judicial decision, but the total abolition of the separate use of force, and the agreement that in case of a refusal to observe treaties or to obey rules and judgments imposed the other members of the alliance should compel a refractory sovereign to comply by arming unitedly against him and charging to his account the expense of this forcible constraint. It was during Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest of Italy that Immanuel Kant published his famous essay on "Eternal Peace."

It would be tedious to examine or even to restate the numerous schemes that have been proposed for insuring peace and harmony among the nations. Almost without exception they have assumed that the basis of reorganization is exclusively political, and that there must therefore be instituted what is equivalent to a superstate, a new sovereignty set above the national state as

this is set over its constituent members. For this purpose it has been considered by many necessary to establish not only an international legislature and an international judiciary, but also an international executive in command of armies and navies or at least controlling such an armed force as would constitute an effective international police, but generally without a very clear notion of what its extent would have to be.

It is advisable to dismiss at the outset such a futility as this superstate would be. A universal world state of this description would imply the sudden annihilation of all the national characteristics that differentiate, for example, Turkey from Switzerland, or France from the German Empire. The proposal to federate such disparate political units would invoke prompt resistance on every hand.

Only approximately identical types of government are eligible for any real international organization, which in order to constitute an organism must be composed of mutually adaptable organs. In brief, the component parts must be expressions of a common life. Absolute and constitutional states do not belong to the same species

of bodies politic. There is between them an inherent hostility. An attempt to unite them in a league to enforce peace would result in generating new causes of war. This attempt has already been made, and it ended in dismal failure. The Holy Alliance was organized to sustain the highest international ideals of the signatory powers, having "No other object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States, and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of the holy religion our Saviour teaches, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace." Yet Great Britain and France could not enter into this alliance, which had for its real object to secure tranquillity by crushing out all movements toward national independence and constitutional development. As Alison Phillips has clearly shown in his work on "The Confederation of Europe," "the effective working of an international federal system demands a far greater uniformity of political institutions and ideas among the nations of the world than at present exists."

The fundamental difference between states, as has already been pointed out, is to be found in the conception of sovereignty. In the case of the constitutional states there has been a limitation of the power of the sovereign, and in the great democracies there has been some modification in the conception of sovereignty itself. In the United States, for example, there has been much dispute regarding the question whether sovereignty belongs to the Federal Government or to the separate States. The truth is that in its absolute sense of unlimited power it belongs to neither, not even to the people, whose expressed convictions on the subject constitute a declaration that government exists only "to secure the rights of the governed," and is therefore essentially limited. This is the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence and of all the bills of rights, in which the idea of sovereignty has no explicit recognition; and this word, which the American system would never have invented, has been made the subject of extended discussion with the result that while some authority is seen to belong to the Federal Government and some to the state governments, their relation is one of coördination

and not one of unqualified and absolute supremacy. In international affairs it has never been seriously pretended that the authority of the United States in any respect exceeds what, as the Declaration of Independence expresses it, "independent States may *of right* do."

It is evident that autocratic powers, basing their authority upon the postulates of absolutism, will not and logically cannot accept this view of essentially limited state authority and the consequent existence of inherent and binding international obligations, for the reason that these limitations and obligations are from their point of view encroachments upon the unlimited will of the sovereign.

It may be said that these limitations and obligations cease to be encroachments when they are freely and explicitly accepted by the sovereign, and that, therefore, obligations, when thus accepted, are as binding between absolute governments as between constitutional governments. But this observation evades the fundamental issue which is whether there are any obligations growing out of the essential nature of the state that should control the relations and conduct of

sovereign states that they may not by an arbitrary act of will reject; for if there are obligations that are inherently binding between them because of the nature of the state, a state, though sovereign, cannot be free to reject them; but if, on the contrary, as the absolutist theory of the state contends, the sovereignty of the state is unlimited, such a state is bound only by its will, which is casual and changeable. Its will to reject an obligation is as absolute as its will to accept it.

It is, therefore, only through a modification of the idea of absolute sovereignty that any hope can be found for the permanent and pacific organization of mankind. Unless we start out with the postulate that the state is founded upon the inherent rights of its citizens, and therefore reaches its limits of authority where their collective rights of safety and possession end, we shall have no constructive principle upon which to base a better organization of the world. The right of arbitrary aggressive force once admitted, no matter how noble and elevated its aims may be, imperialism has triumphed; and, if imperialism is

to triumph, it will create its own rules of action in defiance of international law.

As the basis of any practicable scheme of world organization, it is necessary to lay down the postulate that every free community of men may form a government for the protection of their inherent rights. But this fundamental political right, which we call by the ambiguous name "sovereignty" is by no means an unlimited right. It is necessarily limited by the similar right of other coexistent communities; and from the constitutional point of view it is further limited by the fact that there are inherent personal rights which no government may justly take away.

It is, therefore, utterly useless to expect that any plan of international government that will be really effective can be successfully carried into practice with governments that adhere to the absolute conception of sovereignty. No treaty can bind them, for they always reserve the right to break it whenever they consider it in their interest to do so. No international law can control them, for they will not admit that it is law unless it is an absolute decree of sovereign power. No congress or conference can overrule them, for

these, in their view, possess no authority. All contractual relations entered into with powers which hold themselves not subject to moral law are therefore written in running water. They have no value whatever. What can be expected of a power that claims to possess an unlimited right of national expansion, restrained only by the extent of its ability to carry its projects into execution by an assault upon its neighbors? The polite expression for this exalted privilege is "liberty of national evolution." But what does liberty of national evolution mean if not freedom to do what a particular nation desires to do without the restraint of the collective interests of other powers and the limitations imposed by fixed principles of law?

It is evident, then, that any effective form of international government implies the renunciation, to some extent at least, of absolute sovereignty. To what extent must this renunciation be carried? Certainly not to the extent of admitting interference in the purely domestic affairs of a state. But it must be accepted to a degree that will allow of bringing to bear upon the important relations of states to one another,—that

is, upon strictly international questions,—the collective judgment of at least a group of states having an interest in those questions.

Here, undoubtedly, have to be made two discriminations: (1) between questions which are strictly internal to the separate states and strictly international questions; and (2) between the powers capable of uniting together upon terms of equality for the consideration of questions purely international and those that will not submit to a collective decision.

It may often be difficult to distinguish between what is merely domestic and what is properly speaking international in the action of sovereign powers. The great powers have in the past not hesitated to interfere in matters of a wholly domestic character in the case of the weaker states, as, for example, with administrative reforms in Turkey, and with customs tariffs in China. Such interference is beyond question an infringement upon sovereignty. It can be justified only when it is intended to suppress a domestic condition that unjustly affects the rights of foreign powers, such as a state of anarchy, inhuman barbarity, or a persistent form of maladministration.

When, on the other hand, it aims at extorting a commercial advantage, it has no justification. It is natural, therefore, that small and weak states, feeling themselves liable to such abuses by stronger powers, should dread any form of international control that might unjustly infringe upon their sovereignty. It would be necessary, therefore, in framing an international constitution intended as the legal authorization of an international government, to mark out very clearly the limits within which it could act, and thus to protect the weaker states from the intervention of the stronger.

It is evident, also, that the formation of a general union for purposes of legislation, judicial judgment, and executive action would involve grave problems. While all independent states, regardless of size and power, are in law juristically equal, they are not materially equal either in a military or an economic sense. If, therefore, representation in international bodies—legislative, judicial, and executive—were equal, it would involve a certain subjection of the great powers to the will of the small states to which they would not willingly submit. If, on the other

hand, representation were proportioned to wealth, population, extent of territory, or any other similar standard, the smaller states would feel that they were in danger of being subordinated by their more powerful neighbors. Finally, there would be an inherent incompatibility between the absolute and the constitutional powers, the former being indisposed to bind themselves to the restrictions that would necessarily be placed upon them by general principles of law, and the latter being uncertain whether or not they could depend upon the good faith of powers whose political systems were in principle opposed to any external restraints—restraints which at a critical moment they might in perfect consistency with their absolute theory of the state suddenly decide to renounce.

We are brought, therefore, boldly to dismiss the pretension that a general international government is either possible or desirable. Such an organization would of necessity include both great and small states, empires and democracies, powers with unsatisfied world-wide ambitions and petty sovereignties just emerging from semi-barbarism, and among them aspirants to nationality

virtually only on the ragged edge of statehood, yet claiming the right to possess an equal voice in an international body, but in reality the mere vassals or protectorates of great powers.

Would it not, in fact, appear that the most that could reasonably be expected in the form of an international organization fit to legislate and exercise judicial functions would, at least in the beginning, be a strong, but limited, group of powers, each willing to sacrifice something of its own sovereignty for the purpose of insuring peace and equity, thus constituting a coherent force, not upon the principle of the balance of power, but a nucleus for the ultimate union of all responsible and socially inclined nations? This, of course, would have to be sufficiently powerful to defend its members from attack and even able to offer protection to the independence of the smaller states desirous of entering into its compact. It would not necessarily be a federation, which would imply the creation of a new state, nor even an alliance. It might be in substance merely the formal recognition of the existence of a real, as distinguished from a purely fictitious, society of states based upon common intentions and a dec-

laration of definite principles of right which the members were willing to accept, to observe, and to defend.

Such a society of states as has just been outlined would, however, itself be a mere fiction of the mind unless it possessed some kind of legislative, judicial, and executive powers. But it is quite possible that a society of states should in some degree possess such powers without in reality constituting a new state. The establishment of new relations is not equivalent to the creation of a new entity, and it is merely the establishment of new relations that is here contemplated. There would be no new sovereignty developed, but merely the concurrent action of preëxistent sovereignties. For constitutional states there is virtually no surrender of sovereign authority in submitting to international law, because, being themselves constituted for justice as the end of their existence, international law contradicts nothing essential to them. For an absolutist state, however, the case is different. Pretending to possess unlimited authority and finding the end of its existence in augmenting its own power, the

absolutist state does not regard itself as under obligation to accept any law that is not the declaration of its own will.

Here is the explanation of why the Hague conferences of 1889 and 1907 were nearly fruitless as legislative bodies. They were, however, generally regarded as law-making assemblies, subject, of course, to veto by the refusal of the separate states to ratify their conclusions. In the first conference twenty-six states, and in the second conference forty-four—these being all but four of the independent states of the entire world —united in making conventions intended to have a universal and legal character, but these were of an extremely limited nature because in both cases the range of subjects was restricted by previous agreement, entire unanimity was necessary in order to secure adoption of each separate item by the conference, and the conventions that had braved and triumphed over all these discouragements were still null and void for all the powers that did not expressly ratify them. It is not surprising, therefore, that the results were meager.

While these conferences prove that international legislation is possible by an association of

sovereign powers, they also make evident what is necessary to render it really fruitful. The first necessity is that strict unanimity must be given up, and the nations must admit their obligation to obey such international rules as receive preponderant assent, not perhaps the assent of a bare majority, but of a very large plurality. This the absolutist governments will not do, for they will accept no rule which involves any disadvantage to themselves, no matter how just it may be. A constitutional state, on the other hand, may accept any just rule without surrendering any of its sovereign rights, for it claims no rights which just legislation would endanger.

The primary problem therefore is how to organize an international conference, assembled to perfect international law, in such a manner as to prevent unjust or *ex parte* legislation. The only practicable method, perhaps, is, first of all, by negotiation between powers disposed to participate in such a conference and to be bound by it to frame a constitution defining and limiting its powers, and, since the procedure must of necessity be experimental, to provide for its subsequent amendment, except as respects certain defi-

nite and essential rights explicitly and permanently reserved to the states taking part in it. Such a conference, for reasons already stated, would not be universal. At The Hague it was esteemed necessary that an international conference should be universal, and this was the reason for requiring absolute unanimity and for the consequent dread of isolating one or more of the powers, which, therefore, were able to hold up the conference on every vital question and thus prevent the adoption of the measures most necessary to the peace and safety of the world.

While unanimity is most desirable, it is absurd to insist that some one recalcitrant power, even though a great one, may virtually frustrate the labors of all the rest. Such a decision not only forestalls the possibility of reaching a conclusion upon any really vital matter, but it prevents even the discussion of the subjects most needing to be considered. At the termination of the second conference at The Hague, after four months of tuition in the gentle art of arriving at no conclusion under past-masters in obstructive diplomacy, many of the most thoughtful of the delegates were of the opinion that another con-

ference to be held under the same conditions would be a waste of energy.

What then should be the competency of an international conference? What authority may safely and wisely be attributed to it? In other words, how far may an independent nation submit to the collective decisions of such a body?

Reserving its political independence and its territorial integrity in the mandate constituting such a conference, supposing the conference to be composed exclusively of constitutional states, why should it not submit to any decisions in the nature of general laws which after full discussion the large majority is willing to accept and agrees to observe?

Here is the crux of the whole matter of international organization. If everything is to remain entirely voluntary, such organization is useless. If, on the contrary, everything is compulsory, that makes an end of state independence and transfers sovereignty altogether to a central body.

The key to the problem is to be found in the expression "decisions in the nature of general

laws." There is no reason why such decisions, made under constitutional limitations, should not be freely accepted as binding. It is the only way in which the rules of international law can be brought to any high degree of perfection; and it is the perfection of these rules—that is, their approximation to principles of justice—that alone can furnish a basis for the normal life of a society of states.

Given an acceptable body of law, the necessary machinery of international government is reduced to extreme simplicity. Next comes the need of judicial decision. The reluctance of constitutional governments to submit their disputes to arbitration does not proceed from a desire to act unjustly. It arises rather from the conviction that in the absence of fixed standards of judgment decisions will be reached which are purely arbitrary—mere attempts to settle the dispute by makeshift compromises that do not embody justice to any one. Where the law is clear, there is little difficulty in inducing responsible governments to submit to an international tribunal disputes which, to use the technical word, are "justiciable," that is, which are of a legal character.

But it is obvious that the reason why so many international questions are not of a legal character is simply because the law is so incomplete, so imperfect, or customs are so contradictory, that there is no legal basis of settlement, since there is virtually no clear law upon the subject.

The remedy here is quite simple. It consists in perfecting the law; and the law can be perfected only by discussion and decision in an international conference, the members of which are willing to accept one another's *bona fides,* and respect the clear, deliberate, and preponderant collective judgment of the delegates.

It is true that difficulties have been raised regarding the formation of an international judiciary, but the chief of these has grown out of the idea that such a tribunal must have a universal character; that is, that every state must have a representative on the international bench. A court composed of forty-four judges would be in every way impracticable. But it is altogether unnecessary. The assumption that every state must be represented on the bench is based upon the idea that every state must sit in its own case, which is absurd. This idea grows wholly out

of the vagueness and imperfection of the law, which involves the reference of a dispute to the private judgment of a jurist who may be influenced by his national prejudices in making his decision. But when the law is clear and complete, the decision is greatly simplified. It then becomes merely an ascertainment of facts which must rest on sufficient evidence, and an application of the law to the circumstances of the case. National prejudice, under these conditions, is virtually excluded; and where the law is perfectly clear the requirements of a good international judge are simply common honesty and clear intelligence, which happily are not national monopolies and are not impossible to find.

As to the form or constitution of the court, that is a matter of much less consequence than is ordinarily supposed. The important thing is that there should be some competent court available; for ordinary cases, perhaps, a small permanent tribunal of expert jurists always open to hearings, and for special and delicate controversies specifically chosen judges selected *ad hoc* by the contestants.

When we come to the enforcement of judicial

decisions, other difficulties present themselves, but most of them are imaginary, at least as far as constitutional states are concerned, for these are habituated to accepting without hesitation the decisions of properly constituted courts. As for absolutist governments,—governments based on force and not on law,—they are by definition left out of the society of states as here conceived. There would be the same danger in including them in it that there would be in inviting a band of highway robbers to form part of a protective constabulary to secure the safety of property.

The natural consequence of refusing to respect the decision of an accepted international judicial tribunal would be, that a state thus refusing would henceforth be considered an international outlaw, and might properly be treated as such.

How far military power should be employed in the enforcement of international obligations is a matter for grave consideration. The use of military force means war, and the question therefore becomes, For what purposes should nations be prepared to go to war? Certainly not for any objects that can be peaceably obtained without

the sacrifice of essential rights. Certainly not for any such abstract idea as peace, apart from any known or concrete circumstances. No wise nation, therefore, will enter into any general compact to "enforce peace," which in view of actual facts might bind it to the most odious obligations against its own judgment and conscience. Such an agreement would, moreover, bind itself and its cosignatories by a solemn compact to preserve the *status quo,* for a time at least, in every unjust situation. Nor is there less danger in the enforcement of delay, which might produce worse consequences than prompt action. But there might, with very good reason, be an international declaration of what should constitute just and unjust causes of war, which would serve as a warning to unjust aggressors as to where the sympathies of neutrals would be placed in case the rules were violated. It is inconceivable that prudent statesmen will ever unite in an engagement to go to war under circumstances wholly unknown to them, and not affecting the direct interests of the powers they represent or their specific obligations toward their neighbors or allies. International morality will find its best field of de-

velopment in conditions that leave the nations free to exercise in such matters their reason and their consciences in the light of the actual conditions by which they may be surrounded.

There remain, of course, many international questions that cannot be reduced to formulæ of international law, or submitted to the decision of judicial tribunals. These are the questions of national policy which every nation must reserve for its own determination. What means each nation shall take for its own defense, whether on land or sea, must be left to its own decision, as well as where to find its friends and whom to consider as its enemies.

But this reserve of national independence by no means excludes international relations outside of those which relate to the determination and enforcement of international law. There is a wide field for friendly social intercourse, for mutual counsel, for an exchange of views, and for the exercise of those influences which promote confidence and consolidate friendship. This is the work of diplomacy which will find its task greatly lightened, but not in any sense superseded, by

the perfection of international law, and the resort to international tribunals.

Diplomacy, rightly considered, is a creative function. It clears the way for better understandings and closer relationships. The nations are constantly making a new world. New needs and new inventions are incessantly preparing the way for new international contacts. There is no longer a possibility of isolation. There can be in modern times no hermit nation. Trade is breaking down the old barriers, and the multiplication of new desires, even among semi-barbarous peoples, is opening new ports and developing new markets.

The whole world is now compelled to think and to act internationally. The public is hardly aware of what was accomplished in the last century in the way of organizing specific international relationships by the creation of such organisms as the Universal Postal Union, the Telegraphic Union, the Radio-Telegraphic Union, the Metric Union, the Geodetic Association, and half a dozen other permanent quasi-legislative or administrative associations of an international character. There are, besides, many periodic con-

ferences relating to industrial property, literary and artistic property, railway and oceanic transportation, safety at sea, sanitation, the use and sale of drugs and intoxicants, commercial statistics, monetary affairs, and other matters of general human interest. To these must be added the permanent commissions such as the Bureau of The Hague Tribunal, the Sugar Commission, the Opium Commission, the Committee on the Map of the World, the Bureau for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, etc. Some of these are the result of official action through diplomatic intercourse, others of private initiative; but all combine to unify the nations, and to accustom them to coöperation and submission to collective decisions.

The success of these efforts suggests the utility of still wider joint action in the treatment of those residuary problems which cannot be solved by legal processes because they are matters not of strict legality, but of national policy.

I refer now to those great international questions of an economic nature which create the conditions for economic imperialism, and which,

more than any other definable causes, endanger the peace of the world. The seed-plot of future wars is to be found in the undeveloped countries. Unable to protect themselves, they are forced to rely upon the protection of stronger countries, and they often become the victims of their designs. China, Persia, Morocco, Turkey, the Balkan States, South Africa, these have been the great centers of international disturbance. It is not merely that they are markets for manufactured goods. That rivalry of mere salesmen might be comparatively innocuous. Economic imperialism has its roots in the exportation of capital seeking permanent investment in backward countries, in concessions, in the political influence that extorts them, and mainly in the foreign governmental power that backs up and supports the extortions. Finally, the rivalry for monopoly between the subjects or citizens of different governments leads to friction. Intrigues follow, contracts are opposed or broken, acquired rights are insisted upon, and powerful financial influences are brought to bear for the employment of armies and navies to enforce them. Dynastic

imperialism masks its political designs under this defense of alleged national rights and interests, and embraces the opportunity to make a popular war; whereas, without such an excuse, there would be opposition to a military adventure.

It cannot be held that the development of the backward countries is undesirable, or that the protection of its own nationals by a government is not a duty. On the contrary, it is only by foreign capital that the resources of these neglected territories can be utilized for the benefit of mankind; and every citizen has a rightful claim upon his government to protect him from injustice even in a foreign land. The extension of civilization over the earth demands both the enterprise of the pioneer and the assertion of civil authority. The crime of governments is that for political advantage they make business a partner in schemes of military exploitation; and the folly of the business world is that it invites the power of the sword to tip the balance of business competition, thereby involving itself in military costs that heavily handicap all industrial and commercial activities in time of peace, and sweep them to the brink of ruin in time of war.

From these undeniable facts two fallacious conclusions are sometimes drawn: (1) that foreign investors and diplomatists are conspirators against peace; and (2) that those who extend their enterprises to foreign lands deserve for their cupidity to suffer loss if they meet with misfortune.

Neither of these conclusions is founded in fact or is worthy of acceptance. If all nations should accept them, there would be an end to all foreign trade. It is true that foreign investors seek governmental protection, and that wise governments protect foreign investors; but in neither case is there good ground for accusation of wrong-doing. The evil is that, instead of promoting the conduct of international business upon proper business lines, by international agreement and coöperation, governments, without effectual efforts to avoid the use of military force, employ it as an instrument of national commercial success and territorial expansion; that is, to secure and hold points of permanent advantage, through political control of distant and strategical parts of the earth, for the extension of empire. Exploitation, monopoly, colonization, and conquest are the successive steps in this procedure.

To such processes, sustained by military force, international law and courts of arbitration present but feeble barriers. So long as these continue to be national policies, there will be much that cannot be brought within the scope of international legislation. But is it not evident that these business interests are proper subjects for negotiation and conciliation? The moment the problem of trade is envisaged as a purely business proposition apart from dynastic considerations, it is clear that military methods of extending civilization are not in the true interest of the people of any country, and not even to the highest advantage of the persons who for commercial reasons encourage them.

It is time, therefore, for business men—the great manufacturers, bankers, ship-owners, and traders—to say to their governments: "We do not ask you to promote our interests by armies and navies; we wish you to give us an opportunity to organize the business of the world on business lines. While your diplomatists and jurists meet at The Hague to settle questions of rights, bring us together with your sanction in a world congress with representatives of other na-

tions to consider our mutual interests. We shall speak of coal, of iron, of shipping, of the gold supply, and of their distribution; and we shall be able to show that if the governments will keep their hands off and leave our business to us, the whole world shall be well fed and well warmed and well clothed; and, at the same time we shall all, yes *all,* obtain a greater share of wealth than we now have or can ever hope to have under the military system. And when we have ourselves, as business men, worked out our plans and our compromises, then we shall ask you to unite, as governments, to see that the seas are free from piracy and menace to life and property, and that we may have the combined force of civilized governments behind us to protect us from robbery and abuse by any one of them."

In brief, an international board of trade conciliation, composed of representative business men, supplemented by frequent general conferences, with no force behind them but the evidence of facts and the power of persuasion, if held to complete publicity, could accomplish more in five years to insure the peace and prosperity of the world than any secret negotiations by dip-

lomatists backed by all the armies in existence. If the business of the world were once frankly established upon a world basis, community of interest would go far to discourage war, for modern wars originate chiefly from economic inequalities and ambitions; and the agents of economic power, if they were not in alliance with military force exercised in the interest of dynastic purposes, could more easily satisfy them by purely economic means.

There remain the questions of free waterways —the paths of world intercourse—from which some nations are excluded, the "open door" in the countries of still unappropriated markets, and the tariff walls. These also are business questions and fit problems for business men, which the sword can never rightly settle. So far, they also have been regarded as purely political questions, and have been treated as such. But all matters of policy are primarily questions of profit or expediency and not of right and wrong, although they may involve them. The difference is important, for right and wrong cannot be compromised, while expediency and profit are always affairs of transaction. There is, therefore, noth-

ing hopeless in such problems, which are matters to argue about, but not to fight about.

Being an economic as well as a jural problem, international organization must be worked out by a combination of governmental and business agencies. Neither can be entrusted with the entire task. The material needs of mankind cannot be regulated by rigid legal formulæ, which would impose a despotism too depressing to be endured. On the other hand, purely business motives which, if given a free hand, might produce intolerable commercial trusts, in the end more powerful than governments, are in need of legal control. It is by the intelligent coöperation of these two agencies, the legal and the economic, for the welfare of mankind, that international organization will attain its normal ends.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONSTRUCTIVE POWER OF DEMOCRACY

IN view of its bearing upon the problem of international organization, one of the fundamental questions in the great conflict that began in Europe in 1914 and has now extended to the whole world appears to be whether autocracy or democracy is finally to prevail. At first apparently a mere struggle for tribal predominance, the war has become a battle of institutions and legal systems. Is the world to be ruled by force or by law? And if by law, who is to say what the law shall be?

No thoughtful man can any longer doubt that imperialism has destroyed Europe and can never reconstruct it. The reason is evident. Imperialism means the forcible domination of one nation over others. Imperial policies not only conflict, they are intrinsically incapable of reconciliation.

An appeal, therefore, is now made to democracy to bring peace and order and mutual confidence out of the chaos that autocratic rule has produced. All the aspirations for the creation of a truly human world—a world in which general principles of justice shall prevail—seem to gather around this word as if it were the only remaining hope of humanity. Never before has the need of a great constructive principle in international affairs been so apparent. Never before has the opportunity for its employment been so auspicious. Never before has mankind, as if inspired by a common impulse, so completely broken away from autocratic traditions. To-day it is a fact that four-fifths of the habitable surface of the earth is dedicated to the aspirations of democracy; and included in this area is at least three-fourths of the human race. China, with her four hundred million human beings, and Russia, with nearly two hundred millions, have thrown off the yoke of absolutism, and joined the great republics of the West in the stupendous task of national self-government.

They, too, are in this war for democracy. What does it mean to them, this old Greek word

which has had such a short history and yet contains such vast implications? What is the philosophy that lies behind it or within it? What new direction does it point out? What new energies does it release? What new ideals does it set up? What new achievements does it imply? Shall they be the better or the worse for the working of this new leaven that seems about to change the destiny of nations?

If democracy were merely a repudiation of autocracy, a mere escape from authority, a mere drift into vacuity, it would undoubtedly be a dangerous experiment for any nation to embark upon. It does, indeed, begin with a demand for liberty, but this is by no means a negative conception. It is rather a constructive force. Liberty is the removal of hindrances to the largest, fullest, most fruitful human activities. But it is not an end, it is only a condition. And what demands this condition is the whole volume of human longing and striving, the reaching out for self-realization in thought and action. It is, in brief, humanity pressing onward to its goal.

It is this vast inward urgency that gives sig-

nificance to democracy. It is imperative, it is irresistible. By suppressing the individual person, this aspiration may for a time seem to be destroyed; but at some unexpected moment it will break out anew and sweep everything before it. It is essentially a mass movement. Isolated, the individual person is timid, circumspect, even obsequious. United, the people are bold, mandatory, overwhelming. "The will of the people"—how the demagogue loves to appeal to it, to invoke it, to inspire it, to utilize it, to appropriate it to the accomplishment of his purposes! And how readily it responds to any ardent touch that evokes its expression! The sense of restraint removed, the prospect of desires gratified, the impulse of new-found power—what an exaltation, what an intoxication they produce!

But if this were all, if the change from an autocratic to a democratic régime resulted in nothing but this elation of spirit, we might be able to explain the origin of revolutions, but we could not justify them to our intelligence. When it comes to a question of political philosophy and we are asked to establish the substantial excellence of democracy, we enter an arena of debate in which

there is a wide field for discussion. Granting the existence of a high degree of intelligence, there is no security in that alone. Man is a being of mixed desires; some of them are good and some of them are bad. Into what is called "the will of the people" all of these enter as constituent motives or impulses. What is to certify that this will shall be always a good will? How shall we know that sometimes it may not be base and selfish? How shall we be sure that the evil may not predominate over the good, the many over the few, the vicious over the virtuous, the idle and the empty-handed over the industrious and the prudent, What security, it may be asked, has any principle of right, where the arbitrary will of an unrestricted majority prevails? Who can be held responsible for its action? What can restrain it from misconduct? Why do we put up the sign, "Beware of pickpockets" in great assemblies, and increase the police force the larger the crowd becomes? If as a totality it is honest, why does the mass of men need to be so carefully guarded against itself? If life and property are safer under the protection of a paid agent than when they are entrusted to the spontaneous im-

pulses of a multitude, is it not wiser, it will be demanded, to concentrate unlimited power in the hands of a capable ruler, set apart for the purpose and placed beyond the influence of ordinary motives?

This is, in fact, the thesis of those who defend the idea of monarchy as a form of government. Assuming that a personal sovereign can be placed and kept beyond the influence of ordinary human motives, the theory has distinct advantages. Objection to it cannot well be urged on the ground that it involves a concentration of power, for this is sometimes necessary to efficiency; and, in great emergencies, like those created by the present war, it is resorted to by democracies, also, as the only means of their preservation. What renders monarchy indefensible in the eyes of democracy is that it recognizes as supreme a power that is above the law, and that claims to be an arbitrary source of law. The protest of democracy against autocracy is not based on the fact that definite and necessary authority is confided to one man. It is that autocracy consists in the exercise of a power that is not only not under the restraint of law, but claims

authority to ignore all law—a power that determines the destinies of men and of whole nations without regard to any principles of right, treating them as mere passive instruments of its own aims and purposes, or of aims and purposes inspired by those who can influence the sovereign for their own private and exclusive benefit.

When we go to the bottom of the indictment against autocracy, it is not at all that one man represents the will of a whole nation, but that an arbitrary and lawless will is in command of dangerous forces, and insists on doing what a just rule of action would forbid. Every type of human government must of necessity admit of the delegation of powers, and it is a matter of no concern to one nation to whom another nation delegates those powers. The whole issue centers around the question, What is the source and measure of rightful authority?

What democracy asserts and autocracy denies is that all rightful authority in human governments is derived from the nature of the human beings who are to be governed. When, therefore, Autocracy declares, "I create the law because

I am strong," Democracy replies, "It is justice, not strength, that should create the law."

What then is the origin of law? Historically rules of action have been laid down by those who have had the power to enforce them. Before such rules were consciously and specifically formulated, law consisted in the customs of the groups or societies in which they had come to be adopted as the usual modes of action. In the societies where conquest or other forms of ascendancy had produced a personal ruler, they were the edicts or decrees of the ruler and his counselors. These forms of obedience were imposed upon subject peoples and accompanied with the prospect of penalties to be inflicted if they were not regarded. To the historical school of legal philosophy, therefore, law is simply the sum of those rules of action which have an outward sanction. It is an expression of sovereign will. It is a trophy of power. Whoever can enforce his will can make the law. With morality and abstract right it has nothing whatever to do. If it is just, it is not because law is essentially just, but because it has happened to be prescribed in a spirit of justice.

It is, in fact, often unjust; but, just or unjust, it is expedient to obey it, for, like the laws of the natural world, it is a part of the environment in which we live, and the consequences of obedience and disobedience are reasonably sure to follow.

From this theory of the nature of law is derived an equally arbitrary theory of the nature of the state. Etymologically, it is the status, the condition which the sovereign has imposed. The philosophers of course could not neglect so interesting a subject of speculation, and some of them have represented it as a kind of self-subsisting entity, an emanation of a metaphysical absolute, an incarnation of divinity, and even as a huge leviathan, a natural organism of which the monarch is the head, and of which the ordinary person is only a subordinate molecule. Autocracy has eagerly appropriated these conceptions as furnishing a convenient vehicle for imposing its pretensions by making itself seem to be a part of the order of nature. Wishing to screen itself from the exactions of morality as well as from the judgments of the intellect, it has enveloped itself in the impenetrable mysteries of religion, thus ren-

dering itself unapproachable by the common man, and wholly inscrutable to the ordinary mind.

Democracy has irreverently swept aside this veil of metaphysical mysticism. For it law is to be discovered in the nature of man as a personal and social being. It is something other than the sum of sovereign decrees. It is a revelation of mutual obligations. Like the truths of nature it is an object of unending research. Its basic principles like geometric axioms are intuitions of universal reason. It springs from inherent personal rights, and issues in social duties. It is preëminently a principle of intelligence. It finds its standards in universal rational conceptions like those of justice and equity. It has never yet attained perfect expression, but it is an ever-present mandate of nature, which, like a flowing stream, rushes on amid new and changing scenes, as variable in its content as the growing needs of men, but as firm in the indications of its direction as the granite walls that bound the course of a mighty river on its journey to the sea.

It is this idea of law as a persistent human ideal that has determined democracy's conception of the state, which is not a self-subsisting entity, and

not like society a purely natural product, but a creation of the mind and purpose of man. It belongs to the category of legal relations rather than to that of material substance. Its only substantial components are the wills of human persons. If there were no people, there would be no state.

Historically, it is true, the state has consisted chiefly in a relation of subordination between the persons ruled and the persons who ruled them. It was a status produced by the domination of the weak by the strong. It is historically correct, therefore, to speak of the state as "a creation of force," and of sovereignty, which is its essence, as "supreme power." This is the state as autocracy would maintain it, the creation of arbitrary power beyond the jurisdiction of any binding law, and without any form of responsibility.

For democracy the state has an entirely different meaning. It is a status produced not by force, but by voluntary consent. It is the expression of what is most vital and essential in the nature of man as a moral and social being. As law is derived from principles inherent in rational intelligence, the state is an embodiment of law in per-

manent institutions. Both the law and the state rest on the axiom of inherent personal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Autocracy speaks as if life itself belonged to the individual person only through an act of grace. In fact it proclaims openly that the state is the sole creator of rights, and what it has created it may also take away. Democracy reverses these relations, and declares that government is created by the consent of the governed. Priority therefore belongs to the individual person, because society is wholly composed of individual persons, in whom alone is to be found either a basis or a consciousness of rights. Not, indeed, persons in isolation or as abstract entities, for men have never existed in separation from society into which all are born and of which all form a part. It is from the nature of human beings existing in communities that democracy derives its theory of rights, but it is not from the fact of "social solidarity" that it can be deduced. That fact alone contains no implication of rightful authority, or of any moral qualities whatever. Each person in a community might still be a member of it without observing any rule but his

own interest if that were the general disposition. A distinction between right and wrong could never be deduced from such a community. Such a distinction exists only for the individual mind and conscience and can be predicated only of individual minds and consciences capable of knowing their own rights and the duties correlative to such rights.

If the state cannot be founded on the mere fact of social solidarity, it is even less possible to base it upon the fiction of a self-subsistent "social consciousness," for such a consciousness does not exist. There is in a community a general consensus of ideas and sentiments, but it inheres in the minds of its individual members only. To them it has the quality of a law for conduct, and the expression of it becomes the solid foundation of the state. Its value is to be found in the fact that it is recognized to be an embodiment of justice, and may therefore be generally accepted without resort to violence. Being the composite formula of their united conceptions of their rights, obedience to it may be secured with a minimum of penalty.

But if it is true that a just government is a

creation of the governed, the question is pressed upon us, How far may *some* individual persons rightly enforce their own private wills upon *other* individual persons? If there is any rightful authority in government, it must be derived from beings who believe themselves to possess inherent rights because they distinguish between right and wrong in conduct. What inherent rights then do *some* possess which do not belong to *all?* And what principle can be adopted as a standard of judgment unless it is universal?

We perceive, therefore, that, while autocracy has no solid moral foundation, the triumph of democracy involves a principle of self-abnegation which not all the advocates of its desirability are willing to accept. The people cannot logically take over and exercise the absolute and unlimited authority which they have repudiated. We are compelled to recognize the fact that when it comes to imposing an absolute will upon a person to an extent that robs him of an inherent right like that to life, liberty, or property, it makes no practical difference whether that deprivation is effected by one or a few or a majority of his fellow-

beings, since in all these cases he is equally divested of his right. When the state does this, no matter what the form of government may be, it becomes despotic, and its tyranny is as odious under one disguise as under another.

It is necessary, therefore, for democracy to plant itself firmly and unalterably upon the rights of the individual person and the doctrine that government exists to secure these rights. Unless it stands upon this foundation, it has no ground of protest against autocracy, and it has no means of self-justification. A society may transform itself into a predatory band, but, however numerous or powerful it may be, it is impossible to identify such a band with the democratic conception of the state. A true democracy can neither oppress the poor nor rob the rich, for it is based on equal laws for all. If it were not loyal to the right of every man, no matter how humble or how fortunate, it would repudiate its own basis of authority. It might, when supported by great majorities, be very formidable, even irresistible, but, although by means of its power it could enforce obedience, it could not command our respect or inspire our loyalty.

The right of a government to claim legitimacy and to demand that its authority be respected is in no sense founded upon its power, but upon its purpose, and that purpose must be the protection of all human rights. Everything else is pure assumption. And there are in the world no rights that are not in some sense inherent in persons, or in some manner derived from them. Eliminate the human being from your order of ideas, and you have not only rendered rightful authority an illusion, you have also destroyed altogether the sole foundation for the conception of right, and reduced the whole fabric of society to a complex of purely mechanical relations.

If this be true, there is no human being, no matter how poor or feeble or helpless, who does not, by virtue of the nature and dignity of personality possess inherent rights and claims to just consideration which the most overwhelming majorities cannot take away without the logical destruction of their own right to formulate the law; for the right to make law has no other solid foundation than this, that it consists simply and solely in the right to protect personal rights by placing the whole force of the community behind them.

This is the creed of democracy. Against it autocracy opposes the traditions of power, the sophisms of sovereignty, the keen edge of the drawn sword. Above all human rights it places the interests of the state as supreme power, with its pretended right of conquest and subjugation, derived from some mysterious mandate of deity in whose name it claims the exclusive right to speak. It boasts of the gleam of its shining armor. It hides its schemes of dishonor behind the mask of virtue. It promises glory and plunder. It tramples the breasts of women under the feet of its horses. It rains fire from the clouds, desolates fair landscapes, mutilates temples, carries whole populations into slavery, and adds to the natural terrors of the sea the diabolical contrivances of human ingenuity dedicated to the task of wholesale destruction.

While humanity shudders, democracy goes forth to the rescue. It is the battle of St. George and the dragon multiplied by all the powers of strong nations. But it is not a contest of material forces only. It is a struggle of principles. How can Europe be reconstituted? How can civilization be restored? How can the world

resume its task of culture and social development?

Autocracy has no answer. Triumphant, it would cause all nations to pass under its yoke and yield to its exactions. Only half defeated, even in its death-throes it would invoke new wars, dream of more cruel barbarities, plan still wider devastations. Let the battle, then, be fought out now. But first it must be won in the thoughts of men. Who is it who speaks for humanity? Is it autocracy or is it democracy? What can end triumphant tribalism? What can establish universal humanism? It is man and not the state that can give the answer.

But the state must continue to exist. The nations are persistent realities. They may be decimated in numbers and impoverished in their possessions, but they cannot be destroyed. Ruined in fortune, broken and mutilated in person, men may enclose themselves in trenches and fortifications with death in perpetual command of their frontiers, but they will still cling to their nationality; in their desperate extremity they will learn more and more to love it, and as long as a shred of

the riddled and blood-stained banner of their country flutters above the field of carnage, they will still feel that they belong to a nation.

What, then, is a nation, but a group of men with common traditions, common memories, common interests, and common aims? But there is also the larger community. The traditions, the memories, the interests, and the aims may be very different, but beneath them all and over them all is the community of rights. These are not tribal. They are not national. They are human and universal.

Between democracy and the fiction of unlimited sovereignty there can be no logical alliance. If the postulates of democracy are true, then the pretension to unlimited sovereignty is false. A state has no rights that are not derived from the rights of the persons who compose it. The government they create has no other source of authority. But even the sum of all such rights does not create an unlimited sovereignty. By virtue of their origin, the just powers of the state are limited both as respects its citizens, and as regards all other states; for the inherent rights of its components, on which the whole structure of its authority

rests, may not justly be taken away and other states, like itself, represent with equal clearness the rights of other nations which therefore cannot justly be denied.

Thus understood, the value of democracy as a basis for international law is apparent. As the just powers of separate states are derived from the personal rights of their constituents, so the idea of international rights arises from the relations of independent states. They, too, thus become endowed with rights of existence, of independence, of just treatment, of self-defense; but the attribute of an unlimited sovereignty is not among them. It cannot be deduced from any source whatever except physical power, and mere physical power, apart from principles of justice, is not legal authority in any sense which scientific jurisprudence can maintain.

Autocracy, based on no distinction of right and wrong, asserts the absolute subjection of some persons to the will and dictation of other persons, and without inconsistency affirms also the absolute subjection of some nations to other nations, the test of superiority being merely their relative strength. He who has the power to do so has the

right to rule; and the only limit to this right, according to autocracy, is in the power to resist it.

What this signifies for democracy is evident. It means that however unwilling to do so, peaceable nations must arm themselves and prepare all the vast and complicated enginery of war on land and sea in order to preserve their existence. It means that as long as autocracy has plans of conquest democracy is in danger. In vain it elaborates constitutions for the guarantee of individual rights. In vain it convokes international conferences. In vain it signs treaties and conventions. At some unexpected moment, perhaps in the midst of delicate negotiations, it suddenly hears the tramp of invading armies, it sees the sky darkened with innumerable air craft, while demons of the deep strew the seas with shattered ships and mutilated corpses.

What is the object of these terrors? It is that the authors of them may impose their will upon others. The truth is that imperialism is not so much a form of government as a system of forcible exploitation. No modern nation supports autocratic rule merely out of deference to a dynasty. The dogma of divine right is held

chiefly by the rulers who are its beneficiaries; but whole peoples, consciously or unconsciously, are their business partners in predatory exploits. The motive of these nations is national enrichment. Trade, colonies, mineral resources, to be exploited in the interest of the commercial class—these are the real pillars of autocracy, resting upon the interests of a military caste—the brood of younger sons, too proud to work, who must be provided with a gentleman's career. Autocracy flourishes nowhere without the stimulus of prospective war, and it is in modern times a people's war, of which Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs are the unhappy instruments quite as much as they are the personal authors. Imperialism has become a national predatory enterprise far more than it is a political conviction, and the evidence of this is so overwhelming that it cannot be denied. The imperialistic organizations in Germany that urged on the war under the preposterous representation that the empire was attacked are now declaring that there can be "no peace without indemnities for the enormous sacrifices Germany has made, and to develop her economic, cultural, and social life." "Germany," it is de-

clared, "must secure better protection for its frontiers, land for settlement and food production, the strengthening of its naval position, and the improved condition of its industries by greater supplies of raw materials." Failing these, it has been openly announced in the Reichstag that Germany must be indemnified for her sacrifices by the people of the United States of America.

With the political preferences of a nation, other nations have no right to interfere; but when imperial exploitation is convicted by its own words of predatory designs, when it wantonly destroys the independence of small states, expropriates their resources and carries into captivity their vanquished populations, interference becomes an international duty.

In a war alleged to be one of defense, the armies of the German Empire are encamped on the territory of twelve independent nations, nine of which are the victims of its depredations, and three of which are its partners in crime. After acts of piracy unknown in the history of civilized countries, including the wanton murder of innocent men, women, and children on the high seas, it

has taken complete possession of the Atlantic Ocean, so that no ship of any nation is anywhere safe from destruction. But even these enormities did not set a limit to the arrogance and outlawry of the imperial spirit; and as a punishment for the resentment felt because of the injuries endured the territory of the United States was to be invaded and dismembered by means of a subsidized coalition to be used as an instrument for a blow at our national life.

Not only is autocracy organized for war with a design to subsist upon it, but it carries an infection that penetrates to the heart of bodies politic that shrink from contact with it. Some form and degree of it is forced upon any nation which, however unwillingly, seriously undertakes to act in its own defense. All actual war measures, to some extent, denature democracy. Enforced military service, exorbitant taxation, the suppression of a free press, the dictatorial powers of the executive, the constraint placed upon legislative action in time of war—all these, though unavoidable, are encroachments upon the immunities of the individual person, suspend the full en-

joyment of his personal freedom, and temporarily assimilate even a democratic government to the rule of an autocrat.

In order to preserve their existence democracies must submit for a time to this sacrifice, but in doing so they risk the permanent loss of some of their liberties, for in a protracted war these are partly forgotten, and if this condition endures, they may never be wholly recovered. When a government is obliged in self-defense to take over all the people's industries, to organize all their activities, to regulate all their earnings and expenditures, democracy can hardly distinguish itself from autocracy except by the purity and elevation of its purpose in rendering effective its means of military defense. The present war has demonstrated that this is no unfounded inference. "England," wrote a German historian in the first year of the war, "if she would play any part whatever in the world's future, must rebuild her political structure from the ground up, and adopt a state organization such as prevails on the continent, and which has found its fullest development, and therefore its highest efficiency, in the German State."

This prediction has been already in part fulfilled, and it has proved that the very existence of free governments depends upon the suppression of that type of imperialism which menaces the independence of all nations.

There can therefore be no permanent peace until autocratic power is ended. It is futile, it is grossly inconsistent and reprehensible, for those who love peace to demand it until the conditions for its permanence can be established.

Can democracy ever establish it? It must either do so or itself be overcome. It alone possesses the constructive power to impose peace by the extension of the universal principles of justice from which it derives its own existence. If it should prove false to them, its historic mission must end in failure. It has no quarrel with the idea of nationality; but the problem of nationality, with its serious geographic complications, can never be solved by any mere barter and sale of nations or by any process of national vivisection. Its only solution is in the souls of the people. Render them free to choose, give them their rights of unrestrained affiliation, cultural development, local legislation, federation according to their

native affinities, the assured independence of the groups thus formed, and just economic advantages, and no serious problems of nationality will remain.

But this involves a reconstruction of the idea of sovereignty. In its dynastic sense the word must be eliminated from the vocabulary of international politics. No ruler should be the possessor of whole populations merely because he has conquered them. For democracies the word sovereignty in its absolute sense has no meaning. What remains of it and all to which constitutional states can lay claim is merely the right of a free and independent nation to exist, to legislate for itself, to defend itself, and to enter into relations with other similar states on the basis of juristic equality, under principles of international law which respect its inherent rights as free constitutions respect the rights of the individual persons who live under them.

With this high purpose of establishing law and liberty, young men and old may well gird themselves for the conflict. Whoever does so may rest tranquilly under the gaze of the eternal stars that shine in the wide firmament over his bivouac at

midnight, and may firmly face the curtain of fire in the deeper night of beclouded battle, for he will be in communion with all that is noblest in the past and all that is greatest in the future. And if he fall in this struggle, he may close his eyes with the assurance that his act of sacrifice will open to him a deeper sense of communion with the Being that has placed in his keeping for immortal uses the powers of a mortal life.

CHAPTER VIII

AMERICA'S INTEREST IN THE NEW EUROPE

VITAL as the principles of democracy are believed to be to the independence of nations and the ultimate peace of the world, the United States of America would never have entered the Great War for the purpose of imposing a democratic form of government upon any people. What makes the present struggle in a real sense a battle for democracy is the fact that the exposure of imperial designs has produced a conviction that if these designs should prove successful, democracy would ultimately be rendered impossible anywhere in the world. Confronted by a triumphant imperialism, self-governing nations would be obliged to protect themselves against aggression by arming themselves to the full extent of their resources, and to resort to a permanent centralization of public powers that would divest them of their democratic character. Even with the utmost precautions the weaker independent

states, if left to defend themselves unaided, would eventually be compelled to yield to imperial domination, thus progressively augmenting the resources of arbitrary power and proportionally weakening the forces of the independent self-governing states. If, for example, Central Europe, as conceived by Naumann, should be consolidated as the result of the Great War, it would be only a question of time when not only Belgium, but Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian kingdoms, possibly France itself, and certainly the Balkan States, would fall under imperial rule. A great maritime power, such as would then come into existence, with naval stations on all the sea-coasts of Europe and acquired colonies, could proceed to the conquest of the world. If the Imperial German Government can at present interrupt and imperil the commerce of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, what might be expected of it when it possessed well-furnished naval stations on the channel and the Adriatic, not to mention the wider possibilities?

It was not, however, the fear of German expansion in Europe that induced the United States

to abandon its policy of neutrality. So long as the war was considered as a merely European conflict of power, it was to be expected, following the American tradition of non-interference in European affairs, that the contest would be regarded as foreign to the interests of the American people. But in the course of its progress it came to be vaguely realized that a struggle so widespread in extent and so far reaching in its consequences must profoundly affect the whole world.

Even a long succession of incredible outrages upon the citizens of the United States, accompanied with almost open interference with its internal affairs, did not move the American Government to abandon the resolution to remain neutral, nor did it awaken the American people to a full realization of the peril to which they were exposed. Hundreds of American men, women, and children, innocently traveling upon the high seas in the faith that they were under the protection of laws and customs which all nations had agreed to respect, were mercilessly slaughtered under the orders of the Imperial German Government. Repeated protests were followed by the continued destruction of non-combatant lives and the sink-

ing of ships without search or warning, in violation not only of established laws of the seas, but of the principles embodied in treaties that had been solemnly entered into and that the Imperial Government insisted were still binding upon the United States.

When the American Government finally announced that unless the Imperial Government was disposed to conform to the established rules of international law, diplomatic relations between the two countries must cease altogether, a promise to pursue thenceforth a legal course was made, but qualified by the demand that the Government of the United States should serve the purposes of the Imperial Government with other powers friendly to the United States. That the restriction placed upon the devastations of submarine torpedo-boats was intended to be only temporary, and that these devastations were intended to be resumed when a sufficient number of boats should be constructed to become really effective in suppressing American commerce, is now established in a manner that exposes the utter insincerity of the Imperial Government in all its professedly friendly negotiations with the United States.

On January 24, 1917, the Imperial German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr Zimmermann, used the following language for publication in the United States:

In the message which President Wilson addressed to the Senate (January 22, 1917) the Imperial German Government recognizes with extreme satisfaction the fact that the aspirations and thoughts of the President continue to occupy themselves with the question of the restoration of permanent peace. The exalted moral earnestness in the words of the President insures them an attentive ear throughout the world. The Imperial German Government earnestly hope that the untiring efforts of the President to restore peace on earth may be crowned with success.

Apparently believing in "the exalted moral earnestness" of the President of the United States in his "untiring efforts to restore peace on earth," Herr Zimmermann, in the midst of these efforts for peace, was not only meditating war, but *five days* before using these expressions he had communicated by secret code through the German ambassador at Washington the following instruction to the German Minister in Mexico:

Berlin, Jan. 19, 1917.

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention

to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico. That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

ZIMMERMANN.

. One week after expressing his hopes that the President's efforts for peace "would be crowned with success," on January 31, the Imperial German Government formally announced, *as was intended before and during this whole period,* that on and after February 1 it would adopt a policy of ruthlessness in the use of submarines against *all* shipping seeking to pass through certain designated areas of the high seas.

This violation of a previous agreement to observe the rules of international law, the Imperial German Government well knew was equivalent to a declaration of war upon the United States, made in the midst of "the untiring efforts of the President to restore peace on earth." It was the German way of expressing "hopes" that these efforts might "be crowned with success." The pledge to observe the law had lasted until hundreds of submarine-boats were ready to perform their task of wrecking the commerce of the world, as an essential preliminary to "the restoration of peace on earth"! The intention had long been kept a secret, which the German proposal of peace negotiations had aided in concealing. On January 19 the Imperial Foreign Office knew that this vast flotilla of submarines would be ready by February 1, and that its mission would impose measures of war upon all neutral nations; yet when on February 3 diplomatic relations with the Imperial German Government were severed by the United States, Berlin naïvely professed to be "astonished"!

Not until April 6, however, when overt acts had demonstrated the fixed purpose of the Imperial

Government to sink American ships, was the state of war officially declared to exist.

It was with truth that the President said to the American people, "The wrongs against which we are now arraying ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life."

It is German violence that, notwithstanding our peaceable purposes, has made this *our* war. That the United States would ultimately be involved in it was inevitable, for it was conceived and promoted in arrogant contempt of everything for which the American people stand sponsors. We have accepted the challenge thrown down to us, as the President has said, "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles."

It was at last made evident that geographic isolation is no longer a sufficient guarantee of American security, and that it is with a world problem that we now have to deal. Until this fact was established by indisputable evidence, and rendered

undeniable by a prompt confession that saw in this hypocrisy nothing that called for shame, few of our citizens could have believed that it would ever enter into the plans of the Imperial German Government to propose the dismemberment of the United States, and that it would even designate and portion out whole States as the spoils of a war of conquest to be promoted by German gold paid to mercenary armies under the command of German officers, as the forces of the Ottoman Empire are already commanded by them, for the purpose of rendering the will of Germany supreme through the conquest of Europe and the mastery of the sea.

Fortunately, this secret purpose was disclosed in time to lay bare at a critical moment the real attitude of the Imperial Government toward the United States, and thus to reveal to the American people unmistakably the degeneration of the Prussian official mind. Happily, also, both the Japanese and the Mexican governments were resentful of the insult offered to them by the infamy of this proposal. Even the citizens of the United States whose racial affinities led them at first to

sympathize with the German cause on account of their belief in the moral soundness of the German people must now realize how cruelly they themselves, as well as their friends in Germany, have been deceived by the sophistications of the Imperial Government's propaganda, which has everywhere made appeal to race prejudice and sordid interest, but never to the noble humanism that was once esteemed characteristic of German thought.

The evidence that the motives of the Imperial German Government are unscrupulous, predatory, and ruthless has become overwhelming. Its conspiracies envelop the world. They have been directed under the mask of friendship by official diplomacy on our own soil. They lay under tribute every quarter of the globe and seek partners in crime in both hemispheres. Such a power is the enemy of all mankind. At last the American people have come to understand this; but they have not, perhaps, even yet fully appreciated how America will be affected by the fate of Europe, for the fate of Europe will determine the fate of the world.

The President of the United States has said:

"We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering the war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval.

There is a commendable spirit of fairness in these words; yet it should not be overlooked that the German people are not without responsibility for the war and for its consequences. It is an error to suppose that the population of Germany is the victim of a system of oppression against which the people are in a state of mental revolt, that they do not sympathize with their Government, or that if they could, they would overthrow it as the people of Russia have overthrown the Romanoff autocracy. The German people have profited greatly in an economic sense from the creation of the empire; they believe in a strong government, and they have passively accepted without protest the Prussian domination. What may be called the directing class—the class that shapes and controls what passes for "public opinion" in Germany—is virtually unanimous in its support of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and it has

its own reasons for this devotion, for the emperor is a generous dispenser of honors, which Germans especially enjoy, and even has it in his power to give financial credit as well as public position to those whom he wishes to favor. The army and navy have come to be recognized constituents of the industrial and commercial system of the German Empire to a degree that has no parallel in any other country. They are regarded as the tentacles of foreign trade, the prehensile forces of national expansion. Add to this that every able-bodied male in Germany is trained for war, and taught that it is a "biological necessity," and it becomes, perhaps, possible to comprehend why the Imperial German Government has had—and so long as its plans bring success will probably continue to have—in whatever it does the support of the German nation. Nothing but evident failure to realize its projects of annexation and to satisfy the ambitions of the directing class can destroy its hold upon the country.

There is in Germany a residue of feudalism that exists to the same degree nowhere else in Europe. In matters of public interest the Prussian peasant is mere clay in the hands of his

Junker master. As much as possible—and his grinding toil renders the task easy—he is kept in ignorance of politics. To his simple mind the kaiser acts, as he professes to act, under divine direction, and all the peasant's religious convictions and emotions thus become imperial property. As a soldier he is a cheerful automaton, ready to "goose-step" anywhere the command is given him to go. As a citizen he is nil. When he votes he takes his cue from *"die Herrschaften,"* as he obsequiously calls his superiors.

In the cities the industrial workers and their leaders have developed a keen interest in political matters, but their political ideas are frequently nebulous and always largely theoretical, though often accompanied by brave and honest convictions for the most part suppressed. These are the elements from which are formed the Social Democrats. Occasionally the inner consciousness of these men overflows in public utterance, sometimes in the Reichstag itself, as when Karl Liebknecht said on December 2, 1914:

> I refuse the war credits demanded, at the same time protesting against the war, those responsible for it and directing it, against the capitalist policy which has in-

cited it, against the capitalist designs which it pursues, against the plans of annexation, against the violation of Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality, against the military dictatorship, against the forgetfulness of social and political duty of which the Government and the directing classes still at this time render themselves culpable.

For this attitude Liebknecht, though a member of the Reichstag, was sent to prison, and the text of his speech was never printed by the German newspapers. Those venturing to print it would have been suppressed.

This violation of parliamentary immunity in England, in France, or in the United States would of itself occasion a popular uprising. In Germany it sealed the lips of thousands who believed as Liebknecht did. "We are not, as you are, in the habit of reckoning with public opinion," said one of the most distinguished of the younger men in official life in Germany. "With us it does not count for anything. Opinion has never had any effect on policy. It resembles rather the chorus of antiquity, which looks on and comments upon an action unfolding around it. I should compare it," he concludes, "to a crowd that follows, but is not admitted to the game."

There is, of course, a difference between active aggressors and those who, without discriminating between their actions, give them loyal support. But it is the consequences rather than the motives of a national attitude with which other nations have to deal. So long, therefore, as the German people continue to support a war which their own directing class in moments of frank utterance confesses to be predatory, and still continues to advocate, the rest of the world must treat them as enemies not less than the Government which derives its strength from their support.

What then is the testimony of the Germans themselves regarding their aims and ambitions in this war? In a book of more than four hundred octavo pages, the Swiss publicist Grumbach has collected "Documents Published or Secretly Circulated in Germany Since August 4, 1914," bearing upon the annexation of conquered territory. In his preface he declares, "No competent person can dispute the fact that the war aims of Germany are of a nature to cause the greatest anxiety to the entire world."

Although the Imperial Government avoids as

much as possible committing itself to any definite declaration of policy, it allows and even encourages a popular demand for annexations and indemnities. Men of every party, of every class, and of every profession possessing influence in public affairs in Germany, have constantly voiced the demand for annexations which the Pan-Germanist literature had made before the war and often in the same terms. The expectations of spoils which rendered the war popular in Germany in the beginning have during every stage of its progress taken the form of urgency that they be realized at its close.

Not knowing just how the war will end, the Imperial Government dares not promise too much, but it does not hesitate to keep alive a popular approval of any conquests which the forces at its disposal may eventually enable it to make. "Compare," writes Grumbach, "the passivity which the authorities manifested when the Six Great Industrial and Agrarian Leagues circulated their famous annexationist petition without encountering the least obstacle, with the confiscation at the moment of its publication of the petition of the anti-annexationist league *Neues Vater-*

land, intended as a reply," followed by the gradual strangling of the anti-annexationist league under police surveillance, and the imprisonment of its secretary.

It is important also to note that the territory now claimed for annexation in the West is even in excess of that marked out for conquest by the Pan-German writers in 1911. "In the interest of our own existence," says the petition, "we ought to enfeeble France politically and economically, without scruple, and to render our military and strategic situation more favorable with regard to it. We are convinced that, to secure that end, a serious correction of our whole Western frontier, from Belfort to the coast, is necessary. We ought to do everything possible to conquer a part of the French coast, from the North to the Pas-de-Calais, in order to be assured from a strategic point of view against England, and to possess a better approach to the ocean." The German scientific experts, it is explained by one of the commentators on this extension of the frontier, were not aware in 1871 of the vast treasures of coal and iron that they had failed to claim!

The territory now demanded includes: in the

West, the whole of Belgium and the frontier territories of France, that is to say, the part of the coast almost to the Somme, with a *hinterland* assuring the complete economic and strategic exploitation of a port on the Channel, the iron-mine fields of Briey, the frontier fortresses with the lines of the Meuse, especially Verdun and Belfort, with the watershed west of the Vosges, between Verdun and Belfort; on the East, "at least" parts of the Baltic provinces and the territories to the South, in such a manner that the new acquisitions would protect first of all the present Prussian provinces the whole length of the frontiers of Eastern Prussia, and also the length of the frontiers of Western Prussia, of Posnania, and of Silesia.

To secure these advantages the six leagues stated in their manifesto that they did not desire a "premature peace"; for, "from such a peace," the petition runs, "one could not expect a sufficient fruit of victory"!

But, in addition to the defined areas of conquest, there are certain indefinite aspirations here set forth, "if it be possible to realize them"! These include "a colonial empire which would

fully satisfy the manifold economic interests of Germany, besides guarantees for our commercial future and the securing of a sufficient war indemnity, paid in an appropriate form."

This definition of what the war is really for, prepared in May, 1915, is signed by representatives of the League of Agriculturists, the League of German Peasants, the Directing Group of the Christian Associations of German Peasants, the Central Group of German Industrials, the League of Industrials, and the Union of the Middle Classes of the Empire, these being the six largest and most powerful economic groups in Germany. It is not pretended in this petition that the results demanded have already been brought within the power of the Imperial Government. It is a program of aims to be achieved before the war closes, and a confessed enlargement of the purposes with which it was begun. "These exigencies," it expressly states, "it is needless to say, depend upon the possibility that the army may realize them."

The reasons for these additional conquests are not that Belgium and France have forfeited these territories by making an attack upon Germany. The iron- and coal-fields specified are said to be

"indispensable not only for the existence of our industrial power, but they constitute military necessities"; that is, they are desired as new bases for future military activity. It is pointed out that "neutral industrial States are constrained to make themselves the tools of that one of the belligerents that can assure them a supply of coal." By possessing all the coal in Western Europe, Germany can better exercise that restraint. Germany, it is urged, has already been "obliged to have recourse to the Belgian production, in order to prevent our neutral neighbors from becoming dependent on England." Besides, in Belgium, it is explained, are found also "the fundamental elements of our principal explosives"; and "benzol, the only substitute for benzine, which we lack, and this is indispensable for submarines."

For these reasons Belgium and Northwestern France must belong to Germany. The native populations of these districts, it is insisted, "shall not be put in a position to obtain a political influence upon the destinies of the German Empire." It is also urged that "the existing means of economic power in these territories, including the medium and the great properties, shall be placed

in the hands of Germans, in a manner that shall require France to indemnify and recall the proprietors"!

Were these encouragements to depredation and conquest merely the spontaneous expression of the desires of these signatories, or were they indirectly inspired by the Imperial Government itself, with a view to making its conduct seem like the execution of a popular mandate? It is impossible conclusively to answer this question; but the attitude of the Imperial Government is certainly not one of hostility to the most extreme of these demands. The emperor, whose stake in this game is the greatest of all, is the least definite in statement; but his words might be interpreted as ultra-annexationist if circumstances should make that course seem expedient. He has expressed his desire for "a peace which would offer us the military, political, and economic guarantees of which we have need for the future, and which would fulfil all the conditions necessary to a free employment of our creative forces, at home as well as upon the sea." The King of Bavaria expressly wishes "a gate of exit direct from the Rhine to the sea," with "an enlargement of the Empire beyond its

present frontiers." The Duke of Mecklenburg demands "a powerful colonial empire in Africa, and a sufficient number of solid *points d'appui* on the terrestrial globe for our marine and our commerce, coaling stations and stations for wireless telegraphy." The former imperial chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, shrewdly limits his expectations to "all the powers and all the real guarantees possible"; but these, he insists, "must secure for Germany a position unshakably strong." The secretary for colonies, Dr. Solf, wishes the empire "to possess colonies in all the climatic zones, but without prejudice to possible territorial gains in Europe." The Prussian minister of the interior, Loebell, thinks, "The German empire ought to open a road by fire and blood to the point where it may fulfil its mission of world politics."

In the same spirit, but often much more definitely, speak innumerable privy counsellors, members of the Reichstag, university professors, military officers, diplomatists, and pastors, whose views are repeated and generally applauded by the press, with the exception of the Social Democratic organs, from the daily newspapers to the

serious reviews. The evidence is absolutely overwhelming that from the first months of the war the directing classes of Germany have been eager for territorial conquests.

In order to give some appearance of justice to these plans for imperial expansion at the expense of Belgium and France, the legend of a "conspiracy" to attack Germany and destroy her, of which England is charged with being the instigator, and France, Belgium, and Russia the eager instruments, has been persistently propagated in Germany and in the United States. As a penalty, runs the legend, for bringing this dreadful scourge of war upon peace-loving Germany, these guilty nations must repay her for the terrible sacrifices made by her brave sons and loyal subjects, who have given their lives and their treasures for the defense of the Fatherland. Not only territories, but money indemnities, are expected; and these last the imperial chancellor, as late as February 27, 1917, asserted are "necessary." This Government, which declared war on Russia and France; which ordered the invasion of Belgium; which authorized Austria-Hungary to subjugate

Serbia; which in July, 1914, rejected the proposals of Serbia and the Czar to submit the Austro-Serbian question to the Hague Tribunal; which has ruined and depopulated Belgium, annihilated Serbia, and devastated Poland,—this Government expects "indemnities for the wrongs inflicted upon Germany"; and, to give this extortion a color of justice, holds these countries up as the guilty culprits!

Note, for example, the attempt to heap calumnies upon Belgium for acting in self-defense. "Deputy Hirsch [Social Democrat]," cries the National-Liberal deputy, Dr. Friedberg, in the Prussian Landtag, in January, 1916,—"Deputy Hirsch desires that the political and economic independence of Belgium be restored. But we have no right to forget that Belgium was in no respect *the neutral country it appeared to be on August 2, 1914*"! And so a man who has been assassinated in his bed is to have his house plundered because it was discovered during the murder that he had tried to make previous arrangements with his neighbors for his protection against this very crime!

Germany, it is said, did not desire war. But

listen to Major-General Von Gebsattel, an eminent soldier-diplomat, who is not afraid to confess the truth to his fellow-officers. In October, 1915, he said:

> We have not wished the war to try seriously this time the efficiency of our quick-firing cannons and our machine-guns—of that we had a very exact idea, particularly we old soldiers;—we wished it because we understood our people were on the wrong road in their development, because we considered the war a necessity, and because we were besides aware that a war is easier—as much in its military course as for its minimum of sacrifices—when a people, in every fashion constrained to struggle for its existence, *is more resolute and more prompt to choose the moment favorable for aggression.*

Here is no attempt to conceal the fact that the present war was not only desired by the German officers, but that the time for it was opportunely chosen, yet not without serious miscalculations, and the whole progress of the war has shown how groundless and how ignoble the accusation of an international conspiracy is.

Realizing the futility of the conspiracy legend, the theologian Mumm, a Christian-Socialist deputy to the Reichstag, in the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten,* recommends that the conquest be

justified to the Germans and to the world by showing that historically, at some time in the past, Belgium—which he describes as "a mere political concept due to chance and the *pis-aller* of embarrassed diplomats"—and the other coveted lands were once parts of the German Empire. "Dip into the past," he urges, "in order to write that which should be known at present: the readers will understand well what inferences to draw, *when it is not possible to expose them openly.*" A truly ingenious method of concealing a cold-blooded national crime!

In some quarters it is considered almost treasonable to the empire to question the rectitude of forcible annexation. Calling to account the former secretary for the colonies, Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, for assuring the people of the United States, where he was on mission in May, 1915, that the promise of the imperial chancellor to restore the independence of Belgium after the war would be kept, the *Tägliche Rundschau* declared for home consumption: "If Herr Dernburg has really offered to our enemies—or the same as enemies—the voluntary evacuation of Belgium, that would be an unheard-of audacity, against

which it would be necessary to direct the most vehement protest. If he has, in fact, said that Germany cannot think of increasing its territory in Europe, that would be on his part an extraordinary presumption!" And the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten,* ridiculing the statement attributed to Dr. Dernburg that Germany would not forcibly subjugate neighboring peoples, doubts that he really made such a statement; for, it declares, "such a criterion would put an end to all political development and to all colonization."

The orthodox German doctrine on that subject, it seems, was stated by the chief of the National-Liberal party, Herr Bassermann, as early as December, 1914, when he said in the Reichstag: "We shall hold till the most remote future the countries fertilized by German blood. . . . We shall be able to keep what we have acquired, and to acquire in addition that of which we have need."

But we do not reach the final formula of German tribal ambition until we have received it from the chief of the Free Conservative party in the Prussian Landtag, Herr Zedlitz-Neukirch. He said:

If the peace we aim at is to be durable, all the territorial acquisitions which the General Staff deems necessary to shield us from the danger of a future war must be secured by that peace; and no regard for our adversaries, their country, or their people, should prevent our imposing these conditions, least of all the so-called right of the inhabitants of the territories that are to be conquered to dispose of themselves.

The purposes for which the war was begun having failed of accomplishment through an unexpected obstinacy of resistance on the part of the Entente Allies, the problem of negotiating a peace has become a serious one for the Imperial German Government. Not to make any annexations or collect any indemnities beyond the levies extorted from Belgium and Poland during military occupation, would signify a defeat of the German plans. To this kind of a settlement all those responsible for the war quite naturally object, and desire no relinquishment of territory occupied and no abatement of frightfulness, in the hope that the Allies may soon be disunited or exhausted, thus leaving Germany the victor. The Hohenzollern dynasty, having taken the responsibility of this vast predatory enterprise, cannot, however, save its face without showing

some justification for the "sacrifices" imposed upon the people of Germany. So long as the Allies continue their opposition, this embarrassment will endure; and in the meantime two changes are occurring in the minds of the German people: a growing weariness of the war as a result of exhaustion, and a gradual enlightenment regarding the responsibility for a war which the mass of the German people believed at its beginning was forced upon the empire by a combination of hostile powers. As a result, the desire for peace even without annexations and indemnities at first insisted upon by a group of Social Democrats is rapidly becoming the sentiment of the country, with the exception of the Junker class and the military and industrial imperialists, whose very existence as a dominating caste in the empire depends upon the continued alliance of private business with dynastic and military power. Between these instigators of predatory war and the peace-loving people of Germany the former imperial chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, anxious to save the dynasty, hesitated to formulate the Imperial Government's terms of peace, and to the end of his administration he adhered to

his ambiguous formula, "All the pawns and all the real guarantees possible."

The embarrassment is not, and is not likely to be, greatly relieved by changes in the persons holding office under the house of Hohenzollern. The aims and interests always remain the same, and the naming by the emperor of new ministers serves only to postpone the real issues of reform and the definition of policy. It means little that the Reichstag has by a large majority declared, "We are driven by no lust of conquest," or that it professes to repudiate "forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic, and financial violations," for the Reichstag is not the Imperial German Government. On the contrary, it has again and again vindicated its title to be called a "hall of echoes." Installed in the seat of power by the military party, the successor of Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. Michaelis, speaking with all the authority of the emperor in what the family councils have decided to be the interest of the dynasty, has said, "The constitutional rights of the head of the Empire must not be endangered, and I am not willing to permit any one to take the reins out of my hands."

Impotent as the Reichstag may be as an expression of the will of the German people, one fact is evident, and is of the highest importance: the Imperial Government is confronted with a greater problem in the making of peace than it has ever had to face in the prosecution of the war. The reason for this is that the Imperial Government can no longer conceal the alliance between predatory business and military power which brought on the war.

Between the demand on the one side that the real objects of the war be fulfilled by annexations, and on the other that the professions of the Imperial Government that it was purely defensive be established in the making of peace, the house of Hohenzollern is loaded with a heavy responsibility. It cannot safely disappoint the alliance between the army and the predatory class; and it cannot conveniently confess to the loyal subjects who have believed its professions and been brought to the brink of ruin by the war, that it has deliberately deceived them. Yet this is the choice that lies before it.

The peril of the situation is frankly confessed by at least one German statesman of the highest

character, Prince Alexander von Hohenlohe. His wise and brave utterances are worthy of the son of the imperial German chancellor, who in 1899, during the first Hague Conference—at the instance of the American ambassador at Berlin and first delegate to the conference, Hon. Andrew D. White, who sent a messenger to Berlin for the purpose—warned the emperor of the lasting injury he would inflict upon Germany if he allowed the German delegates to block the proposals for the formation of an international tribunal,—as they had been instructed to do,—and succeeded in obtaining a reluctant withdrawal of open opposition.

Prince von Hohenlohe, with similar foresight, takes the ground that jockeying for spoils of war, instead of frankly stating Germany's desire for peace, is a shortsighted policy. He holds that for the German people, as for all others, the highest and the only true reward for the sacrifices made in the war is the assurance of an enduring peace; and such a peace cannot be based on the spoils of war which Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and his successor are hoping to secure, but must be founded upon a just and hon-

orable settlement which will leave behind it no sentiments of future revenge. Nothing, he holds, could in reality so strengthen the empire, within as well as without, as the establishment of such a peace.

The German people, he believes, when fully instructed, will draw the proper lessons from the war. It may be well for them, he thinks, to realize that their own government was in the first place responsible for the war; but, he contends, they will not permit foreign interference in their political organization.

It required more than ordinary courage for the prince to say publicly, in reply to the clerical deputy, Spahn:

> Without doubt, the majority of the German nation is still monarchist. The different peoples of Germany still hold to their princes, more or less, according to the individual character of the sovereigns. But that confidence in the supreme chief of the Empire is still entirely intact is an affirmation which, after three years of war, cannot be maintained. . . . Confidence in the direction of the Empire has begun to disappear among the German people. . . . They begin to ask themselves how it happens that nearly all the world is in arms against us, and who is responsible for it.

With regard to the attitude of the German masses toward terms of peace, the prince proceeds to say:

> The German people as a whole do not demand the annexation of foreign territories. Only little groups of industrials and the superheated Pan-Germans, who are not recruited from the masses of the population, but from the circles of professors, functionaries, and burghers, desire annexations. Herr Scheidemann has been called to order because he pronounced the word "Revolution" from the tribune in the Reichstag. And yet he has only repeated what may be heard every day on the street. He also added, "We have not yet arrived at that point." But it would be puerile to dissimulate what might come of it, if the men who hold in their hands the destinies of the German Empire are not of sufficient proportions to carry the responsibilities that are placed upon them, to recognize the necessities of the new times, and to take account of them. In that case the moment might well come when they would recognize with terror that it is too late, and that the German people have finally lost patience.

While the war lasts it will be difficult for any German to oppose the Imperial Government, but it is evident that there are in Germany inevitable tendencies toward profound political changes. The nature and extent of these will depend largely upon the results of the war. If the Allies were

overcome or disunited, the triumph of autocracy would be complete. No one in Germany could resist the effect of victorious armies returning in triumph from the field and a peace dictated by successful imperialism. On the other hand, the house of Hohenzollern is preparing for a different contingency. The emperor, always sensitive to deep-seated popular movements, notwithstanding his strident proclamations that his royal prerogatives are "from God alone," has already proposed "a people's kingdom of the Hohenzollerns," in the faith, it would appear, that a right conferred by the people might be better than none at all, and with a growing suspicion that the people, in the end, if the armies are beaten, will be more powerful than he has supposed them to be. In that case, it would be as expedient to disavow new ministers as it was to end the tight-rope performance of Bethmann-Hollweg. The negotiations for reform would have only to be resumed, for this house of Hohenzollern is a shrewd race of traders, which from a Swabian lordship over a village of peasants has known how to raise itself to the eminence of empire by an alternation of bloodshed and bargain, and would per-

haps rather reign by the will of the people than to follow in the footsteps of the Romanoff retirement.

With what ease in an extremity the Imperial Government might carry on negotiations for "a people's kingdom of the Hohenzollerns" is illustrated by the interest taken when the same Herr Scheidemann who pronounced the word "Revolution" in the Reichstag was engaged with approval in sounding through socialistic channels the possibilities of a separate peace with Russia, and won even from the annexationist press the compliment that he "was in a fair way to become a statesman." Yet it was Herr Scheidemann who had boldly enunciated the doctrine that "the annexation of the territory of a foreign population constitutes a violation of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves." This would be new doctrine to the house of Hohenzollern; but, if the army should fail, it would not be surprising if the world were given to understand that the emperor, as some have contended, had been forced into the war by his own officers and their confederates against his will! The historian may some day be able to produce the evidence that this

is true. If this should prove to be the case, it would be the end of Prussianism, but would it not be the end of imperialism also?

Whatever may be the disclosures of the future, it cannot be doubted that this is the main issue of the Great War—the right of peoples to dispose of themselves. If this fundamental right is conceded, there is a solid foundation for the new Europe when the peace congress meets to determine the future; for this right involves the repudiation of autocracy, giving the state an ethical basis, and at the same time implies the existence of the inherent obligation of every people to respect that right in others.

Unhappily, this doctrine has not yet been clearly enunciated as a principle of public law. In Germany it is still disputed. The eminent professor of law in the University of Berlin, Dr. Joseph Kohler, writes:

> The irresistible force of war and conquest takes possession of countries and peoples. That is one of the fundamental principles of international law, and it suffices to make litter of the old sentimentalities. . . . It is needless to be disquieted over the superfluous sentiment regarding a plebiscite, in virtue of which it is of importance to

consult the population to know if it wishes to belong to one state or another. The territory carries with it the population that inhabits it; the individual who is not satisfied has only to quit the territory of the State. . . . The rational assent of a people has hardly any sense; the impulsive forces of the popular soul repose the greater part of the time below the threshold of reason and reflection. Thus it is all reduced to force, an inflexible domination.

This is Prussianism, which is at once a philosophy, an institution, and above all an army. It is the apotheosis of autocratic power. It has created the Prussian state, and the logical policy of the Prussian state is the domination of the world. "World dominion or downfall"—that is the declared alternative that runs through the desperate plotting and remorseless barbarism with which Prussia is leading to ruin one of the greatest nations on the earth.

Historically, Prussia may justly claim that Europe has never formally repudiated the doctrine of the right of conquest, and that virtually every state has at some time practised it. This cannot be disputed, and it is important that it should not be forgotten, for the time has now arrived to determine permanently whether arbitrary force or the generally accepted principles of justice are to

constitute the basis of European civilization. If the Central powers are to be judged by their conduct, and the Allied powers by their professions, this is really the fundamental issue between them. If the future of Europe and of the civilized world is to rest upon the assumption that a powerful state, in order to satisfy its economic ambitions, may take possession of the territory and people of a weaker state by military force, and appropriate the land and the people to its purposes, then all Europe and all the world is already Prussianized in principle and will soon be Prussianized in fact. It would be encouraging to believe that only the Central Powers and their Turkish and Bulgarian allies accept this principle.

It was the menaced application of the Prussian theory of international relationship to the United States that finally clarified the vision of the American people and enabled them to perceive that neutrality toward an empire holding, practising, and plotting to extend and perpetuate that theory is impossible. They had hesitated to avenge their dead, cruelly slaughtered on the high seas; they had been reluctant to join in what seemed to be a European quarrel; they believed that the German

nation would itself rise in denunciation of such enormities as it had been led into perpetrating; they waited long for this in the faith that a whole people—a people that had risen to such heights of excellence in many forms of civilization—could not always be blinded by leaders who defied all the nations of the earth to check what they deemed to be their irresistible force; but thus far they have waited in vain.

Those who best know Germany and the Germans do not look for a general revolution while the German armies are not beaten in the field. Revolt against the existing system is not only extremely perilous for the persons who may propose it, but it is in the German character to be loyal to the Imperial Government while their country is believed to be still in peril. Not until the whole ghastly truth dawns upon them regarding the atrocities committed in their name, how they themselves have been deceived; what cruel wrongs have been done to their sons and brothers in leading them to the shambles for the acquisition of ports, and mines, and war indemnities, and that this has brought only disaster, debt, and shame upon them, will the German people cry

out for a more responsible control of their own destinies and a reorganization of international life upon a basis of peace through justice. Already isolated voices have been heard demanding these changes. The protests have come mainly from the Social Democrats, but it is not they alone who are aware that Germany stands before the rest of the world as a convicted culprit whose good name has been lost through an unholy alliance between private greed and the weird priest-craft of divine prerogative, a partnership which has decked out an altar of sacrifice in the name of religion in order to give to military power a sacramental sanction for the commission of wholesale crime.

That which has made it possible for this alliance to obtain the support of the German people is the representation that Germany is the victim of the selfish designs of other powers, and that a fair field for German industry and commerce and the safety of Germany from future attack could be secured only by fighting. So long as this is believed to be true, the Imperial Government will not improbably be able to command support even

from those who do not approve of aggressive designs on the part of Germany.

The pathway to peace therefore leads in the direction of better guarantees of justice to all nations. So long as purely national interests are made preëminent, military rivalry will be considered justified. It is therefore to be desired that the fruits of victory in this war shall be international fruits. No nation should be permitted in the great settlement to place its private interests above the general welfare. Each nation involved in the Great War had, no doubt, its own special national interests to serve in entering it; but it cannot truthfully be said that the Entente Allies had ends in view that were not just. Russia was vindicating the right of Serbia to a judicial hearing. France was Russia's ally and a designated victim of German attack. England was a pledged defender of Belgian neutrality, and Belgium was ruthlessly subjugated in violation of solemn treaty obligations made to the United States as well as to the European powers. America's entrance into the war was a response to repeated warlike aggressions and secret plots di-

rected against its industries, its neutral rights, and its territorial integrity. As the President has well said: "We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind." But this championship of the highest human interests would be illusory and nugatory if the treaties of peace were in any respect embodiments of the doctrines against which we are contending, no matter in whose interest they might be invoked. The cause for which we are fighting would be lost if there remained in the field any bully or any braggart reasserting a right to claim territory or to enslave a people on the mere ground of conquest by superior military force. The American people are not participating in this struggle for the purpose of setting any European nation above another.

There will be questions of reparation, of restoration, and of guarantees for the future, but these adjudications should be made on judicial principles and not merely on military grounds.

Claims for damages and for advantages made by the belligerents might very well be submitted to the judgment of others before they are pressed as final conditions of settlement. If there is to be a durable peace, the idea of internationalizing the results of the war must receive an immense development. The victory of the Allies will not belong to one, but to all; and the sooner the fact of community of interest and a disposition to submit to collective judgment can be established in the minds of the belligerents, the sooner will peace be possible, and the more just and lasting it will be. Only in this spirit can the seas and oceans of the world be made freely accessible and safe for all nations. Many routes of transit that have hitherto been closed to the nations shut off from the sea will need to be opened, and the backward nations of the world must be treated as the wards in common of those more advanced in civilization.

Nothing could contribute more effectually to a termination of the war than a frank disavowal of exclusive national gains. The exemplary spirit of renunciation manifested by Russia and the known absence of selfish purposes on the part

of the United States might well inspire such a disavowal. A clear statement of the principles of public law which it is desirable to establish for the future, with a solemn compact to observe and sustain them, would be an appropriate preliminary to the negotiations for peace. The whole world would then be in a position to express its voluntary adherence to those principles. Such a compact would necessarily involve the repudiation of the right of conquest for the purpose of acquiring territory by military force from an independent state, and its infamous corollary that the population goes with the land and becomes subject to the will of the conqueror; for the only foundation upon which Europe can be reconstructed as a society of states is the inviolability of its law-abiding members.

History will judge the nations involved in the Great War much less by the motives with which they profess to have entered into it than by the results they finally bring out of it.

If the signatories of the treaty of peace base its terms upon secret compacts for aggrandizement, and go forth from the peace congress with new secret engagements in their pockets, the idea

of a new Europe will prove but a dream, and it will be with the old Europe in a new guise that America will still have to live.

The American people will doubtless support their Government in joining a league of peace, but they will expect from it a genuine purpose of peace and not an occasion for brewing new conflicts into which the United States or other American countries would be drawn.

At least one English writer has hastily assumed that

> President Wilson has offered to guarantee a league of peace and to back international treaties by the promise that America will in the last resort intervene against the aggressor and the treaty-breaker. In other words, she stands security for such treaties in the future. Her intervention is a new fact, a guarantee of a kind with which the past was unacquainted.

Such a guarantee would, indeed, be "a new fact," but of a kind with which the future also is likely to be unacquainted. The President has of course made no such pledge. No intelligent statesman would "stand security"—knowing how treaties are sometimes made—for treaties he had not previously approved.

A league of peace there will no doubt be; but such a league cannot at the same time be a league for future wars, either in the military or the economic sense. Guarantees must be required from all and equally, but the best guarantee will be a new community of interest, based on the award to each signatory of the treaty of peace of equal rights and the requirement of equal duties.

The American people desire to oppose aggression and treaty-breaking; but, if they are wise, they will not pledge their Government, under the pretext of enforcing peace, either to make war on other nations, or to submit to war as a legal act if made upon itself, in circumstances wholly unknown at the time when the covenant for peace is made.

The true wisdom is for America to associate itself in good faith with the forces that seek for peace with justice in the world; but, in order to perform effectively its part, the first duty is always to be able to defend itself.

INDEX

Absolutism, 13–16
Agrarian leagues, 251
Alldeutscher Verband, 91
Althusius, Johannes, on sovereignty, 17–18
Annexations proposed by Germany, 250–262
Armaments, limitation of, 125–126
Austin, John, referred to, 51
Australia, 117
Austria-Hungary, as part of Central Europe, 153–165
  the weak point in Prussia's plans, 168
Autocracy, cases of, 227–228
  indictment of, 214–215
  mysticism of, 216–217
  subsists on war, 231
  wanting a moral foundation, 221

Backward nations, 279
Bagdad railway, referred to, 169, 126
Balkan States, future fate of the, 155, 169, 237
Bassermann, German deputy, quoted, 262
Belgium, invasion of, 77
  future fate of, 169
  neutrality of, 277
  retention of by Germany, 259
Berchtold, Count, telegram from, 129
Bethmann-Hollweg, referred to, 170, 172, 257, 258, 264, 265
Bismarck, Prince von, referred to, 86, 87, 98, 140, 142, 152, 166
Bodin, Jean, referred to, 15
Bonaparte, Napoleon, referred to, 15, 117, 176
British Empire, creation of, 36
  neutrality of expected, 126–127
  transformation of, 115–116, 121
Bryce, Viscount, quoted or referred to, 108–109, 114
Bülow, Prince von, quoted or referred to, 85–103, 141–142
Bundesrat, powers of the German, 143–144
Byzantinism in Germany, 144

Canada, 117–119
Catherine II, attitude regarding Poland, 77
Central Europe, referred to, 151–157, 161–169
Chéradame, André, referred to, 102
China, interventions in, 121, 184

Christendom, failure of to unite Europe, 3–4, 10, 27
Coal, importance of to political control, 255
Commerce, relation of to peace and war, 24–35
Commonwealth of nations, a vision of a, 104
Conferences, how organized, 188, 190, 192
of business men, 204–206
See also The Hague Conferences
Conquest, the right of, 20–22, 273
Constantinople, the fall of, 3
Courts, international, 68, 193–195
Crucé, Emeric, referred to, 175
Cuba, Germany's desire to possess, 99
Culture, the true nature of, 64–66
Curia, the Roman, 4
Czar of Russia, the, telegram from, 127
referred to, 137

Daily Telegraph, referred to, 142
Declaration of Independence, omission of sovereignty in, 179–180
Democracy, a basis for international law, 227
a constructive principle, 208
dangers of, 32
involves a principle of self-abnegation, 221–222
no alliance of with autocracy, 226
the testing time of, 116, 133
the war of, 108–111
Dernberg, Dr. Bernhard, referred to, 261–262
Diplomacy, the function of, 199
Divine right, the dogma of, 228, 276
Dominions, the British, 117–119
Dreadnaughts, the first building of, 125
Dynasties, abolition of, 8
secret solidarity of, 9
struggle of with feudalism, 12

Economic imperialism, 170, 200–203, 229
Egypt, British attitude in, 125
"Encirclement" of Germany, alleged policy of, 98, 125, 258
Entente Allies, aims of, 84–85, 109–110, 120, 274, 277
Evolution, political, 67

Faustrecht, 4
Fénelon, quoted, 175
Fetials, college of, 9
Feudalism, character of, 12
Fichte, referred to, 46
Fisher, Mr. Andrew, quoted, 119
Frederick II, of Prussia, quoted or referred to, 77, 166
"Freedom of the seas," meaning of, 122

Friedberg, German deputy, referred to, 259
French Revolution, referred to, 15, 19, 46

Gebsattel, Major-General von, quoted, 260
George III, attitude toward Poland, 77
George V, referred to, 130
German Emperor, declaration of war by the, 127
powers ascribed to the, 141
See also William II
German Empire, aspiration for world power by the, 122–124
constitution of the, 143–144
efficiency of the in war, 147
the transfiguration of the, 136–142, 145–146, 153, 171
"Germanic liberties," referred to, 140
Government, the purpose of, 44
ownership as an economic corporation, 24
Greater Germany, 93–96
Greece, the future fate of, 169
Greek Empire, the fall of the, 4–5
Grey, Sir Edward, telegrams from, 128–129
Grotius, Hugo, referred to, 13
Grumbach, S., publicist, quoted, 250
Guarantees of peace, 278, 281–282

Hague Conferences, The, 20, 83, 125, 136–137, 189–191
Hamburg to Bagdad route, see Bagdad railway
Hapsburg, house of, referred to, 8, 154
Harms, Professor, referred to, 151
Hegel, referred to, 42–52, 63, 139
Helgoland, 124
Hirsch, German deputy, referred to, 259
Hohenlohe, Prince Alexander, quoted, 267–269
Hohenzollern, house of, referred to, 89, 246, 263–266, 270–271
Holland, future fate of, 155, 169
Holy Alliance, the, 19, 178
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, 154
Humanism, struggle of with tribalism, 5, 10

Ideals, international, 38, 41, 66
Imperialism, dynastic, 73–74
economic, 68–69, 70–71, 84, 120–121
See also Economic imperialism
Industrialism, modern, 24, 30–35
International ideals, the realization of, 66
Internationalism, repudiation of by Germany, 138, 148–149
International law, development of, 27
existence of, 56–57
not wholly disregarded, 58–62

limitations of, 193, 198–199, 204
International organization, 40, 172–174, 187
International right, repudiated by Tannenberg, 96
defied by absolutism, 182–183
International unions, 199–200

Japan, referred to, 241, 244
Judicial decisions, enforcement of, 196–197
See also Courts

Kant, quoted or referred to, 14, 43–50, 176
Kiel Canal, referred to, 124
Kohler, Dr. Joseph, quoted, 272
Kultur, the "holy" mission of, 90–91, 166
See also Culture

Law, origin of, 215–216
nature of, 49, 61
supremacy of, 4
See also International law
Law, Mr. Bonar, referred to, 115
Laws, of struggle, survival, and selection, 173
League to enforce peace, 176, 281
"Liberty of national evolution," meaning of, 122
Liebknecht, Karl, quoted or referred to, 248–249
Liszt, Franz von, quoted, 122
Loebell, German minister, referred to, 257
Locke, referred to, 14
Louis XIV, referred to, 175
Louis XV, attitude on Poland, 77
Lycurgus, "the modern," 175

Machiavelli, referred to, 11, 21, 22
Maria Theresa, attitude on Poland, 78
Mark Brandenburg, referred to, 151
Marriage, effect of in forming nation-states, 8
Mexico, referred to, 241, 244
Gulf of, 100
Meyer, Professor Edward, quoted or referred to, 136–138, 141–142, 146–149
Michaelis, German chancellor, declaration of, 265
Militarism, alliance of with industry and commerce, 30–31, 34–35
Mittel-Europa, referred to, 151–152
Moltke, Field-marshal von, referred to, 166
Montesquieu, referred to, 14, 175
Muir, Professor Ramsey, quoted, 121
Mumm, German deputy, quoted 260–261

Nation, what is a? 226
National monarchies, 5, 6, 12
Nation-states, formation of 6
not accidents, 7
not of pure race, 7
unity of, 7

Naumann, Dr. Friedrich, German deputy, quoted or referred to, 151–169
Neues Vaterland, anti-annexationist league, 251
Neutrality, nature of, 21–22
New Zealand, 117

"Open door," the, 206
Ottoman Empire, establishment of in Europe, 3
future fate of, 169
reference to, 111, 244

Palace of peace, 137
Pan-German propaganda, 146, 151, 191, 251–252
Pax Romana, 4
Peace congress of the future, 158
enforcement of, 62, 63, 197, 281–282
first article of a treaty of, 134–135
repudiation of by Tannenberg, 93
the pathway to, 277
under absolutism an "empty dream," 48
Penn, William, referred to, 175
Personality, as a basis of rights, 43, 50, 223
claims of, 65
development of, 63
Phillips, Alison, quoted, 178
Poland, partition of, 77
Protection of citizens abroad, duty of, 202–203
Prussia, domination of, 88–91, 141–151, 166–169
King of German emperor, 143
official philosophy of, 103
origin of, 150
Prussianism, defined, 273
Prussian peasant, political ignorance of the, 247–248

Reparation after the war, 278
Restoration, after the war, 278
Reichstag, Declaration by the German, 265
limited powers of the German, 143–144, 266
Rhodes, Cecil, referred to, 154
Rights, the foundation of, 51
Roman law, 4, 9, 12
republic and unjust wars, 9
effects of, 4, 5
Romanoff dynasty, the, referred to, 246
Rousseau, J. J., referred to, 14
Russia, revolution in, 115, 246, 279

Saint-Pierre, the Abbé de, referred to, 176
Sarajevo, the assassination at, 112
Sazanoff, Mr., telegram from, 128–129
Scandinavian Kingdoms, the future fate of the, 155, 169, 237
Scheidemann, Herr, German deputy, 269, 271
Seeley, Sir John, referred to, 36
Sifton, Sir Clifford, quoted, 116
Six Great Leagues, for annexation, referred to, 251, 254

"Social consciousness," 220
Social Democrats, in Germany, 248, 257, 264, 276
"Social solidarity," 219
Society of States, a real, 106–107
Solf, Dr., German colonial minister, referred to, 257
Sovereignty, absolute conception of, 12, 14, 16
  Althusius' conception of, 17–18
  as substance of the State, 10
  consequences of the absolute conception of, 27
  definition of, 14
  idea of unchanged by French Revolution, 24
  in American sense, 179–181, 188
  in constitutional states, 55–56
  necessary limitation of, 183–184, 188, 191
  reconstruction of the idea of, 234
South Africa, 117
Spahn, Dr., German deputy, referred to, 268
Spencer, Herbert, referred to, 30
State, a business corporation, 31–32
  absolute conception of the, 12–13
  democratic conception of the, 217–219
  fiduciary function of the, 153
  fundamental function of the, 54
  irresponsibility of the, in the absolutist conception, 26
  modern demands upon the, 29
  nature of the modern national, 25
  Professor Meyer's conception of the German, 138, 139
  revised views of the, 79
  theories of the, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48
  Treitschke's idea of the, 155
States, constitutional, 68
  responsibility of, 37
  the society of, 106, 107
Submarine warfare, 238–243
Sully's alleged "Great Design," referred to, 176
Switzerland, coexistence of different races in, 66
  future fate of, 155, 169, 237
  taxation in, 60

Tannenberg, Otto Richard, quoted or referred to, 91–100
Thirty Years' War, referred to, 175
Trade rivalry, 33–34
Treaties, German drafts of future, 101–102
Treitschke, referred to, 155
Trench defenses in the future, 160–161
Tribalism, struggle of humanism with, 5
Tribunals, international, see Courts
Troppau, the Conference of, 19
Trusts, international, 207
Turkey, intervention in, 184

relation of to Germany, 97
See also Ottoman Empire

Unions, international, 199–200
United States of America, international law in the, 56
reasons of the for entering the Great War, 236–245, 274
Utrecht, Congress of, 175

Vienna, Congress of, 19, 157
Villari, referred to, 11

War, the unlimited right to wage, 19–21
Wars, duration of modern, 74–76
results of trade rivalry, 34
Waterways, 206, 279
Wellington, Duke of, referred to, 117
Weltpolitik, German dream of, 92
Westphalia, Peace of, its effect, 76
treaties of, 13
William I, German emperor, referred to, 142
William II, telegram from, 131
revolt against produced by *Daily Telegraph* incident, 142
See also German Emperor
White, Hon. Andrew D., referred to, 267
Wilson, President, quoted or referred to, 243, 246, 278, 281

Zanzibar, 124
Zedlitz-Neukirch, Prussian deputy, quoted, 262–263
Zimmermann, Herr, German Secretary for foreign affairs, quoted, 240–241
Zeppelin air-ships, 126

5139

THIS BOOK MAY BE KEPT

14 Days

and may be renewed if not called for by someone else.

A fine of 2 cents per day is charged if the book is kept after the last date stamped below.

DUE	DUE	DUE
NO 20 '48		
DE 4 '48		
DE 13 '48		
NOV 18 '59		
JAN 21 '64		
MAR 31 1995		

H. A. IRONSIDE
MEMORIAL LIBRARY

~~242~~
940.3
H551r Hill, David Jayne 5838
The rebuilding of Europe

WITHDRAWN

Author/BCL